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ABSTRACT 
CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: A DEFENCE OF ALVIN PLANTINGA’S 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
 
I argue (1) that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and (2) that, contrary to the 
Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use 
Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way 
that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for (1), I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman 
case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I 
then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each of which attempts to 
demonstrate that his conditions for warrant are neither necessary nor sufficient. Having 
defended the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I present and expand his key 
arguments to the effect that naturalism cannot make use of it. These arguments provide the 
conceptual tools that are needed to argue for (2): that there are certain world religions that 
cannot legitimately use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to demonstrate that their beliefs could be 
warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted.  
 
Tyler Dalton McNabb                                                                                                           
Advisors: Victoria Harrison and Adam Rieger                                                                                         
School of Humanities           
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Chapter 1: Alvin Plantinga and his Theory of Warrant 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Alvin Plantinga is one of the most influential philosophers of our time.1 He is widely 
regarded as having influenced the revival of theism in Western philosophy.2 In light of his 
work, the University of Pittsburgh recently awarded Plantinga the very prestigious 
Nicholas Rescher Prize for Contributions to Systematic Philosophy.3 Recognition of 
Plantinga’s influence also extends beyond academia to the general public. Christianity 
Today calls Plantinga ‘the greatest philosopher of the last century,’4 and Time hails him as 
‘America’s leading philosopher on God.’5  
 
How has Plantinga become so influential within Western philosophy? Plantinga’s 
influence has been spread through several works that are, each in their own right, historic 
contributions to various fields in philosophy. In the field of metaphysics, Plantinga’s The 
Nature of Necessity6 was one of the first extended works to emerge about modalities. After 
defending the concepts of essence and accident and exploring the concept of modality, 
Plantinga applies his theories about these to the ontological argument for the existence of 
God and to the problem of evil. Plantinga’s modal ontological argument, even if deemed to 
be ultimately unsuccessful, has been recognized as breathing new life into a dead 
argument. In regard to the problem of evil, Plantinga has moved the literature from 
                                                          
1 See James Beilby, Epistemology As Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology 
(Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), i. 
 
2 See Quinton Smith’s comment on the back cover of William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland’s The 
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
 
3 Myrana Anderson, ‘Plantinga Wins Prestigious Rescher Prize,’ last modified December 6, 2012, accessed 
October 28th, 2013, http://www.calvin.edu/news/archive/plantinga-wins-prestigious-rescher-prize. 
 
4 John Stackhouse, ‘Mind Over Skepticism,’ last modified June 11, 2001, accessed October 27, 2014, 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/june11/19.74.html. 
 
5 ‘Modernizing the Case for God,’ Time, last modified April 7, 1980, accessed June, 2016. 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921990,00.html. 
 
6 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).  
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discussing the ancient logical problem of evil to a lively and fruitful discussion of the 
evidential problem of evil.7  
 
In addition to these major contributions to metaphysics and philosophy of religion, 
Plantinga is responsible for significant developments in the field of epistemology; and it is 
in this area that his work has achieved widest acclaim. For example, Richard Foley states, 
‘[t]his [i.e., Plantinga’s work on warrant]…is one of the major accomplishments of 
twentieth-century epistemology.’8 Jonathan Kvanvig agrees in praising Plantinga’s work. 
He writes that, ‘[o]f sustained attempts to understand these concepts [i.e., justification, 
proper functionalism, internalism, and externalism] Plantinga’s…work on the nature of 
warrant stands out...as the very best.’9 Similarly, Laurence BonJour states, ‘I have learned 
and will continue to learn a great deal from these tightly argued, extremely knowledgeable, 
and also highly entertaining volumes.’10 Perhaps Ernest Sosa captures it best as he 
describes Plantinga’s volumes on warrant as ‘[a]n important contribution which will be 
widely stimulating and influential for years to come.’11 
 
But even granting the wide influence that Plantinga’s work in epistemology has 
enjoyed, it is still legitimate to step back from the accolades of praise and ask if there are 
good reasons for thinking that he gives us a plausibly true theory of warrant. To begin to 
answer this question, I will give an overview of each book of Plantinga’s trilogy. Due to 
the scope of this chapter, I will give a meaningful exposition of Plantinga’s work without 
giving an in-depth or tedious analysis. Though I will pay special attention to the last book, 
Warranted Christian Belief, as it is the most relevant for my project. I will review popular 
objections to this third volume and examine how Plantinga has responded to them. The 
objections considered include the evidential argument from evil, the problem of religious 
                                                          
7 For the logical problem of evil, see J.L. Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence,’ Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200-
212. For the evidential problem of evil, see Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument from Evil 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
 
8 On the back cover of Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant: The Current Debate (New York.: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
 
9 Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of 
Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), vii. 
 
10 Laurence BonJour, ‘Plantinga on Knowledge and Proper Function,’ in Warrant in Contemporary 
Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 47. 
 
11 On the back cover of Plantinga’s Warrant: The Current Debate, op. cit. 
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diversity, and the Great Pumpkin Objection. After explaining these objections and 
discussing how Plantinga has responded to them, I will attend to, what I call, the Pandora’s 
Box Objection. In comparison to the above mentioned objections, the Pandora’s Box 
Objection has received the least attention, even though, I take it, it deserves the most. I will 
then lay out my two-part thesis, which I will defend in the chapters that follow. My two-
part thesis will pertain, first, to defending proper functionalism simpliciter and second, to 
responding to the Pandora’s Box Objection. I begin, then, with a brief overview of the first 
book of the trilogy.  
 
 
1.1 Warrant: The Current Debate 
 
Warrant: The Current Debate can best be understood by breaking it down into three 
sections. The first three chapters are a critique of internalism—which, in its simplest form, 
is the view that in order for a subject, s, to be warranted in believing p, s must have internal 
access to the properties which confer warrant. The middle section is a critique of 
coherentism—which is the view that what grounds the warrant for a belief, p, is p’s 
coherence with other beliefs. The last section critically engages with different reliabilist’s 
theories—which roughly state that either s has a warranted belief, p, iff, s reliably produces 
belief that p, or s has a warranted belief, p, iff, s’s belief that p is in the right statistical 
relationship with p. By arguing that such theories of warrant are implausible, Plantinga’s 
overall goal is to pave the way for his second book, Warrant and Proper Function.12 He 
makes this clear by declaring that his, ‘ultimate aim is to come to a satisfying and accurate 
account of warrant.’13  
 
It is important to note that what Plantinga means by warrant is: that ingredient that 
separates mere true belief from knowledge. I could believe that the Philadelphia 76ers will 
go 82-0 after only winning a few games the previous season, but unless there was a 
dramatic roster change, few people would dare call this belief knowledge, even if it did 
turn out to be true. Warrant is supposed to be that thing, which, when added, will turn mere 
true belief into knowledge.14 
                                                          
12 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York.: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 
13 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, op. cit., vii. 
 
14 Historically, justification combined with true belief was considered sufficient for knowledge. This changed 
in light of Gettier cases. This will be discussed further in chapter two. 
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 In establishing, to his satisfaction, that there are no plausibly true internalist 
theories of warrant, Plantinga spends Chapter one giving a traditional view of internalism 
through examining the works of Descartes and Locke.15 He argues that through studying 
the early internalists one can derive a particular consensus about what the core beliefs of 
traditional internalism are. Namely, that epistemic justification is entirely within one’s 
power, that objective and subjective epistemic duties coincide, and that one cannot be 
mistaken if a belief is justified.16  
 
After systematizing internalism through examining the works of its early 
proponents, Plantinga continues his discussion by dissecting Rodrick Chisholm’s early 
version of it. Plantinga interprets Chisholm to be suggesting that at the heart of warrant is 
the fulfilment of one’s epistemic duty; he thus holds him to be in company with Descartes 
and Locke.17 Subsequent to this exposition of Chisholm’s view, Plantinga attempts to show 
how the fulfilment of one’s epistemic duty is, in fact, neither necessary nor sufficient for 
warrant. To establish that it is not necessary for warrant he gives a counterexample. He 
invites us to consider the scenario in which he nonculpably believes that there are Alpha 
Centaurian conquerors who dislike it when he thinks that something is red. In this scenario, 
he believes that they are monitoring his beliefs and that, if he believes something is red, 
they will engender in him all sorts of false beliefs, thus depriving him of epistemic 
excellency. He then trains himself very hard not to think that things are red. However, one 
day in London, he appears to come across so many things that are red that he becomes 
exhausted and tells himself that epistemic duty be hanged as he forms the belief that there 
are red objects in front of him. Plantinga argues that this would be tantamount to ignoring 
his epistemic responsibility, and yet it appears very obviously that he would indeed have 
warrant for believing that such things are red.18 
 
 In Plantinga’s third chapter, he takes on what he calls post-classical Chisholmian 
internalism (PCCI). The thesis of PCCI is that there must be a right relationship between 
                                                          
15 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, op. cit., 12-14; René Descartes, ‘Meditation 4,’ in Philosophical 
Works of Descartes, eds. E. S. Haldane and G.R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
Vol. 1; and John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser (New York: Dover, 
1959). 
 
16 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, op, cit., 19-22. 
 
17 Ibid., 31.  
 
18 Ibid., 45. 
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the evidence-base and the belief; a relationship that, on the whole, will display something 
intrinsically valuable.19 What is that evidence-base? According to Chisholm, it should be 
understood as consisting of purely psychological states, 20 that is one must have internal 
access to those properties that confer warrant. There are a few serious problems that 
Plantinga sees in this internalist theory of warrant. The two that I will briefly mention 
pertain to the theory being unmotivated, and the theory not providing sufficient conditions 
for warrant.  
 
Plantinga reiterates that classical internalism is motivated by the fact that one must 
do their epistemic duty, as justification is primarily a deontological requirement. Warrant 
in this sense is to be understood as fulfilling the rational requirements that are set out 
before the individual for a particular belief. However, if duty is not, in fact, involved and 
justification is not primarily a deontological concept, why suppose that in order to be 
justified one must have access to certain psychological properties? Plantinga asks: ‘why 
lay this down as an initial constraint on locating the notion to be explained?’21 He then 
points out that, ‘[f]or the earlier classical view, there was a clear answer: the deontological 
connection. But for the later post-classical view, this connection vanishes; and with it goes 
the reason for an epistemic internalist dimension in this view.’22  
 
 In addition to claiming that the post-classical view is unmotivated, Plantinga argues 
that this theory or such theories do not give sufficient conditions for warrant. He gives an 
example of a demon who, every once in a while, will randomly produce in a subject such 
phenomenology that normally goes with the belief that a squirrel just ran from that tree to 
that tree. He argues that if this happened in conjunction with an actual squirrel running 
from that tree to that tree, it would appear that the belief that a squirrel just ran from that 
tree to that tree would be both true and evident.23 The individual would thus have internal 
or privileged access. However, even though the individual here would possess the needed 
psychological states, it wouldn’t appear that the individual would have warrant as these 
psychological states just so happened to come about at the right time. The belief lacks a 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 51. 
 
20 Ibid., 50. 
 
21 Ibid., 54. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Ibid., 64. 
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tight connection to truth. In other words, there isn’t a tight connection between the belief 
produced from the individual’s faculties and that belief being true. Plantinga takes this to 
be good reason for thinking that the post-classical theory of warrant does not provide 
sufficient conditions for warrant. 
 
The last chapter that I will bring up in this brief overview is entitled ‘Reliabilism.’ 
Here Plantinga explains three different versions of reliabilism, namely, the views that are 
supported by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. For the sake of brevity, I 
will only consider the versions of reliabilism that have been advanced by the latter two. 
Using these two different accounts as representatives, I will demonstrate why Plantinga 
believes that reliabilist accounts are inadequate.  
 
Goldman’s version of reliabilism, which, as I explain shortly, comes in two 
varieties, emphasizes that a belief needs to be produced by a reliable belief-producing 
mechanism, while Dretske’s account focuses on the right probability relations holding. In 
regard to the latter, Plantinga states, ‘[t]he second sees warrant as a matter of probability; a 
person is said to know a (true) proposition A if he believes it, and if the right probability 
relations hold between A and its significant others.’24  
 
According to Plantinga, Dretske’s final account can be summarized as follows: 
‘(D5) K knows that s is F if and only if K believes that s is F and there is a state of affairs 
r’s being G such that (1) r’s being G causes K to believe that s is F and (2) P ((s is F)/(r’s 
being G&k)) = 1 and P ((s is F)/k)<1.’25 Like the internalist views before it, Plantinga finds 
a fundamental flaw in this theory. To expose this flaw, Plantinga gives the case of the 
Serendipitous Lesion. An individual has a lesion that causes him to believe lots of crazy 
and false propositions, however, among these crazy and false beliefs there is a true belief, 
namely the belief that he is suffering from a brain lesion. Plantinga states, ‘according to 
D5, it follows that K knows that he is suffering from a brain lesion. His having this lesion 
causes him to believe that he is thus afflicted; the probability of his suffering from a brain 
lesion on his background knowledge k is less than 1; but of course its probability on k & K 
is suffering from a brain lesion is 1.’26 Plantinga goes on to say, ‘[b]ut surely K does not 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 192; Fred Drestke, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1981).  
 
25 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, op. cit., 195. 
 
26 Ibid., 195. 
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know that he is suffering from a brain lesion. He has no evidence of any kind.’27 His belief 
seems lucky, as there are no clear connections between the cause of the belief and the 
belief being true. 
 
In reference to Goldman’s reliabilist theory, Plantinga distinguishes between two 
different versions—only the first of which need to concern us here. According to this 
version:  
 
(a) If S’s belief in p results from a reliable cognitive process, and there is no 
reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S 
in addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S’s not believing p 
at t, then S’s belief in p at t is justified. 
(b) If S’s belief in p at t results from a belief-dependent process that is (at least) 
conditionally reliable, and if the beliefs (if any) on which this process operates in 
producing S’s belief in p at t are themselves justified, then S’s belief in p at t is 
justified.28 
 
Plantinga thinks that this theory is also plagued by the Serendipitous Lesion. 
According to Plantinga, in this scenario you would have a reliable cognitive process, 
namely the brain lesion, produce the true belief that you have a brain lesion. Given that, in 
the scenario, there is no reliable process available to you which would have resulted in you 
not believing that you had a brain lesion, your belief is justified.29 Of course, this whole 
incident for Plantinga seems serendipitous; and, thus, he thinks we have good reason to 
reject Goldman’s view.30  
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Goldman quoted in Plantinga, ibid., 198; Alvin Goldman, ‘What is Justified Belief?,’ in Justification and 
Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, ed. George Pappas (Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 
10, 13, 20. 
 
29 Goldman appears to be using justification synonymously with warrant. 
 
30 I should point out that John Greco doesn’t think that this is a genuine counterexample to reliabilism 
simpliciter. Greco argues that the problem in this brain lesion counterexample isn’t the lack of proper 
function that is displayed in the example, but rather the lack of cognitive integration. Greco states, ‘[t]he 
cognitive processes associated with the brain lesion are not sufficiently integrated with other of the 
person’s cognitive dispositions so as to count as being part of cognitive character.’ Thus, for Greco, in 
order for the brain lesion to count as a genuine counterexample, the brain lesion would need to be (a) stable 
in the relevant sense, and (b) well integrated with other of the person’s cognitive dispositions. But why 
couldn’t one change the scenario to where the brain lesion is integrated with other cognitive dispositions in 
a stable sense? One could imagine a brain lesion, that due to its location, actually acts as an aid to one’s 
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At the heart of the failure of these internalist and reliabilist theories, according to 
Plantinga, is their lack of a proper function condition. With this conclusion, Plantinga 
believes that he has successfully laid down the groundwork for the next volume in the 
trilogy, to which I now turn. 
 
 
1.2 Warrant and Proper Function 
 
In Warrant and Proper Function,31 Plantinga elaborates on the range of concepts entailed 
by the notion of proper function: namely, ‘dysfunction,’ ‘design plan’, ‘damage,’ 
‘normality,’ and ‘purpose.’ These concepts are all interconnected and thus, he argues, 
cannot be defined independently of each other.32 According to Plantinga, the situation is 
similar in modal metaphysics, where the meanings of words like ‘contingency,’ 
‘necessity,’ ‘possibility,’ and ‘entailment’ are interrelated.33 But Plantinga’s point is not 
just about the meaning of words. For Plantinga, if the necessity of proper function can be 
demonstrated, the necessity of a design plan will also be demonstrated. The proper 
functioning of our faculties pertains to how our faculties ‘ought’ to operate, while the 
design plan is the program that explains why our faculties ‘ought’ to operate in a particular 
manner.34 Though Plantinga initially argues that neither the notion of proper function nor 
that of a design plan necessarily invoke the need for an intelligent or conscious designer, 
by the end of the book he has established, to his own satisfaction, that there are no good 
naturalistic accounts of proper function.  
 
                                                          
inductive and deductive ability, or perhaps it somehow amplifies one’s memory. Even if the belief in 
question came about from a cognitive disposition that was integrated and stable, it would still seem 
implausible that the belief in question would be warranted. Moreover, it seems plausible that in order for a 
newly acquired faculty to produce warranted beliefs there would need to be some initial awareness that the 
faculty was a reliable one. But the proper functionalist, for reasons that will be looked at more closely in 
chapter two, thinks that proper function is required for awareness. If this is the case, then I think 
Plantinga’s point still stands, or minimally, it is not undercut. For Greco’s argument, see John Greco, 
Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity (New York: Cambridge Press, 
2010), 152.  
 
31 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, op. cit. 
 
32 Ibid., 5. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid., 21. 
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Before going further into the overview of the second volume of the trilogy, it would 
be helpful to provide a summary of Plantinga’s theory of warrant in schematic form: 
 
1) One’s cognitive faculties must function properly, 
2) one’s cognitive environment has to be sufficiently similar to the one for which 
the cognitive faculties were designed, 
3) the design plan that governs the production of such beliefs is aimed at producing 
true belief, and 
4) the design plan is a good one such that there is a high statistical (or objective) 
probability that a belief produced under these conditions will be true.35 
 
Plantinga changes the direction of the book when he applies his theory of warrant 
to beliefs that, though universally held and commonly understood to be warranted beliefs, 
have traditionally been targeted by sceptical arguments because of a lack of supporting 
evidence. His goal is to show that his theory of warrant has the scope as well as the power 
to explain how the beliefs targeted by scepticism could be warranted. If Plantinga’s theory 
of warrant can solve the problem of scepticism and show how such beliefs are warranted 
more convincingly than the alternatives available, this would at least suggest that his 
theory is plausibly true. 
 
Even though Plantinga interacts with beliefs about memory, the reality of the past, 
other minds, testimony, perception, and the uniformity of nature, my aim in this overview 
is simply to explain how he answers the problem of scepticism about beliefs that are 
obtained by means of perception and testimony. 
 
 
1.3 Perception 
 
Can we obtain knowledge from perception? Plantinga argues that we can and he does this 
by applying his theory of warrant. He argues that we normally come to our perceptual 
beliefs in a ‘basic’ way, that is, in a way that doesn’t depend on other beliefs.36 When we 
perceive that a squirrel is running in our backyard we have a particular phenomenology, 
                                                          
35 Joseph Kim, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity: Proper Function, Epistemic 
Disagreement, and Christian Exclusivism (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 19. 
 
36 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, op. cit., 93. 
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and it is in virtue of this that we form (or at least partly form) the belief that a squirrel just 
ran through the backyard. This belief does not come about through reflecting on certain 
propositions, or through having infallible beliefs; rather, perceptual beliefs are naturally 
produced by our cognitive faculties without requiring the mediation of propositions.37 
 
Holding to this account of perceptual belief formation to be broadly correct, 
Plantinga develops the following key argument: If one’s faculties are functioning properly 
in the environment for which they are meant, and they have a design plan that is aimed 
toward producing true beliefs, and there is a high objective probability that beliefs 
produced from the design plan will be true, then perceptual beliefs formed under these 
conditions will be warranted.38 Plantinga does not hold that a subject has to believe or 
know that these conditions are in place in order to have a warranted belief; rather, as long 
as these conditions are in place, the subject’s belief will be warranted.39 
 
At the end of the chapter, Plantinga briefly entertains the possibility that one could 
come to hold a particular perceptual belief by cumulative means that would include 
inductive methods and testimony. He gives the example of a child who, upon experiencing 
something treely, finds out from his mother that what he perceives is called a tree. He later 
finds a paper mâché model that resembles a tree, and he goes on to form, by induction, the 
belief that he perceives a tree. However, he then finds out through testimony that trees are 
not made out of paper mâché. He thus finely tunes his belief in what a tree is so that the 
next time he experiences either a tree or a paper mâché model, he identifies it correctly. 
Plantinga is willing to grant all of this provided it is accepted that there is some component 
of perceptual belief that is basic, in the sense that he has defined, and that could only be 
warranted given an account of proper function along the lines that he suggests.40 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 I am aware that in contemporary cognitive science literature there exists a preference to use the term 
‘cognitive systems’ instead of ‘cognitive faculties.’ Nonetheless, due to the abundance of proper 
functionalist literature that already uses the phrase ‘cognitive faculties’ it is prudent for me to continue in 
this tradition, given the main focus of the thesis. 
 
38 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, op. cit., 89. 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
40 Ibid., 101. 
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1.4 Testimony 
 
Plantinga starts his section on testimony by quoting a famous passage from Thomas Reid. 
Reid states, ‘[t]he wise author of nature hath planted in the human mind a propensity to 
rely on human testimony before we can give a reason for doing so.’41 Plantinga clarifies 
what Reid means by arguing that beliefs based on testimony are not formed by way of a 
clever inductive or abductive argument, rather we obtain them through a special 
mechanism.  This is important because, if it can be established, one would have to make 
room in one’s epistemological system for the method by which beliefs based on testimony 
could be warranted apart from argumentation. This would be the case for most of our 
beliefs which are based upon testimony; this includes beliefs about scientific theories, past 
results of scientific experiments, beliefs about things that happened in history, 
geographical locations, people’s names (including your own name), and so on.42  
 
One might be tempted to argue that when we accept testimony we do so because 
we have a reason to accept the reliability of the testimony-giver (that is the testifier). 
Perhaps we use our memory to think about all of the times this testimony-giver was right, 
or maybe we think about the reliability of other testimony-givers who at one time, were in 
analogous circumstances to the current testimony-giver. After doing this, we might decide 
if we are justified in accepting the current testimony. Plantinga argues that this isn’t 
typically how we acquire beliefs by way of testimony, though he acknowledges that we do 
come to some beliefs like this. 
 
 In order to bring one’s intuition to concede this point, Plantinga deploys the 
example of a five year old whose dad tells him that Australia is a large country and it 
occupies an entire continent by itself. The five year old doesn’t think (normally) of past 
times when his dad has been reliable, rather he seems to have a natural inclination to 
believe his dad. Plantinga uses this example as evidence that our cognitive faculties are 
inclined to accept the testimony of others as soon as we develop a certain cognitive ability. 
This inclination to accept testimony as a source of potential knowledge seems to be a 
                                                          
41 Reid quoted in ibid., 77; Thomas Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in Thomas Reid's Inquiry 
and Essays, eds. R. Beanblossom and K. Lehrer (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), VI, 5, 281-282. 
 
42 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, op. cit., 77. 
12 
 
natural part of our cognitive design plan, and it is present when our faculties are 
functioning properly.43 
 
There are two more relevant ideas that Plantinga elaborates on in this chapter. First, 
just because we have a natural inclination to accept testimony as a potential source of 
knowledge, it doesn’t follow that we cannot learn to discipline this inclination in light of 
certain experiences. Plantinga notes that we learn not to accept the testimony of politicians 
who want our vote. We also discipline our inclination to accept what we hear when we are 
listening to a dispute and we refrain from making a decision until we have heard both 
sides.44  
 
Second, in order to produce a warranted belief the testimony must come about 
through a warranted testimony cycle. For example, if someone intentionally lies to me and 
tells me that Santa Claus exists, even if it happened to be true (he does exist!) I wouldn’t 
be warranted in believing that he exists. This will also save us from possible Gettier 
scenarios, where you have a true belief that is justified, but it lacks warrant because it is 
based on faulty premises.45  
 
To conclude his discussion of how certain beliefs could be warranted through the 
proper functioning of one’s faculties, Plantinga applies his view of warrant to naturalism. 
In doing so he paves the way to applying his theory of warrant to religious beliefs. This is 
where his third volume, Warranted Christian Belief,46 begins. As I explain the critiques of 
naturalism that can be found in Warrant as Proper Function and Warranted Christian 
Belief, in chapter three, below, I now turn my attention to finishing the overview of the 
trilogy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 80. 
 
44 Ibid., 80. 
 
45 Ibid., 83. 
 
46 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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1.5 Warranted Christian Belief  
 
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga brings us back to the argument of Warrant: The 
Current Debate by reiterating the classical picture of justification. He argues that 
justification, as espoused in the classical account, can best be seen in Locke’s evidentialist 
epistemology.47 The evidentialist that he has in mind here affirms that in order to know that 
God exists one must have good evidence to support one’s belief that God exists. This view 
is made up of two even more basic epistemological tenets, namely, that one has strong 
doxastic responsibility and that all justified beliefs must be, or be based on, self-evident or 
incorrigible beliefs (that is the core thesis of classical foundationalism). The objection goes 
that, if these sorts of evidential requirements are needed for warrant, then Christian belief 
could never be warranted. Christian belief doesn’t seem self-evident and, since it is not an 
incorrigible belief, if one lacks evidence (evidence that is based on self-evident or 
incorrigible beliefs) that Christianity is true, then even if Christianity were true one could 
never be warranted in believing it to be so.48 This is what Plantinga terms the de jure 
objection.  
 
After explaining this objection, he proceeds to give two reasons why one should 
reject classical foundationalism. First, he argues that classical foundationalism is self-
referentially incoherent.49 As we have seen above, the thesis of classical foundationalism is 
that, in order for a belief to be justified it must be either self-evident or incorrigible, or it 
must be properly based on other beliefs that are self-evident or incorrigible. Plantinga 
argues that, if this is so, belief that classical foundationalism is true must itself either be 
self-evident or incorrigible, or be based on beliefs that are. However, the belief that 
classical foundationalism is true doesn’t appear to be self-evident or incorrigible, or based 
on beliefs that are. Classical foundationalism then is self-defeating as it fails to meet its 
own criteria.  
 
Second, Plantinga argues that given classical foundationalism most of our beliefs 
would not be justified. He points out that there are certain central beliefs that we all appear 
to hold, and yet there are no good arguments for them (e.g. belief in other minds). Since he 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 82; John Locke, Introduction to the Essay (New York: NAL Penguin, 1974). 
 
48 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 67-68. 
 
49 Ibid., 94. 
14 
 
holds it to be obvious that the beliefs in question are justified, he takes this to show that 
classical foundationalism must be false.  
 
Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that classical foundationalism is false, 
Plantinga thinks that there are all sorts of beliefs that could be considered properly basic. 
Though Plantinga gives some attention to how this relates to theistic belief and the concept 
justification, my interest here pertains to how his theory of warrant could allow for belief 
in the existence of God to be properly basic. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
 
1.6 Warranted Theistic and Christian Belief 
 
Plantinga does not attempt to use his theory of warrant to prove that God exists; rather he 
aims to show that his religious epistemology is epistemically possible, in other words, that 
it is consistent with what we know.50 He argues that, if God exists, and if He has 
successfully constituted subject s’s cognitive faculties in such a way that, when they are 
properly functioning in the environment for which they are meant, they would produce the 
belief that God exists, then s’s belief that God exists could be warranted even apart from 
argumentation. Since belief in the existence of God wouldn’t depend on arguments and 
would be formed through the proper function of s’s cognitive faculties, s’s belief should be 
considered properly basic.51 He calls his model of warranted religious belief the 
Aquinas/Calvin model (AC model). 52 And, like Calvin before him, he calls this cognitive 
awareness of the existence of God the sensus divinitatis.53  
 
Plantinga attempts to explain why some people fail to form the belief that God 
exists54 by arguing that, if the Christian story is true, then something like sin has come into 
                                                          
50 Ibid., 168. 
 
51 Ibid., 177-179. An epistemology that endorses that belief in God could be properly basic is known as a 
reformed epistemology. 
 
52 For Thomas Aquinas, see Summa Theologia I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. For Calvin, see John Calvin, Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, Tr. Ford Lewis Battles and ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960), 44. 
 
53 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 170-172. 
 
54 It seems to me that Plantinga’s epistemology is completely compatible with the fact, and actually predicts, 
that people will have very different views about God. All sorts of different articulations of the transcendent 
are to be expected, given that sin has damaged the faculty that produces belief that God exists.  
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the world and has damaged our belief-forming structure. Thus, while God intended that we 
would always perceive Him, sin has weakened (though not destroyed) our awareness to the 
extent that sometimes it doesn’t function at all.55 
 
Plantinga extends his discussion of how belief in the existence of God could be 
warranted to cover the much more specific case of belief in Christianity; 56 arguing that, if 
Christianity were true, it would likely be warranted. He does this by further articulating his 
extended Aquinas/Calvin model (EAC model).57 On this model, Holy Scripture, which has 
both a primary author (the Holy Spirit) and numerous secondary authors (the human 
writers), acts as a testimony to s, in that it conveys the truth of the Gospel message. The 
Spirit of God then instigates (this can be seen as a form of giving a testimony) s to see that 
the Gospel message is true.58 The testimony about the Gospel message can be accepted by 
s, in part, because the Spirit would improve on or repair any cognitive damage (damage 
that was the result of sin) that s would have. The result of this cognitive restoration would 
be s’s faith that the Gospel message is true. Plantinga argues, if the EAC model were 
correct and God really was testifying by His Spirit to s that the Gospel message is true, and 
if s found herself believing that the Gospel message is true, then s’s belief that the Gospel 
message is true could be warranted.59  
 
After arguing for the epistemic possibility of his religious epistemology, Plantinga 
ends the trilogy by addressing possible defeaters for belief in the existence of God and in 
                                                          
55 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 213. 
 
56 For Plantinga, the Gospel message just is the essence of the Christian religion. Thus, if belief in the Gospel 
message were warranted, belief in Christianity would be warranted. By Gospel message, Plantinga has in 
mind something like the following story: God created the cosmos and all things in it. God, specifically, had 
in mind bringing about human life in His image, and so He created man with free will. Instead of loving 
God with all of his heart, mind, and strength, man served his own needs and broke off communion with 
God. As a response to this, in the way of the ultimate love story, God the Son became man, born of a 
virgin, in order to love God the Father in the way man should have loved Him. He loved His Father to the 
point of suffering the consequences of the world’s sins on a cross and He died. This then, pleased God the 
Father as by the Holy Spirit, He raised His Son from the dead, three days later. In doing this, God justified 
and vindicated His Son and is in the current process of reconciling all of the cosmos back into communion 
with Himself.  
 
57 Plantinga calls this the Extended Aquinas/Calvin model because he believes Aquinas and Calvin 
articulated something very similar in their respective works. See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. 
cit., 251-252. 
 
58 Ibid., 252. 
 
59 Ibid., 285. 
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the truths of Christianity. I now turn my attention to certain objections that Plantinga deals 
with and consider how he and his disciples have responded to such objections.  
1.7 Objections to Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology 
 
There are several well-rehearsed objections to Plantinga’s epistemology. Those objections 
I will engage with here are: the evidential argument from evil, the problem of religious 
diversity, the objection that religious belief is not properly basic, and the Great Pumpkin 
Objection. Interacting with these objections will lead me to articulate an objection that I 
have termed the Pandora’s Box Objection.  
 
 
1.8 Evidential Argument from Evil 
 
In ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,’ William Rowe argues that there 
is a plausible argument for atheism found in the probabilistic or evidential problem of evil. 
In this new version of the problem of evil, Rowe believes that he has created a defeater (to 
use Plantigian terms) for Christian belief. Rowe argues:  
 
(1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting 
some evil equally bad or worse. 
(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse 
(3) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.60 
 
Rowe is relying on being able to make a plausible case for (1). The famous example that he 
gives in defence of (1) is the story of a young fawn who finds herself trapped in an intense 
forest fire, where she suffers extreme pain for days until she dies. Though this does not 
guarantee the truth of the first premise, it shows the probability of the first premise being 
true is extremely high.  
 
                                                          
60 William Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,’ in The Evidential Argument from 
Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 1-11. First published 
as William Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,’ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-341.  
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But does the fact that (1) could seem more likely than not act as a defeater for 
Christian belief? How might one respond to Rowe’s argument from evil? First, according 
to Plantinga, most of the time true defeaters are not probabilistic. He states, ‘[a]nd indeed 
the fact is most defeaters do not proceed by way of the subject’s becoming aware of 
probabilistic relationships.’61 It won’t come as a surprise then that Plantinga is not 
convinced that the evidential argument acts as a defeater for Christian belief.  
 
If Plantinga is right, Christian belief, like generic belief in the existence of God, can 
be acquired in a properly basic way, analogously to the way that beliefs are arrived at by 
sense perception. The belief would be based on neither propositional evidence nor 
argument; rather, the person would in a very firm way, and with a high degree of warrant, 
just find herself believing that Christianity is true. If this is so, it doesn’t seem obvious that 
an attempted probabilistic defeater would be successful. In fact, I think there are scenarios 
which show that this isn’t the case. 
 
Here is one such scenario: Say I am known for stealing philosophy books, in fact, 
there is even a picture of me, warning the clerks that I like to steal books. If, one day, the 
whole philosophy section of the library went missing and there were several witnesses 
saying they saw me steal a lot of books, the objective probability62 that I stole the books 
would be very high. Nonetheless, if I had a very distinct and highly warranted memory of 
myself at my house during the time that the books disappeared, would I have a defeater for 
my belief that I was at my house when the book snatching occurred? It doesn’t appear to 
be the case that I would. As I hold to this belief with a sufficient amount of firmness 
(which is partly responsible for my level of warrant being high), the probability that I stole 
the philosophy books wouldn’t play any significant role in my doxastic process. 63 It is for 
a similar reason that Plantinga and his disciples think that the evidential problem of evil 
doesn’t have to pose a threat to Christian belief.64 
                                                          
61 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 482. 
 
62 By objective probability, I mean the evidential probability given the objective, sharable evidence. 
 
63 Along with Tyler Taber, I apply this scenario to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness, in Tyler Taber and 
Tyler Dalton McNabb, ‘Is the Problem of Divine Hiddenness a Problem for the Reformed 
Epistemologist?,’ The Heythrop Journal, forthcoming. The scenario and discussion are based on 
Plantinga’s own work. See Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and 
Naturalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 180.  
 
64 It is also worth mentioning that Plantinga has other responses to the evidential problem of evil. As of 
recently, Plantinga seems comfortable with his Felix Culpa theodicy. This theodicy argues that God chose 
to actualize a world where evil exists, because He is interested in actualizing a world that contains the 
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1.9 The Problem of Religious Diversity 
We can summarize the objection from religious diversity as follows: Even if one were to 
grant that religious belief could be warranted without the subject of the belief having 
access to the internal properties which ground the warrant for that belief, it would appear 
that one would not be rational in holding to any particular religious doctrine because of the 
vast number of other conflicting religious beliefs available. This type of argument often 
utilizes equal weight theory,65 which holds that one should give equal weight to both an 
epistemic peer’s belief and to one’s own. The argument can best be illustrated in the 
following syllogism:  
 
(1) It is unreasonable to hold to one’s views in the face of disagreement since one 
would need some positive reason to privilege one’s views over one’s opponent[‘s 
views]. 
(2) No such reason is available since the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers and 
have access to the same evidence. 
(3) Therefore, one should give equal weight to the opinion of an epistemic peer and 
to one’s own opinion in the case of epistemic disagreement.66 
 
The Plantigian, Joseph Kim, has argued that equal weight theory shouldn’t be seen 
as a threat to Christian belief for at least three reasons.67 First, one could accept equal 
weight theory but deny that followers of other religions are epistemic peers. If the Spirit of 
God actually repaired one subject’s cognitive faculty and testified to that subject, then that 
subject wouldn’t be in the same epistemic situation as a subject who mistakenly perceives 
that God has revealed Himself (and a different religion) to them. The latter subject’s belief 
could have been a product of wish fulfilment or some cognitive malfunction.68 This 
                                                          
incarnation and atonement stories. Due to the great aesthetic value that the stories carry, he takes the set of 
worlds in which the incarnation and atonement take place, to be a set of worlds that should be considered a 
part of the best set of worlds that He could actualize. Since the story of the incarnation and atonement 
presupposes sin and a fallen world, Plantinga believes it is very probable that evil would exist in a world 
that God would create. See Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and 
Naturalism, op. cit., 59. 
 
65 For equal weight theory, see Thomas Kelly, ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,’ in Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology, ed. John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
66 Kim, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity, op. cit., 49-50. 
 
67 Ibid., 46-65. 
 
68 Ibid., 65. 
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disparity between the subjects would hold even if an onlooker couldn’t tell the difference 
between the two. 
 
Secondly, it would further appear that if equal weight theory were true one could 
not have knowledge about the right conclusions to philosophical paradoxes and even 
common sense philosophical beliefs (this would even include philosophical beliefs about 
knowledge of other minds). This is because there exist epistemic peers who differ on 
whether such beliefs could be justified or warranted.69 This thought can also be applied to 
science. Take the example of quantum mechanics: If one top scientist takes a non-realist 
view about the interpretation of the wave function, while his epistemic peer takes a realist 
view, it would follow, according to the equal weight theory, that, both of them would need 
to withhold belief about the correct interpretation. 
 
Lastly, Kim sees good reason to reject equal weight theory as it would appear to be 
self-defeating.70 If philosophers in one category, say category A, affirmed equal weight 
theory, while another category of philosophers, say category B, denied equal weight 
theory, it would follow that, philosophers in neither categories would be warranted in 
believing in equal weight theory. This is the case presuming only that they were all 
epistemic peers lacking any convincing reasons to privilege one belief over another. Kim 
believes that the reasons given here give us enough justification to reject equal weight 
theory and with it this version of the problem of religious diversity altogether. 
 
 
1.10 Religious Beliefs are Not Properly Basic 
 
Moving on to a related objection, Michael Tooley argues that since there is no reliable 
religious belief-forming faculty religious beliefs are not properly basic.71 For Tooley, 
properly basic beliefs are beliefs that have attracted massive intersubjective agreement. He 
states:  
 
                                                          
69 Ibid, 54-55. 
 
70 Ibid., 61. 
 
71 This section is taken from Tyler Dalton McNabb, Warranted Religion: Alvin Plantinga's Theory of 
Warrant Defended and Applied to Different World Religions (MA Thesis, Southeastern Baptist 
Theological Seminary), 48-49. 
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Consider the cases where there are reliable belief-forming mechanisms – as with 
perception, memory, and deductive reasoning. What one finds in those cases is that 
there is a massive intersubjective agreement. Two observers, who are near one 
another and looking in roughly the same direction, will offer descriptions of what 
they see that agree to a striking extent, and with an enormous amount of detail.72 
 
Since religious beliefs elicit a great amount of epistemic disagreement among peers, it 
wouldn’t appear that they are produced from a reliable belief-forming faculty. How would 
Plantinga respond to Tooley’s claims? The answer may be found in his explanation of why 
there is such religious diversity to begin with.73 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Plantinga argues that sin has damaged the religious belief-forming faculty and that it needs 
to be repaired by the Holy Spirit. This is not to say that sin has damaged the totality of our 
cognitive system in a significant way, or that our memory or perceptual faculties aren’t 
reliable; rather, there is damage to our religious belief producing faculty. 
 
If multiple individuals had damaged memory faculties and each individual 
experienced the same events for a week, it would be a safe assumption that there would be 
radical differences in each individual’s recalling of the previous week. It would not follow, 
however, that the disagreement between these individuals proves that there is no reliable 
memory faculty, or that the memory faculty shouldn’t ever be considered as a reliable 
means to obtain knowledge; at best, it proves that there is a damaged faculty. And if 
Plantinga’s story is right, there would be some whose faculties would be in the process of 
being repaired to full optimal function.  
 
 
1.11 The Great Pumpkin Objection(s) 
 
The most famous objection to Plantinga’s religious epistemology is probably The Great 
Pumpkin Objection. This is the objection that states that if belief that God exists could be 
warranted in a properly basic way, then all sorts of beliefs (even bizarre and apparently 
irrational beliefs) could be warranted in a properly basic way.74 If Christianity could be 
                                                          
72 Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2008), 243. 
 
73 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 199. 
 
74 Ibid., 344. 
21 
 
properly basic, then why couldn’t belief in the Great Pumpkin75 or belief in voodoo or 
some other type of obviously false belief be as well?  
 
Plantinga argues that this objection is clearly mistaken. Just because Christianity 
could be properly basic it doesn’t follow that belief in anything and everything could be 
properly basic.76 One wouldn’t say that if incorrigible beliefs and self-evident beliefs could 
be properly basic (according to the classical foundationalist picture), then every possible 
belief could be properly basic. So why would one argue this way in regard to basic beliefs 
construed in Plantinga’s sense? In classical foundationalism, what privileges incorrigible 
and self-evident beliefs is the fact (though there is reason to doubt this) that these beliefs 
are of such a kind that it is impossible to be wrong about them or, minimally, one couldn’t 
rationally deny their truth. Since this infallibilism isn’t a property of almost all of our 
beliefs, the classical foundationalist argues that the beliefs that have this infallibilism 
should be considered properly basic. Similarly, according to Plantinga’s epistemology, not 
every belief is or could be properly basic. Only those beliefs that, given our design plan, 
we do not require an argument for, could be considered properly basic.  
 
Thus, if the design plan of our faculties does not lead us to require an argument for 
belief in a transcendent God, but does lead us to require an argument for the existence of 
the Great Pumpkin or for the mystical workings of voodoo, and so on, then, on Plantinga’s 
system, belief in the Great Pumpkin and belief in voodoo couldn’t be properly basic 
beliefs. Perhaps these sorts of beliefs could be internally rational and one could have the 
right sort of epistemic response to an experience, but if the design plan (when our faculties 
are functioning properly and are successfully aimed at truth) does not designate these 
beliefs to be properly basic, these beliefs could not be properly basic. Plantinga’s system 
inherently puts limits on what could be properly basic and, in doing so, it doesn’t allow for 
any and all sorts of crazy beliefs to be warranted.  
 
Now, perhaps by ‘everything could be properly basic’ what one has in mind isn’t so 
much that there might not be limits on what could be properly basic in the actual world. 
One might have in mind that it is epistemically possible that crazy and irrational beliefs 
                                                          
75 The Great Pumpkin is a fictional character from the cartoon Peanuts, who is rumored to go to pumpkin 
patches every Halloween. Even within the show, the belief that the Great Pumpkin exists is largely seen as 
an irrational belief to have.  
  
76 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 345. 
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(like belief in the Great Pumpkin or Voodoo) could be warranted given Plantinga’s 
epistemology, and this is troubling in itself. In other words, for all we know, there could be 
something like a sensus cucurbitatis and, when it functions properly, it could produce 
warranted Pumpkinite belief. Thus, the following conditional is true: If Great Pumpkinism 
is true, it would likely be warranted. Plantinga calls this objection, The Son of the Great 
Pumpkin Objection. 
 
There are at least two responses to this objection. First, one could argue that, in 
order for this conditional to be true, Great Pumpkinism would essentially need to be a 
slightly more elaborate version of theism. Plantinga makes this point as he states: 
 
But why think it likely that if Great Pumpkinism is true, there will be a sensus 
cucurbitatis? Why think the Great Pumpkin has created us? Why think this 
pumpkin would care about whether human beings know anything about it? Why 
think it is conscious, capable of knowledge, and the like? All the story says is that 
there is this very large and scary-looking pumpkin that returns to Linus' pumpkin 
patch every Halloween. The argument for their being a sensus cucurbitatis if Great 
Pumpkinism is true, has very little going for it.77  
 
Plantinga goes on to point out that what one really needs in order for it to be possible that 
Pumpkinite belief could be warranted, is having the Great Pumpkin be a person who is 
capable of having knowledge, creating humans, and, who out of wanting a relationship 
with humans, created in them a sensus cucurbitatis. Plantinga fails to see how this religious 
belief would be radically different than belief in theism, perhaps with the exception of an 
additional tenet that God has an undetected interest in pumpkins.78   
 
The second approach to tackling The Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection is to 
argue that belief in the Great Pumpkin has an obvious empirical defeater that Christianity 
doesn’t have. One could strip away any potential warrant for believing that the Great 
Pumpkin exists merely by going to a pumpkin patch on Halloween and seeing that he 
doesn’t show up.79 There isn’t an analogous sort of defeater for the serious religions that 
                                                          
77 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Replies to my commenters,’ in Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief: Critical Essays 
with a Reply by Alvin Plantinga, ed. Dieter Schönecker (Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 248. 
 
78 Ibid. 
 
79 Kim, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity, op. cit., 77.  
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exist. You can’t just as easily find the body of Jesus, or without much effort, muster up 
evidence that Muhammad never existed. And for this reason Great Pumpkinism shouldn’t 
be taken all that seriously. 
 
 
1.12 The Pandora’s Box Objection 
 
As one can see from the objections considered above, Plantinga’s theory and his 
application of it are quite controversial. There have been whole volumes authored by 
numerous top epistemologists attacking his theory of warrant,80 his religious 
epistemology,81 and his evolutionary argument against naturalism.82 There is, however, one 
specific objection that Plantinga and his disciples have paid little attention to. Contra 
objections related to the Great Pumpkin, this objection states that, though the crazy and 
irrational or ‘way out there’ beliefs shouldn’t be taken seriously as threats to Plantinga’s 
epistemology, there are still serious religions and worldview beliefs that could be 
warranted in an analogous way to Christian belief, when combined with Plantinga’s 
epistemology.83 Thus, Plantinga is seen as having opened up something like Pandora’s 
Box, and this is, somehow, thought to undermine his whole epistemological project. 
 
Rose Ann Christian is an example of someone who applies Plantinga’s 
epistemology to a non-Christian belief system. She has suggested that a follower of the 
Advaita Vedanta religion could adopt Plantinga’s religious epistemology and thereby 
assert that the core belief of Advaita Vedanta was warranted.84 She sees this as a problem, 
since this religion is vastly different from Christianity as it teaches that all of reality is 
ultimately the non-personal Brahman. Thus, it would be problematic if Plantinga’s 
epistemology implied that the core belief of Advaita Vedanta and the core belief of 
Christianity could all be warranted. James Beilby makes the point that there might be 
                                                          
80 For example, see Kvanvig, Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. cit. 
 
81 For example, see Dieter Schönecker, Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit.  
 
82 For example, see James Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument 
Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
 
83 Beilby probably best articulates the objection in, Epistemology As Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin 
Plantinga's Religious Epistemology, op. cit., 131-136. 
 
84 Rose Ann Christian, ‘Plantinga, Epistemic Permissiveness, and Metaphysical Pluralism,’ Religious Studies 
28, no. 4 (1992): 568-569. 
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possible objections to the worldview of Advaita Vedanta, yet one might be able to handle 
these potential defeaters similarly to the way Plantinga handles the potential objections for 
Christianity.85 David Tien, similarly, argues that Neo-Confucianism could be warranted in 
the same way that Plantinga’s Christianity could be. He concludes that this would be 
troubling for a Plantigian for it would show that the follower of Neo-Confucianism is in 
the same epistemic boat as the Christian.86 Plantinga himself seems to believe that various 
religious traditions could use his system. He writes: 
 
For any such set of beliefs, couldn’t we find a model under which the beliefs in 
question have warrant, and such that given the truth of those beliefs, there are no 
philosophical objections to the truth of the model? Well, probably something like 
that is true for the other theistic religions: Judaism, Islam, some forms of Hinduism, 
and some forms of Buddhism, some forms of American Indian religion. Perhaps 
these religions are like Christianity in that they are subject to no de jure objections 
that are independent of de facto objections.87 
 
Despite this assertion of Plantinga’s, I would like to challenge the claim that he has 
allowed a wide range of serious religious beliefs to be warranted in the same way that the 
Christian religion could be warranted. Since Rose Ann Christian, as we have seen, claims 
that an adherent of Advaita Vedanta could use Plantinga’s religious epistemology, in the 
argument to follow I will first specifically address this religious view. I will also address: 
the Samkhya Hindu tradition, the Middle Way Mahayana Buddhist tradition, and Wang 
Yangming’s Neo-Confucianism.  
 
However, in order to get that part of the project off the ground, I must first 
demonstrate that Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausibly true. There would be little 
reason to entertain Plantinga’s religious epistemological system if it were based upon an 
implausible theory of warrant. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is two-fold:  (1) I will argue 
that Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausibly true; and (2) I will argue that there are 
                                                          
85 See Beilby, Epistemology As Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology, op. 
cit., 131. 
 
86 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the 
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 4 (2004): 31-55. As noted in the section dealing with equal weight theory, I 
do not find Tien’s claim to be a problem for Plantinga’s claims about Christian belief being warranted. 
 
87 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 350. 
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certain serious world religions that cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate 
that their core belief could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be 
warranted. 
 
In regard to establishing (1), I will first briefly reiterate Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant. Then, I will discuss Ernest Sosa’s Swampman Objection88 which attempts to 
establish that proper function is not a necessary condition for warrant. I will flip Sosa’s 
argument around and conclude that the scenario he describes actually gives us good reason 
for thinking that proper function is a necessary condition for warrant. Swampman is an 
epistemic subject who, though he can meet the criteria of various internalist and reliabilist 
theories of warrant, has beliefs which lack a tight connection to truth because his cognitive 
faculties lack a way in which they should appropriately produce any beliefs.  
 
After demonstrating that the proper function condition is a necessary condition for 
warrant, I will deploy certain Gettier examples to show that the proper function condition 
is not a sufficient condition for warrant; this is because an appropriate epistemic 
environment is also required. I will then demonstrate that Plantinga’s conditions of (i) 
having a design plan that is aimed toward producing true beliefs and (ii) having a truth-
aimed design plan that has a high probability of producing true beliefs are also necessary 
conditions for warrant. These two conditions are necessary for warrant because there are 
other design plans that wouldn’t bring about warrant, even if a person’s faculties were 
functioning properly in the right epistemic environment.  
 
To offer further support to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I will answer three main 
objections to it: Laurence Bonjour’s Norman’s Clairvoyance counterexample; Linda 
Zagezebski’s Gettier problem; and Timothy and Lydia McGrew’s argument that 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant presupposes internalism. Discussing each of these objections 
will help to further define and defend Plantinga’s theory of warrant. After arguing that 
these objections fail to destabilize Plantinga’s theory, I conclude that his theory of warrant 
is plausibly true. This brings to competition the first part of my two-fold project.  
 
                                                          
88 Ernest Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: 
Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 253-270. 
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Before I can robustly argue for the claim that there are certain serious world 
religions that cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their core belief 
could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted, I first need to 
entertain Plantinga’s critiques of naturalism. I will specifically interact with the idea that 
naturalism cannot account for proper function. I will also engage with naturalism’s failure 
to account for faculties that are aimed towards producing true beliefs (I will refer to this 
condition as the truth-aimed condition). It will be here that a crucial part of the foundation 
for the rest of the project is laid in place. In regard to naturalism and proper function, I will 
examine accounts proposed by Karen Neander, Ruth Millikan, Michael Levin, and Ernest 
Sosa. I will articulate how Plantinga has responded to each of these accounts and why it 
appears that he has successfully done so. Having demonstrated from Plantinga’s work that 
a strictly naturalistic account of proper function is unlikely to succeed, I will move on to 
discuss the truth-aimed condition. 
 
Does a naturalist have good reasons to think that, given naturalism and evolution, 
our cognitive faculties are aimed towards producing true beliefs? I will use Plantinga’s 
work in order to argue that the naturalist has a defeater for thinking that their faculties are 
reliable. After reiterating Plantinga’s thoughts on this matter, I consider Stephen Law’s 
Wandering Nomad Objection and ask if he has given us any compelling reason to think 
that Plantinga’s argument fails. Lastly, I will suggest how Plantinga’s evolutionary critique 
can be improved, thereby strengthening his case against naturalism even further. 
 
In chapter four, I turn to Hindu beliefs, interacting with both Shankara’s Advaita 
Vedanta tradition and the dualistic Samkhya tradition. I will address each of these 
traditions separately and articulate their central tenets. In doing so, I will explore whether 
these traditions contain doctrines that can provide the resources to make use of Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant, thus giving them an advantage over naturalistic accounts. After 
surveying both of these Hindu traditions, and considering their possible advantages with 
respect to deploying Plantinga’s epistemology, I will argue that, due to their ontological 
commitments, they ultimately lack the preconditions needed to account for proper function 
and thus cannot accommodate Plantinga’s theory of warrant. 
 
In chapter five, I will interact with Mahayana Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, 
assessing whether or not they contain doctrines that would allow them to be warranted via 
Plantinga’s epistemology. In regard to the Middle Way Mahayana Buddhist tradition, I will 
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demonstrate that this tradition cannot account for Plantinga’s theory of warrant because 
reality is ultimately ‘empty’ and ‘void’, and thus such things as proper function and design 
plans are likewise empty and void. Furthermore, given that there is no personal or 
conscious designer, and given that there doesn’t appear to be any other doctrine that could 
give it an advantage over a naturalistic account of proper function, it seems to fall prey to 
the same critiques as previously established in chapter three. With respective to Neo-
Confucianism (particularly Tien’s formulation of Wang’s Learning of the Mind tradition), 
I will argue that for technical reasons (too technical to briefly summarize here) it cannot 
use Plantinga’s epistemology to be warranted.  
 
By the end of chapter five, I will have argued that (1) Plantinga’s theory of warrant 
is plausibly true; and (2) There are certain serious world religions that cannot use 
Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their core belief could be warranted in the 
same way that Christian belief can be warranted. This will constitute a significant blow to 
the Pandora’s Box Objection, as I will have demonstrated that there are limits to the range 
of traditions that Plantinga’s epistemology can accommodate. I will further defend this 
conclusion in my final chapter. There I will flesh out the positive implications of the 
success of my thesis and briefly consider what the negative implications would have been 
for the broader project of Reformed epistemology had it failed.  
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Chapter 2:  The Plausibility of Alvin Plantinga’s Theory of Warrant 
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
In order to demonstrate the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I will first need to 
reiterate it. After doing this, I will articulate each condition of his theory and explain why 
each is necessary for warrant. Having established as much, I will entertain three objections 
to Plantinga’s theory.  Each objection will then act as a tool to further clarify Plantinga’s 
theory. Discussing these objections will help to elaborate how his theory is sufficient for 
establishing warrant. At the end of the chapter, I conclude that Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant is plausibly true. Plantinga’s theory of warrant is as follows: 
 
S’s belief that P is warranted iff, 
1) S’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly, 
2) S’s cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which S’s 
cognitive faculties are designed, 
3) The design plan that governs the production of beliefs is aimed at producing true 
belief, and 
4) The design plan is a good one such that there is a high statistical (or objective) 
probability that a belief produced under these conditions will be true.1 
 
I will refer to (1) as the proper function condition, (2) as the epistemic environment 
condition, and (3) and (4) together as the truth-aimed condition. Presently, I will argue that 
condition (1) is a necessary condition for warrant. In order to argue for (1), I will first 
articulate Ernest Sosa’s Swampman counterexample that is directed toward Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant; I will then argue, contra Sosa, that the Swampman counterexample 
actually gives us good reason to affirm that proper function is a necessary condition for 
warrant. This is because without proper function there is no way for beliefs to have a tight 
                                                 
1 This is a paraphrase from Joseph Kim, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity: 
Proper Function, Epistemic Disagreement, and Christian Exclusivism (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2011), 19. I chose Kim’s layout of Plantinga’s theory over Plantinga’s own as Kim’s layout is 
in schematic form. For the way Plantinga originally laid out his theory, see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and 
Proper Function (New York.: Oxford University Press, 1993), 46. 
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connection to truth,2 which is what is needed if they are to have the right sort of connection 
to truth.  
 
 
2.1 Sosa’s Swampman 
 
Sosa develops his Swampman counterexample3 by first quoting Donald Davidson: 
 
Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is 
reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different 
molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, 
moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs the swamp, encounters and 
seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It 
moves into my houses and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one 
can tell the difference. But there is a difference.4  
 
Sosa claims that Swampman lacks proper function, as a design plan and the correct way in 
which the design plan should be carried out (proper function) aren’t the sort of things that 
can come about through random conditions. There is nothing that can give Swampman’s 
cognitive faculties a ‘proper way’ which they should function. However, Sosa argues that 
Swampman would nonetheless have justified [warranted] beliefs, as Swampman’s 
cognitive faculties would be reliable. 5  His cognitive faculties would be reliable insofar as 
they produce true beliefs and they would still produce the same true beliefs given slightly 
different circumstances. In addition to meeting the reliabilist’s requirement, Swampman 
would seem to meet the internalist’s requirement as he has access to those properties which 
                                                 
2 It isn’t enough to have a true belief, the belief has to have a special relationship to truth; thus, by tight 
connection to truth, I have in mind that there needs to be a tight connection between the truthfulness of the 
belief in question, and why the belief is produced from one's cognitive faculties. Since the connection 
pertains to the truthfulness of a belief, the connection here is specifically in regard to knowledge.   
 
3 Ernest Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: 
Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 258-259; Donald Davidson, ‘Knowing one’s own mind,’ Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (1987): 441-458. 
 
4 Ibid., 256. 
 
5 Ernest Sosa, ‘Knowledge: ‘Instrumental and Testimonial’ in The Epistemology of Testimony, eds. Jennifer 
Lackey and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 120. 
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confer warrant.6 This is so since Swampman’s beliefs would be identical to Davidson’s 
beliefs and he would share Davidson’s reasons for holding these beliefs. Thus, given that 
Swampman would meet such requirements, Sosa claims that Swampman would have 
warrant without proper function. 
 
To better articulate what is at the heart of Davidson’s Swampman case, Sosa also 
mentions the possibility that, instead of a Swampman emerging, a Swampbaby comes 
about via a random lightning strike. If a hunter found the Swampbaby and raised it in a 
normal way, it may appear that the Swampbaby would grow up knowing all sorts of 
things.7 Swampbaby would go to school and form beliefs about what was being taught. 
Swampbaby (or Swampchild?) would come to certain conclusions, such as that 
Christopher Columbus sailed the ocean blue in 1492 or that 1+1= 2, and so on. Sosa argues 
that these Swampfamily counterexamples are incompatible with proper functionalism 
because proper functionalism entails that proper function is necessary for warrant, and 
thereby it should be impossible that someone could be warranted without it.  
 
Does Sosa’s Swampman constitute a genuine defeater for the necessity of the 
proper function condition? Unlike Donald Davidson, Swampman lacks a particular way in 
which his faculties should function. When Davidson sees an alligator running after him in 
the swamp area, if his faculties are functioning as they should there will be a belief 
produced that an alligator is running after him. If, instead of producing the belief that an 
alligator is running after him, his faculties produced the belief that a beautiful woman is 
running toward him it would appear that something is wrong with Davidson’s cognitive 
faculties. There is a malfunction in this situation because this isn’t the type of belief that 
the faculties should produce under these conditions.  
 
The same couldn’t be said about Swampman, however; as Swampman’s cognitive 
faculties have no way in which they should appropriately produce beliefs under particular 
                                                 
6 This would seem to be the case given access internalism, internal state internalism, or inferential 
internalism. In access internalism, one merely needs to have access, or the potential to have access, to the 
fact that certain evidence justifies a belief that p. In regard to internal state internalism, one needs to have 
relevant epistemic properties that supervene on S’s belief that p. And lastly, in regard to inferential 
internalism, one needs access to the connection between one’s premises and one’s conclusion. See Richard 
Fumerton, ‘Evidentialism and Truth’ in Evidentialism and its Dicontents, ed. Trent Dougherty (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 179-191. 
 
7 Ernest Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, 
op. cit., 256. 
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circumstances.8 There is no right sort or wrong sort of belief that should or shouldn’t be 
produced from his cognitive faculties. This would be so even granting that Swampman’s 
faculties are counterfactually reliable and/or that he has the right internal access.9 Thus, it 
would appear that even if Swampman produces the belief that an alligator in the swamp is 
coming for him, and there does happen to be one coming for him, this would be a genuine 
case of cognitive luck.10 It just so happens that his cognitive faculties produce a belief 
about an alligator instead of any other sort of belief (or none at all). It is not as if his 
faculties have been designed (whether it be by God, by evolution, or both) to produce this 
belief under the appropriate circumstances. And as such, putting the two epistemic subjects 
side by side, there would appear to be an obvious distinction between the two.11 
                                                 
8 See Kenneth Boyce and Alvin Plantinga, ‘Proper Functionalism’ in The Continuum Companion to 
Epistemology, ed. Andrew Cullison (London: Continuum, 2012), 130-131. Also see, Michael Bergmann. 
Justification without Awareness (New York: Oxford Press, 2009), 147-150. 
 
9 Even on an internalist model there is a need for faculties to function appropriately. According to John 
Greco, ‘evidence is supposed to play a functional role in our cognitive activity, but to do so it must be 
available to the knower in some sense appropriate to that functional role.’ See Greco’s chapter, 
‘Evidentialism about Knowledge’ in Evidentialism and its Discontents, op. cit., 169. If evidence has a 
function to play in our cognitive activity, I don't think the notion of proper function (broadly speaking) is 
far off. It seems if one lacked an appropriate way to form beliefs based on evidence or if one lacked an 
appropriate way to obtain evidence altogether, then warrant would be lacking.  
 
10 In some sense, what I am proposing (and I take it that Plantinga, Boyce, and Bergmann are as well) is a 
new category of epistemic luck that the epistemologist should be concerned with. In another sense, this 
luck is tightly linked to the luck that can be seen in certain Gettier problems where the subject produces a 
true belief that ‘p’ in virtue of having a cognitive malfunction. 
 
11 In the spirit of comparing epistemic agents to Swampman, suppose that there exists aliens who have 
created a less superior race. Perhaps these aliens have even given this race faculties and have given those 
faculties a design plan to work in a particular way. Let us say that a perceptual faculty is included in this 
group of faculties but there exists no faculty that is intended to form beliefs about the past. It seems 
possible that upon the perceptual faculty working in the way in which it was designed to work, perhaps in 
conjunction with other faculties, a new faculty could come about as an unintended result (unintended 
according to the original design). In this case, we will say that this is how the less superior race’s memory 
faculty came about. For the sake of argument, let’s say that their memory faculty could still reliably 
produce beliefs about the past while the original perceptual faculty malfunctioned. If this is so and if the 
beliefs produced from the memory faculty could still have a tight enough connection to truth to be 
warranted, then one would have an example of how proper function could be absent and yet warrant would 
still be achieved. There appears to be more of an intuitive pull to say that the memory faculty could 
produce warranted beliefs than in the Swampman case as the reliability of this memory faculty is tied into 
the proper function of the perceptual faculty. In response to this, a proper functionalist has at least three 
options: (1) Deny that this scenario is possible, (2) Argue that since the memory faculty still lacks a way in 
which it should appropriately produce beliefs, the beliefs it produces still aren’t warranted, or (3), Argue 
that it isn’t necessary that proper function is always present but argue that it needs to have at least been 
present. If one went for the latter option, they could advocate for the following: Soft Proper Functionalism: 
In order for S to be warranted in believing that p, S must have had or currently have properly functioning 
faculties. As this pertains to my thesis, being that there is still some sort of proper function condition that 
needs to be satisfied for the advocate of (3), the wider argument that I make in this thesis would still go 
through. 
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Davidson’s belief has a tighter connection to truth than Swampman’s belief, to the extent 
that Swampman would appear to lack warrant and thereby knowledge.12  
 
Someone might find it hard to believe that a subject could have a cognitive process 
that continually produced mostly true beliefs, with the subject even having access to the 
right reasons for holding to those true beliefs, and yet have beliefs that lacked this tight 
connection to truth.  I will give a certain scenario, that I think, taken with the Swampman 
counterexample, might make this possibility more obvious. After giving what I have 
termed the Gambling Demons Scenario, I will then briefly reiterate how the Swampman 
counterexample demonstrates that one could have the appropriate internal access or a 
reliable cognitive process and yet still lack warrant due to the absence of proper function.  
 
 
2.2 The Gambling Demons Scenario 
 
It is logically possible that there is a world where demons run around in hell looking to 
commit great sins and atrocities. Moreover, it is possible that in their demon common room 
they might have belief-forming and reason-forming slot machines with which they like to 
play. Perhaps these demons, who love to cause havoc, pick a handful of very unfortunate 
souls who, upon the demons pulling the levers on the belief-and reason-forming slot 
machines, will have whatever beliefs and reasons come up on the machines placed into 
their cognitive faculties. One individual, for example, might hold the belief that ducks have 
blue antlers under the earth, and the reason for this belief is that 1-dog=Noggot. However, 
                                                 
12 Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon have identified another argument that the proper functionalist could use 
to show the plausibility of the proper function condition. They argue that what underlies Swampman 
counterexamples is (C1), a principle that roughly states, ‘If a belief B is warranted for a subject S and 
another subject S* comes to hold B in the same way that S came to hold B in a relevantly similar 
environment to the one in which S came to hold B, then B is warranted for S*.’After articulating this, the 
authors go on to use cognitive science to identify that children as young as four months of age, have 
knowledge that objects don’t go out of existence when they are no longer within their sight. Given this 
fact, the authors go on to create a counterexample which they feel undercuts one’s justification for (C1). 
They ultimately give a scenario where a small child named Billy, has a cognitive malfunction which leads 
him to believe that anything red that goes out of his sight ceases to exist. Soon after, Billy is abducted by 
aliens, who due to their cognitive environment (a cognitive environment where red things pop out of 
existence upon not being observed), normally produce the belief that red things go out of existence when 
they are not observed. If Billy and an alien child were together on the alien planet and both of their 
faculties were operating in the same sort of manner when both of them produced the belief that a red object 
went out of existence (when one did), it would seem one would have warrant (the alien child) and the other 
one wouldn’t (Billy). As this situation meets (C1), it would seem that (C1) couldn’t rationally be held. This 
being the case, the authors think that only the proper functionalist can explain why one could be warranted 
and the other one wouldn’t. See Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon, ‘In defense of proper functionalism: 
cognitive science takes on Swampman,’ forthcoming in Synthese. 
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much to a not-so-lucky demon’s surprise, upon pulling the levers on each of the slot 
machines, for one of the unfortunate souls, there comes about only beliefs that are true, 
along with reasons that just so happen to correspond with these true beliefs. It may 
fortuitously happens that all of the beliefs that were selected (supposing that the slot 
machines at once produced all the beliefs and reasons that the unfortunate soul will have 
for the rest of his/her life) come about at the right time. Thus, when the unfortunate soul 
forms the belief that he is walking to church, he actually is walking to church and he is 
accompanied with the right sort of phenomenological imagery that would correspond with 
such a situation.  
 
There is something about this that would make the beliefs that our unfortunate soul 
(or perhaps now, the lucky soul!) holds seem to have little or no warrant as these beliefs 
came about by complete chance. Moreover, we have before us a clear example of how a 
person could have cognitive faculties that consistently produced true beliefs, and he could 
be aware of the right reasons for holding them, and yet not have warranted beliefs. One 
might say that the unfortunate soul lacks warrant (and would thus lack knowledge), not 
because he lacks proper function, but because he has a poor design plan. This would of 
course be different from the Swampman case, where the Swampman lacks a design plan 
altogether. What is important about this new scenario is that it illustrates how a person 
could produce mostly true beliefs while having access to the right reasons for holding 
them, and yet, still have beliefs that lacked a tight connection to truth.  
 
I have shown two things to be plausible thus far. First, I have shown that because 
Swampman lacks proper function there seems to be something serendipitous about him 
having true beliefs, for his cognitive faculties lack a way in which they should operate and 
produce those beliefs. Secondly, I have shown that just because a subject’s cognitive 
faculties consistently produced true beliefs and the subject had access to the right reasons 
for holding those beliefs, it does not follow that these beliefs have a tight connection to 
truth. Thus, even if the Swampman is consistently producing true beliefs, and even if he 
can articulate why his beliefs are true, it doesn’t follow that his beliefs have any tight 
connection to truth. 13 
                                                 
13 I am well aware that one may find the Swampman argument inadequate (maybe one rejects it because one 
doesn’t think that it is logically or metaphysically possible, or perhaps the Swampman case leaves one’s 
intuitions too unclear for a precise interpretation of what Swampman shows). In this case, I will refer the 
reader back to Plantinga’s brain lesion counterexample for why the proper function condition is plausible. 
Though I think this counterexample to reliabilism is a good one, due to the potential of the Swampman 
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One might agree that it doesn’t follow that, just because one has reliable cognitive 
faculties that, one’s belief would then have the right sort of connection to truth. Yet contra 
proper functionalism, one might still argue that proper function isn’t necessary for a tight 
connection to truth.14 One might claim that as long as one’s faculties track the truth one 
avoids accidental true beliefs. I will look at this claim by considering both Robert Nozick’s 
traditional truth-tracking account and Sosa’s Cartesian truth-tracking account. After 
reviewing both of these accounts, I will argue that each fails to secure a tight connection to 
truth in virtue both of the possibility of truth-tracking through cognitive malfunction (that 
is the lack of proper function) and being in the wrong type of epistemic environment. I will 
take this to be further evidence that the proper function condition is a necessary condition 
for warrant, even within the general framework of truth-tracking accounts.  
 
 
2.3 Nozick’s Truth-Tracking Account 
 
Perhaps the most well-known account of truth-tracking can be found in Nozick’s work. 
Nozick’s theory of truth-tracking is a development of Fred Drestke’s original account, 
according to which, ‘S knows that p if S has a reason, R, for p, such that if p were not the 
case, S would not have R.’15  In developing his counterfactual truth-tracking account, 
Nozick argues that, given S has a true belief that was arrived at via some method M,  
 
S knows p iff, 
(A) If P weren’t true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) P, 
then S wouldn’t believe, via M, that P.  
(B) If P were true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) P, then 
S would believe, via M, that P.16  
                                                 
argument acting as a litmus test for other theories of warrant, I think the Swampman counterexample can 
be developed into something even more powerful. Thus, here, I focus on developing it. 
 
14 Perhaps here, the truth-tracking proponent might be interested in slightly altering the definition of having a 
‘tight connection to truth’ from the one that was given earlier in this chapter. 
 
15 Fred Dretske, ‘Conclusive Reasons,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 1 (1971): 1-22. Reprinted 
in Essays of Knowledge and Justification, eds. George Pappas and Marshal Swain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1978).  
 
16 Cited in Laurence BonJour, ‘Internalism and Externalism,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. 
Paul Moser (New York: Oxford Press), 25; BonJour quotes from Robert Nozick, Philosophical 
Explanations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Press, 1991). 
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Conditions (A) and (B) can be glossed as follows in terms of possible worlds.17   
 
(A) In all the closest possible worlds in which P isn’t true and S uses M to arrive at 
a view about P, S doesn’t believe, via M, that P. 
(B) In all close possible worlds in which P is true and S uses M to arrive at a view 
about P, S believes, via M, that P. 
 
Understanding that these conditions can be glossed in terms of possible worlds will be 
important soon when I entertain possible counterexamples to this truth-tracking account. 
 
To begin to demonstrate why I believe this account fails to secure a tight 
connection to truth, I will introduce George Pappas and Marshall Swain’s argument against 
the original Drestkian truth-tracking account. This will then lay the ground work for my 
own counterexample to Nozick’s developed account. Pappas and Swain’s counterexample 
goes as follows: S believes (justifiably so) that there is a cup on the table; however, 
unbeknownst to him, he is really seeing a hologram that occurs in virtue of the rays given 
off by the cup. It is here that the truth-tracking account fails, as S would not have the 
reason he does for believing p if p were not the case, and yet one would not argue that S 
knows that there is a cup appearing in front of him.18 It seems that this critique could be 
adapted and applied to Nozick’s account as well.  
 
But perhaps one remembers that Nozick’s condition (B) could be understood in a 
way that S would still have the same belief in close possible worlds in which p is still true. 
One might argue that the holographic cup counterexample would fail to be a genuine 
counterexample because there is another close possible world where S would no longer 
believe p because, in that close world, the cup and the observer are not positioned in such a 
way that the observer perceives the hologram of the cup. However, even if this were the 
case, there are still other similar counterexamples where one could change something 
minor about an object and that object would still replicate tricky imagery. I shall now 
elaborate.  
 
                                                 
17 Louis Pojman, What Can We Know?: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Australia: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2001), 51. 
 
18 Ibid., 85; George Pappas and Marshall Swain, ‘Some Conclusive Reasons Against “Conclusive reasons”,’ 
in Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1978). 
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2.4 Holographic Demons, Clairvoyant Subjects, and Epistemic Closure 
 
Suppose that there are invisible quasi-physical demons. Perhaps, in virtue of their physical 
constitution, an emergent property produces a hologram of what they would look like if 
they were not invisible. Thus, wherever the demon goes there is a hologram of the demon 
that goes with it. As I am walking home one day, I see what I take to be the face of a 
demon outside my home and I form the belief that there is a demon’s face right in front of 
me. It would appear that I am justified in believing this as I have the right doxastic 
response to the particular phenomenological imagery that I possess. Furthermore, it is true 
that there is a demon’s face in front of me. However, I don’t believe that I am seeing a 
demon’s face because I actually see a demon’s face; rather, I am merely seeing a hologram 
of the demon’s face that comes about because of the demon’s physical constitution. Since 
it doesn’t seem that changing something small in this scenario would change my belief that 
there is a demon in front of me (you can’t get rid of the hologram without changing a 
major part of the demon’s constitution), and I wouldn’t believe that there was a demon’s 
face in front of me if it weren’t for this tricky projection, this Holographic Demon 
counterexample would meet all of Nozick’s requirements. Yet my belief that there is a 
demon’s face in front of me would not constitute knowledge. The explanation that should 
be considered is that my cognitive faculties are not meant for environments where things 
often reproduce identical images of themselves through distant holograms. Thus, in this 
sort of case, it does not appear that Nozick’s truth-tracking account will guarantee a tight 
connection to truth.  
 
But the example just considered is not the only problem faced by Nozick. His 
account is susceptible to Laurence BonJour’s Norman Clairvoyance example.19 Here the 
subject, Norman, doesn’t believe that he has a reliable clairvoyant faculty, but finds 
himself with the belief that the President is in New York. Since general externalist 
accounts do not require that subjects have internal access to the properties that confer 
warrant as long as the external conditions are in place (for Nozick it would be the truth-
tracking conditions), Nozick would have to say that Norman knows that the President was 
in New York. This would be so even if internally Norman seems to be irrational in 
                                                 
19 BonJour points this out in ‘Internalism and Externalism,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, op. 
cit., 273. 
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accepting this belief. Accepting that one could be internally irrational and yet still possess 
knowledge seems fundamentally problematic, and thus I think provides good reason to 
reject Nozick’s account. I will come back to this objection later on in this chapter, as it has 
been applied to Plantinga’s theory of warrant. 
 
The last (and possibly the most serious) objection that I will briefly mention is that 
Nozick’s view entails that the highly intuitive epistemic closure principle is false.20 The 
epistemic closure principle states, ‘If a subject knows that p and he knows that p entails q  
then the subject knows q.’21 This principle is commonly invoked in the problem of 
scepticism. Typically, the non-sceptic will argue that if she knows that she is doing such 
and such, and if she knows that doing such and such would preclude the idea that she is 
being deceived by a Deceiver, it would follow that she would know that she isn’t being 
deceived by a Deceiver.  
 
Most of us have strong psychological intuitions that lead us to affirm the truth of 
this principle. Given the strength of these intuitions, why does Nozick then reject the 
principle? In order to be succinct, let’s take Nozick’s account to state: (1) If p were not 
true, S would not believe that p. (2) If P were true (in slightly altered circumstances), S 
would still believe that p.22 This being stated, Nozick’s theory predicts that closure will 
fail. Louis Pojman takes the following example to demonstrate this: 
 
Suppose I know I’m eating an apple. If I weren’t eating it, I wouldn’t believe I was, 
and if I were eating it in slightly different circumstances, I would still believe I was. 
Also, I know that if I’m eating an apple, I’m not being deceived by a demon. But 
now, let’s run the tracking test on whether I’m being deceived by one. Suppose I 
were being deceived by a demon. If I were being so deceived, one of his 
deceptions, presumably, would be to make me believe I wasn’t being deceived by a 
demon. So, if I were being deceived by a demon, I would not believe I was being 
deceived by one. Hence, my belief that I am not demon-deceived fails to track 
truth. I don’t know that I’m not being deceived by a demon.23 
                                                 
20 I am aware that this reason might only be appealing to those who want to accept closure, but as most 
people would want to accept it, I think this reason is an important one to mention. 
 
21 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, op. cit., 204.  
 
22 Pojman, What Can We Know?, op. cit., 52-53. 
 
23 Ibid. 
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To summarize the problem, I could end up believing that q (I am not being tricked by a 
Deceiver), but if my belief that q were false (I am actually being deceived by a Deceiver), I 
would still believe that q (that I wasn’t being deceived by a Deceiver). Since believing q 
doesn’t track the truth, it would follow that I wouldn’t know that q. Thus, according to 
Nozick’s own account, some beliefs that would come about via entailment would not have 
a tight connection to truth.  
 
However, if an epistemological model requires that one deny such a plausible 
principle, then the model might not be worth accepting. Taking the need to deny epistemic 
closure, along with the other two counterexamples, I have established why Nozick’s truth-
tracking account fails to deliver what we need for a tight connection to truth. 
 
 
2.5 Cartesian Truth-Tracking 
 
Does Sosa’s truth-tracking account fare any better?24  Sosa incorporates a strong notion of 
safety25 into his account as he argues that, ‘[o]ne tracks the truth, outright, in believing that 
p IFF one would believe that p iff it were so that p: i.e., would believe that p if it were so 
that p, and only if it were so.’26 In an attempt to suggest a possible candidate for a proper 
function account, Sosa states, ‘S’s cognitive faculty, F, tracks the truth (and functions 
properly) if and only if, (1) if P were true F would produce (in S) her belief P, and (2) if F 
were to produce (in S) the belief that P, P would be true.’27 This Cartesian account’s 
biggest weakness can be seen when dealing with necessary truths. If traditional Christian 
theology is right, God is a necessary being. If we could entertain this idea, we could say the 
following: (1) If the proposition God exists were true, my faculties would produce the 
belief that the proposition is true, and, (2) if my faculties produced the belief that the 
proposition that God’s exists is true, then the proposition that God exists would be true.   
 
                                                 
24 I will deal with his modified truth-tracking proper function account in Chapter three, below. 
 
25 A condition that prevents true belief from counting as knowledge if it would have been believed and yet be 
false in a close possible world. 
 
26 Sosa, ‘Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, op. cit., 267. 
 
27 Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. 
cit., 276. 
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(2) would be the case for any necessary truth one could think of. If something is 
true in all possible worlds, then of course if one’s faculties produced belief in it, it would 
be true. Plantinga suggests, in looking at (1), that one could come to believe that God 
exists via a cognitive malfunction.28 If someone could come to affirm that God exists by 
way of a cognitive malfunction and yet fulfil the conditions of Sosa’s truth-tracking 
account, it would follow that Sosa’s account does not secure any tight connection to truth.   
 
Sosa seems to recognize that an account based solely on safety won’t be a sufficient 
account of knowledge because, as he states, ‘[a]fter all, any belief in a necessary truth will 
be automatically as safe as could be. Not easily will one hold such a belief while it is false, 
since not possibly could one hold it while it was false.’29 Sosa’s solution to this problem is 
to implement a virtue epistemology in addition to his hard safety principle.30 According to 
John Greco, ‘the central idea of virtue epistemology is that, Gettier problems aside, 
knowledge is true belief which results from one’s cognitive virtues’, where ‘a cognitive 
virtue … is an ability [or “cognitive faculty”] to arrive at truths in a particular field, and to 
avoid believing falsehoods in that field, under the relevant conditions.’31 Similarly, in ‘Post 
Script to Proper Function and Virtue Epistemology,’ Sosa argues that in order to have 
warrant something very much like an ability, power or capacity needs to be included.32  By 
ability, power, and capacity, Sosa has in mind the faculties of perception, memory, 
introspection, and reason.33 Moreover, despite formulating the Swampman 
counterexample, Sosa seems to end up endorsing (or at least comes close to endorsing) that 
such faculties need to be functioning properly. Sosa does this by stating the following: 
 
Consider now such an ability, power or capacity to accomplish a desirable sort of 
thing. Necessarily allied to that is the notion of ‘function,’ i.e. of performing a 
‘function,’ a special distinctive activity that is desirable or at least desired. And the 
                                                 
28 Plantinga, ‘Respondeo,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. cit., 370. 
 
29 Sosa, ‘Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, op. cit., 275. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 This quote from Greco is cited in ‘Proper Functionalism’ by Boyce and Plantinga in The Continuum 
Companion to Epistemology, op. cit., 134; John Greco, ‘Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology,’ 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 3 (1993):  413-432. 
 
32 Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. 
cit., 273. 
 
33 ‘Virtue Epistemology,’ Jason Baehr, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified August 28, 2004, 
accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtueep/. 
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notion of ‘functioning properly’ is not far to seek. In none of that, however, do I see 
a need to import any notion of design, either theological or merely teleological.34 
 
For Sosa, cognitive virtues are intimately related to the notions of function and proper 
function. This would especially seem to be the case given that cognitive virtues either are 
cognitive faculties or come about from cognitive faculties, which of course can function 
properly or malfunction. Thus, according to Kenneth Boyce and Alvin Plantinga, ‘the 
relevant notion of a cognitive faculty required by the virtue epistemologist presupposes the 
notion of cognitive proper function.’35 However, if the virtue reliabilist is not willing to 
acknowledge as much, they would once again be faced with the problem of Swampman, as 
it could be said that, though Swampman has cognitive virtues, his beliefs would still lack a 
tight connection to truth via lacking a way in which his cognitive virtues should 
appropriately produce those beliefs. In conclusion, if anything, Sosa’s account actually 
accentuates the need for proper function, and does not constitute in itself an objection to it. 
According to both of the truth-tracking accounts considered then, one’s cognitive faculties 
can track the truth and yet because there is a lack of cognitive proper function and an 
inappropriate environment,36 a tight connection to truth is not secured.  
 
 
2.6 Epistemic Environment Condition 
 
Having now established (1) of Plantinga’s theory, I will move on to demonstrating the 
plausibility of (2). In order to demonstrate that one could have proper function and yet not 
have warrant due to the lack of a right epistemic environment, it will be important to 
discuss the Gettier cases. The possibility of Gettier scenarios will be my main argument for 
(2). After I establish how Gettier helps demonstrate the necessity of (2) for warrant, I will 
move on to demonstrating both (3) and (4) collectively.   
 
In the early 1960s Edmund Gettier published a three-page paper demonstrating how 
the classical tripartite analysis of knowledge failed in certain counterexamples.37 One of 
                                                 
34 Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. 
cit., 273. 
 
35 Boyce and Plantinga. ‘Proper Functionalism’ in The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, op. cit., 135. 
 
36 As I will argue, I take the right epistemic environment to guarantee safety.  
 
37 Edmund Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,’ Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. 
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the examples that Gettier used was that of Smith and Jones. Smith and Jones have applied 
for a job and Smith has strong evidence for the belief d: ‘Jones is the man who will get the 
job, and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.’ Proposition d entails e: ‘The man who will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket.’ However, little did Smith know, Jones would not be 
getting the job; however, the man who would get the job has 10 coins in his pocket – 
namely himself. Thus, even though d is false, e, which is entailed by d, is true. Though 
Smith is justified in his assertion of e and e is true, it would be far-reaching to say Smith 
knew e. Thus, the traditional view of true, justified belief as knowledge is lacking. 
 
More counterexamples like those espoused in Gettier’s original paper have 
proliferated. All of these counterexamples to the traditional view of knowledge have been 
dubbed Gettier cases. One of the most famous examples of these can be seen in Carl 
Ginet’s Wisconsinites example.38  
 
In this example, a man named Henry is driving in the country side of Wisconsin. 
Henry would generally expect to see barns, yarn, tractors, and other things that are 
associated with this type of environment. However, unlike the normal environment to 
which Henry is accustomed, he unknowingly finds himself in a town where certain 
Wisconsinites have erected dozens of barn facades alongside a real barn. Moreover, Henry 
just so happens to go near a real barn in the midst of the dozens of fake barns, and he forms 
the belief that there is a barn in front of him. Henry appears to be justified in believing it is 
a barn and, indeed, it is a barn; however, in virtue of all the fake barns around it, one would 
be hard-pressed to say this judgement constitutes actual knowledge. 
 
Keith Lehrer proposes another counterexample to the tripartite view of knowledge. 
In this example, Smith has a Ford but, unbeknownst to him, a meteorite shower occurs and 
destroys his car; however, he had previously entered in a raffle to win a car and again, 
unbeknownst to him, he has simultaneously won a Ford. Thus, Smith has true and justified 
belief about having a Ford – but, again, he would lack knowledge that he has one.39 
 
How do these Gettier examples demonstrate that proper function is not a sufficient 
condition for warrant? In regard to the case of the barn facades, one could postulate that 
                                                 
38 Alvin Goldman credits the example to Carl Ginet in Alvin Goldman, Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 102.  
 
39 Keith Lehrer, ‘Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence,’ Analysis 25, no. 5 (1965): 168-175. 
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there is an individual who has faculties functioning properly and those faculties produce 
the true belief that a barn is in front of them. But because the individual could have just as 
easily walked in any other direction and would then have run into a barn façade, it is only 
by chance that this belief is true. Since the proper function condition is in place, it follows 
one could have proper function and yet not have warrant. Thus, there needs to be 
something added to the proper function condition.  
 
Similarly, in the Smith has a Ford case, one could postulate that Smith’s faculties 
are functioning appropriately. Smith isn’t experiencing any cognitive malfunction and he 
appears to be acting epistemically responsibly in accordance with his cognitive design 
plan. However, Smith lacks warrant for his belief that he owns a Ford. An environment 
where your Ford is destroyed by a random meteorite and yet you simultaneously win a 
Ford from a contest, is not the type of environment in which your faculties are meant to 
operate. As with barn façade example, the particular environment that one is in can bring 
about accidental true beliefs. What these Gettier examples demonstrate is that the 
environment in which one’s cognitive faculties operate, needs to be one for which they 
have been designed.  
 
The epistemic environment condition should be seen as guaranteeing safety. 
Roughly speaking, as we have seen, it is a condition that prevents true belief from counting 
as knowledge if it would have been believed and yet been false in a close possible world. 
All of this being so, I think (2) seems to be a plausible condition. I will now move on to 
arguing for the plausibility of (3) and (4).  
 
 
2.7 The Truth-Aimed Condition 
 
In addition to having cognitive faculties that are functioning properly and being in an 
environment for which the faculties were designed, Plantinga argues that the design plan 
would need to be one that is aimed at producing true beliefs. Moreover, it would need to be 
a good one in that there is a high objective probability that the belief or beliefs produced 
under these conditions would be true.  
 
 In regard to (3), take the example of a malevolent deity who out of boredom 
creates human beings whose design plan is to produce all sorts of crazy beliefs. In addition 
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to this, the malevolent deity creates an environment that will encourage their design plan to 
produce all sorts of crazy beliefs. If we granted that the discussed conditions of warrant 
were in place when an unfortunate soul produced the crazy belief that he was created by a 
malevolent deity to produce crazy beliefs, would this be enough for the unfortunate soul to 
be warranted? This is unlikely, as there is still something serendipitous about his belief 
which is due primarily to the design plan not being aimed toward truth 
 
Consider another example. For argument’s sake, let us say that Freud was on to 
something about projecting beliefs in order to fulfil internal needs and desires. If a man 
happened to produce the belief that a strange woman would ask him to marry her in the 
next hour (and this came about by way of having a cognitive design plan aimed at 
producing beliefs related to desire or wish fulfilment), and it just so happened that a 
strange woman asked him to marry her within that hour, we would have a case of 
epistemic luck, not warrant. This is so even if he has properly functioning faculties that are 
in the appropriate epistemic environment.  
 
Though I will argue for this in detail in the next chapter, it is also worth mentioning 
now that it seems possible that the design plan of our faculties could be to produce beliefs 
that aid in survival and reproduction. If the tenets of naturalism and neo-Darwinian 
evolution are right, then this would be the design plan of human faculties. However, as I 
will demonstrate in the next chapter, this type of design plan could lead to us believing all 
sorts of false things. As long as the belief leads to the Darwinian requirement being met, 
the truth of the belief takes the back seat in importance.  
 
Finally, in regard to (4), not only would there be a need for a design plan that is 
aimed at producing true beliefs, but it needs to be a design plan that has a high probability 
of producing true beliefs. It is possible that we were created by an incompetent designer, 
and though he had good intentions and aimed man’s faculties towards producing true 
beliefs, the poor design of those faculties would lead to man’s faculties rarely achieving 
the intended goal of arriving at true beliefs. It is not enough to have a faculty achieve its 
goal every once in a while. Rather, the design plan must consistently yield true beliefs. If it 
only succeeded every one hundred tries, it would make any true belief produced somewhat 
of an accident. This would, again, strip away the possibility for a subject to obtain warrant 
and thus establishes the necessity of (4) for warrant. 
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I have now argued that each condition in Plantinga’s theory of warrant seems 
necessary. However, there are now three objections that I will entertain. Addressing each 
of these objections will allow me to further clarify and modify Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant. I will first engage Linda Zagzebski’s argument that Plantinga’s theory of warrant 
is not sufficient because it falls prey to certain Gettier examples. I will then interact once 
again with Laurence BonJour’s Norman Clairvoyance counterexample. Lastly, I will tackle 
Timothy and Lydia McGrew’s argument that Plantinga’s warrant-as-proper function 
account must steal from an internalist account in order to formulate defeaters. By the end 
of the chapter, I will have defended a fully robust, sufficient, and plausible theory of 
warrant. 
 
 
2.8 Plantinga’s Theory Getterized? 
 
Linda Zagzebski has argued that Plantinga’s conditions are not sufficient for warrant. 
Similar to how Plantinga uses Gettier to demonstrate that internalist and reliabilist theories 
are not sufficient for warrant, Zagzebski gives a Gettier example of her own to demonstrate 
that the same could be said about Plantinga’s theory. Zagzebski describes the background 
of the Gettier situation that she has in mind as follows, 
 
Scenario: Suppose that Mary has very good eyesight, but it is not perfect.  It is good 
enough to allow her to identify her husband sitting in his usual chair in the living 
room from a distance of fifteen feet in somewhat dim light.  She has made such an 
identification in these circumstances many times. Each time her faculties have been 
working properly and the environment has been appropriate for the faculties. There 
is nothing at all unusual about either her faculties or the environment in these cases. 
Of course, her faculties may not be functioning perfectly, but they are functioning 
well enough that if she’s goes on to form the belief My husband is sitting in the 
living room, that belief has enough warrant to constitute knowledge when true and 
we can assume that it is almost always true.40  
 
Zagzebski then elaborates on how a Gettier situation could arise out of this scenario: 
 
                                                 
40 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 285-286.  
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Suppose Mary simply misidentifies the chair-sitter who is, we’ll suppose, her 
husband’s brother, who looks very much like him. Her faculties may be working as 
well as they normally do when the belief is true and when we do not hesitate to say 
it is warranted in a degree sufficient for knowledge. It is not a question of their 
suddenly becoming defective, or at any rate, more defective than usual, nor is there 
a mismatch between her faculties and the environment. No one is trying to surprise 
or fool her or anything like that. Her husband and his brother may not even know 
she is in the house, so the normal environment has not been doctored as it is in the 
fake barn case.41 
 
According to Zagzebski, this scenario could also include Mary’s husband being on the 
other side of the room when Mary forms the belief that her husband is in the living room. 
Of course what she sees is her husband’s look-alike brother, nonetheless her husband is in 
the living room. Zagzebski argues that this is a belief that was produced from properly 
functioning faculties that were in the environment for which they were designed and the 
faculties had a design plan that was aimed toward producing true beliefs. Thus, on 
Plantinga’s theory, Mary should have warranted, true belief. However, there is still an 
accidental element in this scenario for her belief was brought about by her seeing her 
husband’s brother and not her husband. It would then appear that Plantinga’s theory has 
been Getterized which then leaves room for the possibility of another theory of warrant.  
 
I will now give two reasons to think Zagzebski’s argument fails. The first can be 
found in a further clarification of condition (2) of Plantinga’s theory. Plantinga has 
addressed a similar problem in Warranted Christian Belief. Plantinga’s example includes 
Peter and Paul, the look-alike brothers. Plantinga states, ‘I am not aware that Paul’s look-
alike brother Peter is staying at his house; if I’m across the street, take a quick look, and 
form the belief that Paul is emerging from his house, I don’t know that it’s Paul, even if in 
fact it is (it could just as well have been Peter emerging); again, if Peter hadn’t been in the 
neighbourhood, I would have known.’42 
 
How does Plantinga respond to his own counterexample? Plantinga argues that the 
problem with this situation is that of an untrustworthy and misleading mini-environment. 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
 
42  Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 157. 
46 
 
Not only is there a need for a maxi-environment (an environment containing things like air, 
light, presence of visible objects, etc.), but within that maxi-environment there needs to be 
a mini-environment that correlates with the design plan as well. An environment that is 
misleading (even a mini-environment) with respect to exercising one’s cognitive ability 
will cause the faculties to fail in producing warranted beliefs. He calls this elaboration of 
the environment condition the Resolution Condition. Plantinga points this out when he 
states, 
 
What must then be added to the other conditions of warrant is the resolution 
condition: 
 
(RC) A belief B produced by an exercise E of cognitive powers has warrant 
sufficient for knowledge only if MBE (the minienvironment with respect to B and 
E) is favorable for E.43 
 
In concluding my first response to Zagzebski’s counterexample, though the maxi-
environment in the Mary scenario is fine, the mini-environment is not. The mini-
environment in which Mary found herself is not one for which her faculties were designed. 
Her faculties were not designed for dimly lit rooms where certain persons who look like 
her husband pop into the room expectantly.   
 
Not only do I think Zagzebski’s counterexample could be successfully addressed 
by clarifying condition (2) of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, but I think there is an 
additional response that could be given. For Plantinga, our faculties have a design plan that 
requires that certain conditions be met for certain beliefs to be warranted. As mentioned in 
the first chapter, it could be that the design plan does not require arguments for the belief in 
the existence of God or the belief in other minds to be warranted. Moreover, it might be 
that the design plan does require certain arguments for other beliefs, such as the belief in 
the correct theory of warrant. Going back to the relevant problem, it could be the case that 
in certain scenarios (such as the one described by Zagzebski) our design plan includes an 
additional requirement, perhaps a requirement akin to a proposed Gettier solution. 
Plantinga’s theory then could use any of the proposed solutions to the Gettier problem to 
support his theory of warrant, depending of course on the design plan requirements. This 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 159. 
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would even include Zagzebski’s own virtue condition as found in her work Virtues of the 
Mind.44  
 
To help clarify what I mean, let us take one of the earliest proposed solutions to the 
Gettier problem, the No-False belief condition. This condition states that belief p could not 
be caused by or be based on a false belief.45 Now, going back to Zagzebski’s proposed 
Gettier case, it would be easy for the proper functionalist to respond. The proper 
functionalist could just invoke the idea that the design plan could require that the belief in 
question not be based on a false belief; and thus, Mary doesn’t know that her husband is in 
the room because her belief that her husband is in the room is based on of seeing his 
brother. Perhaps, there might be unwanted consequences for each Gettier requirement that 
one incorporates into the design plan, but the cost benefit analysis of this would need to be 
done case by case. For now, it is only important for me explain how Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant shouldn’t automatically be considered insufficient if one needs to add an anti-
Gettier requirement to the design plan. I have now used Zagzebski’s Mary Gettier 
counterexample as a means to further articulate condition (2) in Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant. I will now move on to using Bonjour’s counterexample to add an additional 
condition to Plantinga’s theory. 
 
 
2.9 BonJour, Norman, and Clairvoyance 
 
In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,46 Laurence BonJour presents a basic objection 
to a general version of externalism, which he later applies to Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant.47 As explained earlier in this chapter, the goal of BonJour’s objection is to 
demonstrate that one could have all of the external conditions in place (and thus have the 
externalist requirements satisfied), but yet be charged with internal irrationality. Recall that 
BonJour sets up his counterexample as follows: 
 
                                                 
44 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, op. cit., 298. 
 
45 Pojman, What Can We Know?, op. cit., 83. 
 
46 Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985). 
 
47 BonJour, ‘Plantinga on Knowledge and Proper Function’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, op. 
cit., 58-59.  
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Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence 
either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his 
clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.48 
 
Since Norman does not believe that he has any reason to trust this belief, it would appear 
that Norman is irrational in believing that the President is in New York.49 Thus, due to 
Norman’s lack of subjective rationality, Norman would not have warrant for his belief 
even though the external conditions for warrant are there. 
 
Depending on the externalist system one is advocating, I believe this could be a 
strong objection. If one is espousing an externalist system that contains little to no 
requirement for epistemic responsibility, like Nozick’s account that was earlier given, I 
believe this objection stands. However, this objection would not stand if the externalist 
system being espoused included a no-reflective defeater clause.50 If Norman did not fulfil 
his epistemic responsibility or if he did and then realized he had no reason to trust this 
faculty (which seems to be the case here), the externalist could agree with the internalist 
and say that Norman is not warranted in his belief. On the other hand if upon reflection, 
Norman did find himself believing that this belief came from a properly functioning 
cognitive faculty, then Norman could be warranted in his clairvoyant belief. All of this 
comes down to whether Norman was epistemically responsible in his reflection of possible 
defeaters for his belief and if he had a correct doxastic response that came about in virtue 
this reflection. Since Plantinga eventually includes this no-reflective defeater clause in his 
theory of warrant, Bonjour’s objection is not relevant to Plantinga’s theory.51 Having dealt 
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49 This part of the section can also be found in Tyler Dalton McNabb, Warranted Religion: Alvin Plantinga's 
Theory of Warrant Defended and Applied to Different World Religions (MA Thesis, Southeastern Baptist 
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with the first two objections, I will now add a supplementary condition that is tied to the 
first condition of Plantinga’s theory of warrant: 
 
(1.2) As the design plan requires, one must give an appropriate reflection for the 
possibility of defeaters. 
 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant should now look something like the following: 
 
S’s belief that P is warranted iff,  
(1) S’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly, 
(1.2) S has given appropriate reflection for the possibility of defeaters, 
(2) S’s cognitive environment (both the maxi-environment and mini-environment) 
is sufficiently similar to the one which the cognitive faculties were designed, 
(3) the design plan that governs the production of such beliefs is aimed at 
producing true belief,  
(4) the design plan is a good one such that there is a high statistical (or objective) 
probability that the belief produced under these conditions will be true.  
 
I have used the first two objections to better clarify and articulate the necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for warrant. I will now tackle the final objection to Plantinga’s theory, 
namely, the charge that proper functionalism is incoherent because it presupposes 
internalism. This last objection will allow me to further elucidate the relationship between 
warrant-as-proper function and internalism. After I tackle this objection, I will have 
established the first part of my thesis.  
 
 
2.10 Warrant-as-Proper Function and its Need to Presuppose Internalism 
 
In Internalism and Epistemology, the McGrews argue that in order for Plantinga to use 
counterevidence and formulate defeaters he must use internalist conceptions of rationality 
and counterevidence to which he has no claim.52 The McGrews’ argument has two steps. 
In the first step they bring up the distinction between metalevel beliefs and object level 
                                                 
52 Timothy and Lydia McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 89. 
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beliefs. For the McGrews, an object level belief is a belief that is not about the epistemic 
status of one’s own belief or the epistemic status of another subject’s belief.53 When one 
asks questions related to the epistemic status of an individual such as ‘Is S warranted in 
believing p at t?’ one is concerned with the metalevel. A metalevel belief then, just is a 
belief about the epistemic status of one’s own belief or the epistemic status of another 
subject’s belief. The McGrews argue that Plantinga’s system has a problem as it cannot 
demonstrate why a belief is justified at the metalevel. Furthermore, the McGrews argue 
that if internal rationality (which is at least partly defined by their metalevel principles) is 
not required, then there would be no way to avoid metalevel epistemic regress or 
circularity. In regard to this, they state: 
 
Yet even there [metalevel circularity] may arise. Within Plantinga’s own system, 
for example, the proposition “God exists” may be held as “properly basic” without 
any premises. If one were to defend the claim that one is justified (or, in 
Plantingian terms, “warranted”) in holding it, using Plantinga’s own theory, one 
would state, inter alia, that God has designed us to have non-inferred spontaneous 
beliefs in His existence.54 
 
Plantinga seems to admit that his system would entail epistemic circularity and he seems 
fine with it.55According to the McGrews, fellow Reformed epistemologist William Alston, 
likewise claims that having metalevel circularity is harmless. According to Alston: 
 
Surprisingly enough, [epistemic circularity] does not prevent our using such 
arguments to show that sense perception is reliable. … Nor, pari passu, does it 
prevent us from being justified in believing sense perception to be reliable by virtue 
of basing that belief on the premises of a simple track record argument. At least this 
will be the case if there are no “higher level” requirements for being 
justified…such as being justified in supposing the practice that yields the belief to 
be a reliable one, or being justified in supposing the ground on which the belief is 
based to be an adequate one.56 
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56 Ibid., 71; William Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993), 16. 
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Thus, for Plantinga and Alston, there are no good reasons to accept that one must be 
justified at the metalevel in any significant sense. It is likely that an externalist would want 
to reject metalevel requirements, regarding them as strictly internalist requirements of no 
concern to an externalist.57 While the McGrews reject that one has to know that they know 
(KK theory) in order for a belief to be justified or warranted, they do advocate other 
additional conditions that need to be met at the metalevel. In regard to justification the 
McGrews advocate the Modal Principle:  
 
MP: If it is in principle impossible to show decisively that S’s belief that p is 
justified, then S is not justified in believing that p.58 
 
The McGrews argue that if one wants to use the term warrant instead of justification, then 
they would invoke the Strong Modal Principle which states the following: 
 
SMP: For any term E intended to indicate positive epistemic status, if it can be the 
case for some belief p that Ep while it is not in principle possible to show 
decisively that Ep, then E is not in fact a type of positive epistemic status.59 
 
With this, the McGrews believe that they have established both that Plantinga’s 
epistemology must endorse metalevel circularity and what the correct metalevel principles 
are which avoid such circularity. Having the first step of their argument completed they 
proceed with the second step. According to the McGrews, accepting something like 
metalevel regress has consequences. For, if one were to reject KK, MP or SMP, how could 
one formulate defeaters? Plantinga wants to formulate defeaters for the Great Pumpkin or 
for believing in other things like naturalism, but given his theory of warrant, how could he 
do this successfully? Even if there is a defeater that invokes the irrationality of the belief 
that the subject holds, the subject could still be warranted because internal rationality isn’t 
a necessary condition for warrant, at least, insofar as it is defined by something like the 
McGrews’ metalevel principles. It seems that Plantinga and his disciples must steal from 
the internalist’s view that there are metalevel requirements in order to be consistent when 
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52 
 
formulating defeaters for beliefs. Since Plantinga’s theory of warrant doesn’t give one any 
way to separate the epistemic sheep from the goats the McGrews conclude that it isn’t an 
acceptable theory of warrant.60 This would be so as an acceptable theory of warrant would 
include an epistemological system that would allow one to formulate internal defeaters 
consistently and thereby avoid this dilemma. 
 
 
2.11 Clarifying Internal Irrationality and the Design Plan 
 
But must those who advocate Plantinga’s theory of warrant steal from an internalist’s view 
when it comes to developing defeaters? If one’s system implied not being able to formulate 
defeaters for beliefs, I could see why this theory of warrant would not be an acceptable 
one; however, I think the advocate of Plantinga’s theory of warrant can avoid the 
McGrews’ criticisms in at least two ways.  
 
Given that the McGrews are classical foundationalists, I assume that for them for a 
subject to be internally rational is for the subject to meet the traditional internalist 
requirements, which include internalist metalevel requirements. Moreover, I assume that 
internal rationality would mean that one would have to have all of their beliefs properly 
based upon incorrigible or self-evident beliefs. If this is what the McGrews mean by 
internally rational, then I agree with Plantinga that internal rationality in this sense is not 
necessary for warrant. However, if all it means to be internally rational is something like 
the subject having a correct doxastic response (which, for Plantinga, as previously 
mentioned, would include reflecting for defeaters as prescribed by the design plan)61 to 
certain phenomenological imagery, then it would appear that the proper functionalist could 
endorse the necessity of some type of internal rationality.62 In fact, the proper functionalist 
could even construe phenomenological imagery as evidence and thus consider herself to be 
an evidentialist. Defeaters could then be formulated to demonstrate how a subject doesn’t 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 88. 
 
61 See Beilby, Epistemology As Theology, op. cit., 169. 
 
62 Here, I take phenomenological imagery to be synonymous or at least closely related to what is more 
commonly referred to in epistemology as ‘seemings.’ By ‘correct doxastic response,’ I just have in mind 
that a belief should be formed in an appropriate way as a response to the specific phenomenology one has; 
and forming the right sort of belief from the corresponding stimuli should be taken as a necessary condition 
(and perhaps sufficient in some cases) for internal rationality. If one has a particular experience that 
something is redly, the right sort of internal response would be to form the belief that something is redly.  
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appear to be giving the correct doxastic response. Having said this, it is important to point 
out that this being the case, given Plantinga’s design plan requirement for having to reflect 
for defeaters, one could not hold to a belief derived by proper function and either refuse to 
reflect for defeaters or refuse to make an appropriate doxastic response in light of a 
defeater. 
 
Furthermore, just because the design plan doesn’t require a subject to always meet 
certain internalist requirements, such as having arguments for their beliefs, it doesn’t 
follow that something like a propositional argument  or certain propositional evidence isn’t 
required for some beliefs.63 Again, perhaps the design plan doesn’t stipulate these sorts of 
internal requirements for beliefs such as the belief in other minds or memory-related 
beliefs, but it seems likely that it would require certain internalist conditions for things like 
the correct theory of warrant, high level scientific theories, or certain metaphysical beliefs, 
such as the belief in naturalism. If the design plan did require these sorts of internal 
requirements for beliefs such as the belief in naturalism, then it would appear that 
Plantinga isn’t being inconsistent when it comes to formulating defeaters that demonstrate 
the subjective irrationality of naturalism. Presumably then, the proper functionalist could 
actually advocate something very close to the McGrews’ modal principle:  
 
Proper Functionalist MP: If it is in principle impossible to show decisively that S’s 
belief that p is justified, then S is not justified in believing that p, insofar as the 
design plan requires such a requirement be met for S’s belief that p. 
 
 
2.12 Objections and Replies 
 
Perhaps the McGrews would argue in response that their modal principles are analytic 
truths, and if one wanted to incorporate their principles in an ad hoc manner, that is in a 
way that was contingent upon the design plan of one’s cognitive faculties, it would be 
analogous to an individual saying something like 1+1=2 only when it is a sunny day in 
Dallas. To treat an analytic truth as if it were contingent in this way would rob it of its 
analytic status and render it absurd. Even if the McGews pushed the proper functionalist to 
                                                 
63 I take it that externalism just is the denial of internalism. That is to say, if one denies that all beliefs need to 
meet some access requirement in order to be warranted, then one is espousing a variation of externalism. If 
this is the case, then Plantinga’s proper functionalism should still be considered as an externalist system, as 
he denies that such access is required for certain beliefs (e.g. belief in other minds).  
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see that this would be the case if the their modal principles were analytic truths, if the 
proper functionalist thinks about and understands their modal principles and yet comes 
away unconvinced that such principles are analytic truths, it would seem to me that the 
McGrews would have to do more in order to motivate the proper functionalist to abandon 
her project. The McGrews could not simply declare that the principles are analytic and yet 
give no positive reason for the proper functionalist to affirm this. At best, such an approach 
is asserting a groundless statement, and at worst, their argument could be accused of 
circular reasoning. If the proper functionalist, after considering such principles, is left 
unconvinced of their analyticity, she is in her epistemic right in rejecting that such 
principles are analytic truths. Moreover, if this is the case, and such principles aren’t 
analytic truths, the proper functionalist could incorporate them into her own proper 
functionalist framework. 
 
If the McGrews grant this, there is at least one more thing they could say in 
response to the proper functionalist who attempts to incorporate their modal principles into 
a proper functionalist framework. The McGrews could argue that I have not actually 
proven that their objection fails; I have only shown that it is epistemically possible that 
their objection fails. This is because I only argue that it is possible that the design plan of 
our cognitive faculties stipulates that metalevel requirements be met for beliefs like the 
belief in the Great Pumpkin or the belief in naturalism. It is still possible, however, that our 
design plan doesn’t stipulate such metalevel requirements in order for such beliefs to be 
warranted. And given that this is the case, I have failed to show that Plantinga doesn’t need 
to steal from the internalist’s view, rather I have merely shown that it is only epistemically 
possible that she doesn’t need to steal from the internalist’s view.  
 
Though I think this last point is fair, I don’t see how this constitutes an objection. 
The whole externalist project is named in conditional terms and those who are sympathetic 
to it aren’t likely to feel the need to know that we know what the design plan actually is in 
order to formulate defeaters towards particular beliefs produced from a subject’s cognitive 
faculties. The externalist is likely to accede to the need to formulate a defeater for the 
belief that ‘p’, if she thinks that ‘p’ isn’t part of the human design plan. And the externalist 
could rest assured, knowing that if the design plan does stipulate certain metalevel 
requirements, that her defeater would strip away such warrant for any subject who affirms 
‘p.’ Now, I suppose the McGrews would not be OK with this. Their internalist intuitions 
would leave them thinking that this should provide good reason for one to reject proper 
55 
 
functionalism altogether. But why should the proper functionalist think that this is the 
case? Her intuitions are fine with the conditional nature of how one knows that ‘p,’ and 
because of this, I don’t see any reason why an already convinced proper functionalist 
would see the need to jump ship and abandon the project of proper functionalism. And 
with this stated, I don’t see the McGrews’ objection as posing a major problem for proper 
functionalists.  
 
In summary of this section, I have argued that Plantinga is not inconsistent in 
formulating defeaters for two reasons. First, I have argued that, under Plantinga’s 
epistemology, all beliefs must be formed with some degree of internal rationality. This is 
so as the design plan requires an appropriate doxastic response to certain 
phenomenological imagery; an appropriate doxastic response that would even include one 
making the appropriate reflection for defeaters. And one could not hold to a belief derived 
by proper function and either refuse to reflect on defeaters or refuse to make an appropriate 
doxastic response in light of a defeater. Second, I argued that one could incorporate certain 
metalevel principles (even the McGrews’ own metalevel principles) into Plantinga’s proper 
functionalism. This, of course, would not work for all beliefs. Nonetheless, it seems 
epistemically possible that the design plan of our cognitive faculties could require their 
metalevel principle (or one like it) for certain beliefs. If it did so, Plantinga would be 
within his rights in directing defeaters towards those beliefs that do need to meet metalevel 
requirements. Given what I have established here, it is clear that it is not the case that 
Plantinga must use internalist conceptions of rationality and counterevidence to which he 
has no claim, rather, certain internalist conceptions of rationality could legitimately be 
appropriated to the proper functionalist’s framework. 
 
 
2.13 Conclusion 
 
The arguments considered have shown no good reason to reject Alvin Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant. As established in Chapter one, if this theory is correct, it would have certain 
important implications for the epistemology of religion. In the upcoming chapters of this 
thesis, I will explore those implications. Before doing this, however, I will need to interact 
with Plantinga’s claim that naturalism cannot account for either the proper function 
condition or the truth-aimed condition. It will be here that the foundation for my 
engagement with non-Christian religions will be laid. 
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Chapter 3: Pandora’s Box: Naturalism 
 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that naturalism cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to be 
warranted.1 Arguing for this serves two purposes. First, keeping in mind the Pandora’s Box 
Objection, it will demonstrate that not all sorts of serious religions or worldviews could use 
Plantinga’s religious epistemology. This is because naturalism is a serious worldview and 
yet it fails to predict its own warrantedness when combined with Plantinga’s epistemology. 
Secondly, in critiquing naturalism, I will establish some of the tools that are needed to 
engage the religions in the next couple of chapters.  
 
I will give two reasons why I believe that naturalism fails in providing the 
necessary resources to make intelligible Plantinga’s proper functionalism. First, by going 
through naturalistic accounts of proper function that have been developed by Karen 
Neander, Ruth Millikan, Ernest Sosa, and Michael Levin, I will argue that naturalism 
cannot account for proper function. I will then articulate how Plantinga has responded to 
these accounts and why it seems his criticism of them is successful. 
 
Second, even if naturalism could account for the proper function condition, the last 
two conditions of Plantinga’s theory still couldn’t be accounted for. This is because, 
according to the naturalist, our cognitive faculties have been developed for the purposes of 
producing beliefs that enable survival and reproduction and not necessarily delivering 
truth. As long as the content that is produced from one’s cognitive faculties enables 
survival and reproduction, that is the Darwinian requirement, the truth value of those 
beliefs becomes irrelevant. If one lacked a reason to privilege one belief that leads to the 
Darwinian requirement being met over another possible competing belief that leads to the 
same Darwinian result, then it would appear that one would have a defeater for both 
beliefs. Arguing in this way will lead me to conclude that naturalism, even if it were true, 
could not be warranted. 
                                                          
1 Some of the arguments made and thus some of the material here can be found in Tyler Dalton McNabb, 
Warranted Religion: Alvin Plantinga's Theory of Warrant Defended and Applied to Different World 
Religions (MA Thesis, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012), 52-82. 
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3.1 What is Naturalism? 
 
Before defending and furthering these arguments, it is important to provide a working 
definition of naturalism. There are many variations of meaning associated with the term 
‘naturalism.’ There is a naturalism that one might invoke in an epistemological context 
when discussing what types of things one can know.2 W.V. O. Quine defines naturalism in 
this context as characterized by the following view: ‘[i]t is within science itself, and not in 
some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.’3 Similarly, Michael 
Devitt notes, ‘[t]here is only one way of knowing: the empirical way that is the basis of 
science (whatever that may be).’4  
 
There is also a methodological understanding of naturalism that stipulates what 
methodological assumptions should guide or constrain the process of inquiry.5 Brian Leiter 
for example, argues, ‘[n]aturalism in philosophy is always first a methodological view to 
the effect that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the 
sciences.’6 These epistemological and methodological understandings are distinct from a 
metaphysical view of naturalism which, according to David Armstrong, is ‘a spatio-
temporal account of the general nature of reality.’7 W.T. Stace likewise states that, 
‘naturalism [is] the belief that the world is a single system of things or events every one of 
which is bound to every other in a network of relations and laws, and…outside this 
“natural order” there is nothing.’8 Armstrong’s and Stace’s definitions appear to be more in 
line with the form of naturalism that Plantinga is arguing against. In regard to what 
                                                          
2 I was originally made aware of the following definitions in Michael Rea, World Without Design: The 
Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 
 
3 W.V. O. Quine, Theories of Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 21.  
 
4 Michael Devitt, ‘Naturalism and the A Priori,’ Philosophical Studies 92, no. 1/2 (1998): 45. 
 
5 Rea, World Without Design, op. cit., 64. 
 
6 Brian Leiter, ‘Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence,’ in Law: New Essays in Legal Theory, ed. Brian 
Bix (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 81. 
 
7 David Armstrong, ‘Postscript: ‘Naturalism, Materialism, and First Philosophy Reconsidered,’ in 
Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, eds. Paul Moser and J. D. Trout (London: Routledge, 1995), 47. 
 
8 Walter T. Stace, ‘Naturalism and Religion,’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 23 (1949 – 1950): 22.  
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Plantinga specifically has in mind, Michael Bergmann states, ‘[m]etaphysical naturalism 
is, roughly speaking, the view that there are no supernatural beings-no such beings as, for 
example, God or angels or ghosts.’9 Bergmann’s definition will be the working definition 
for this chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Naturalistic Attempts at Proper Function 
 
In Chapter two, above, I argued that one of the conditions for warrant was that of proper 
function. It is not enough to have a reliable process of belief formation or internal access to 
the properties which confer warrant, as these things fail in securing a tight connection to 
truth. I argued that the Swampman case demonstrated this. To recap, Swampman’s 
faculties could be reliable and he could have the right internal access and yet, because there 
is no way in which his faculties should operate, he would lack a way in which he should 
form his beliefs appropriately. It wouldn’t be as if his faculties should produce such and 
such belief under such and such circumstance, rather his faculties just so happen to 
produce such and such belief under such and such circumstance. Thus, I concluded that the 
Swampman scenario gives us the ultimate Gettier problem, as well as a good reason to 
think that proper function is a necessary condition for warrant. 
 
If proper function is needed for warrant, could naturalism supply those 
preconditions that are required to make proper function intelligible? Plantinga points out 
that the naturalistic accounts of proper function that are put forward by various people 
aren’t really even accounts of proper function at all, but are merely similar accounts 
(nearby notions of it) that invoke evolution and natural selection.10 I will now give two 
such accounts of proper function (or nearby accounts of proper function) that have been 
defended by naturalists. Each of these either depends on or at least is complimented by 
contemporary evolutionary theory. I will then outline two further naturalistic accounts, 
ones that do not depend on evolutionary theory in any significant way. 
 
 
                                                          
9 Michael Bergmann, ‘Common Sense Naturalism,’ in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s 
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 61. 
 
10 Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2008), 22. 
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3.3 Non-Theistic Evolutionary Accounts of Proper Function 
 
Take, for example, Karen Neander’s account of proper function: ‘It is the proper function 
of an item X of an organism O to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to the 
inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the 
phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.’11 Essentially, when something 
is properly functioning, say one’s heart, it is contributing to one’s survival as that organ did 
in the case of one’s ancestors.  
 
Another very popular account of proper function that is related to Neander’s 
account is advanced by Ruth Millikan’s work: 
 
Putting things very roughly, for an item A to have function F as a ‘proper function’, it 
is necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions should hold (1) 
A originated as a ‘reproduction’ (to give one example, as a copy, or a copy of a copy) 
of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties 
reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally 
historically because) of this or these performances. (2) A originated as the product of 
some prior device that, given its circumstances, had performance of F as a proper 
function and that, under those circumstances, normally causes F to be performed by 
means of producing an item like A. Items that fall under condition (2) have ‘derived 
proper functions’, functions derived from the devices that produce them.12 
 
These naturalistic accounts of proper function will not work. They have in common one 
key thing – namely, a need for no originals. This would be a problem if there were logical 
possibilities where there were originals and yet there was still proper function. Consider, 
for example, the story of Adam and Eve (or something very much like it). Does it present a 
scenario that is logically possible? If so, such accounts as those proposed by Neander and 
Millikan will not work, for Adam and Eve’s hearts would be properly functioning and yet 
they would lack ancestors, or prior copies. Plantinga points this out when he states, 
‘[w]hether or not God directly and immediately created Adam and Eve, clearly he could 
                                                          
11 Karen Neander, ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense,’ Philosophy of Science 
58, no. 2 (1991): 174. 
 
12 Ruth Millikan, ‘In Defense of Proper Functions,’ Philosophy of Science 56 (1989): 288-289. 
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have – and if he had, they would have had no ancestors.’13 Similarly, would the first ever 
computer be properly functioning if indeed it lacked predecessors? It is obvious that it 
would. One will not be able to use accounts that depend on natural selection in order to 
give the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions of proper function as long as first 
copies, originals, and God are logical possibilities.14 
 
Furthermore, in regard to these evolutionary accounts, not only do such conditions 
seem unnecessary (given the logical possibility of Adam and Eve), but, as Plantinga has 
pointed out, such conditions do not appear to be sufficient either. Plantinga gives the 
example of a Hitler-like madman, who in order to fulfill his Nietzschean plan to play God 
orders his minions to enable a genetic mutation in selected non-Aryan victims; a mutation 
that will greatly hinder their visual system and add a certain amount of pain when they 
open their eyes.15  The Nietzschean regime then decides to start killing off the non-Ayran 
non-mutants. In doing so, the genetic mutation that hinders the visual system and causes 
discomfort actually saves the non-Aryan mutants from perishing. If one looks to some 
generations later, we can see the criteria of these evolutionary accounts being met. The 
later generations of non-Aryans mutants have visual systems that aided in their previous 
generation’s survival and that continues to aid them currently in survival. But should one 
really consider that the non-Aryan mutants have a visual system that is properly 
functioning? Plantinga answers no to this question and takes it as reason to reject accounts 
such as Neander’s and Millikan’s all together.16  
 
Contrary to Plantinga’s intuition, Peter Graham has argued that the non-Aryan 
mutants actually have two design plans.17 They have their original design plan of how their 
                                                          
13 Plantinga and Tooley, Knowledge of God, op. cit., 24. 
 
14 Peter Graham has argued that S gets function F from its history. He thinks natural selection, an organism’s 
metabolism, and a trial-and-error process are all ways in which S’s history gives S a function. Similar to 
Neander’s and Millikan’s accounts, Graham’s account seems to fall prey to the Adam and Eve 
counterexample, as Adam’s cognitive faculties and/or his heart lacks a relevant history, and yet each of 
these things possesses proper function. See Peter Graham, ‘Functions, Warrant, and History,’ in 
Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, eds. Fairweather, A. and O. Flanagan (Cambridge Press), forthcoming. 
Also, see Peter Graham, ‘Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Source of Purpose and Plan,’ in 
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2011), 
67-88. 
 
15 Plantinga and Tooley, Knowledge of God, op. cit., 26. 
 
16 Ibid., 27. 
 
17 Peter Graham, ‘Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Source of Purpose and Plan,’ in Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume, op. cit., 67-88. 
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faculties should function and they have a newly acquired design plan that has come about 
under the scenario which Plantinga has described. Thus, for Graham, there is one sense in 
which the non-Aryan mutants’ faculties are not functioning properly (in accordance with 
their original design plan) and another sense in which their faculties are functioning 
properly (in accordance with the newly acquired design plan). But is this plausible? It 
doesn’t seem at all clear to me that a way in which some people’s faculties ought to 
operate can come about solely from the refraining actions of those who decided not to kill 
them, just in virtue of their being victims of genetic harm which was originally brought 
about by those currently refraining from killing them. I think the Plantingian will rightly 
assert that this concession (that the non-Aryan mutants have a design plan) isn’t evidence 
that evolutionary accounts can work but rather that they can’t work. 
 
 
3.4 Non-Evolutionary and Non-Theistic Accounts of Proper Function 
 
It is important to note that non-theistic accounts of proper function do not have to hinge on 
evolution. I will now use two representative non-theistic and non-evolutionary accounts of 
proper function to illustrate how these sorts of accounts fail. The first account I will tackle 
is Ernest Sosa’s. Before I begin interacting with his account, it worth noting that it is not 
necessarily an account of proper function per se; rather it is an account of cognitive proper 
function. Sosa’s account states that, ‘S’s cognitive faculty, F, tracks the truth (and 
functions properly) if and only if, (1) if P were true F would produce (in S) her belief P, 
and (2) if F were to produce (in S) the belief that P, P would be true.’18 
 
According to Sosa’s account, as we explained in the previous chapter, one could 
have a faculty that appeared to be malfunctioning and yet it would in fact be properly 
functioning. Take again, the claim that religious beliefs are a result of cognitive 
malfunction. If God existed necessarily but our belief about him came from an unintended 
malfunction (and nothing else), our belief produced would still meet Sosa’s truth-tracking 
criteria as ‘[a]fter all, any belief in a necessary truth will be automatically as safe as could 
be. Not easily will one hold such a belief while it is false, since not possibly could one hold 
                                                          
18 Ernest Sosa, ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,’ in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: 
Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 276. 
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it while it was false.’19 This of course seems problematic. As discussed in Chapter two, 
because of issues related to this, Sosa proposes that the account would also need to include 
the claim that S would come to believe that ‘p’ in a virtuous way. Thus, Sosa might argue 
that one wouldn’t be functioning properly if one merely believed that God existed by way 
of this unintended cognitive process; rather, one would need that faculty to also be 
cognitively virtuous.  
 
I don’t think adding the virtue condition will save Sosa’s account of proper 
function as it forces him into a dilemma. Either he emphasizes that there needs to be a 
cognitive virtue (that is, as discussed in the last chapter, a faculty which has a way it 
should and shouldn’t function) which then pushes the question back as one would need to 
know what it means for this cognitive virtue to be functioning properly, or he could 
emphasize the original truth-tracking account. If he chooses the latter, in addition to the 
malfunction problem addressed above, a normative problem emerges. This is so as proper 
function invokes normative notions, such as ‘ought’ and ‘should,’ however, Sosa’s account 
(along with truth-tracking accounts in general) is merely a description of what conditions 
need to be in place in order for one to obtain knowledge. Thus, this account wouldn’t be 
going after what is at the heart of proper function, and this being so it isn’t a genuine 
account of what it means to have cognitive proper function. For all of these reasons, Sosa’s 
account doesn’t seem tenable. 
 
Like Sosa, Michael Levin has also developed a non-evolutionary dependent 
account of proper function. In developing Larry Wright’s account of proper function which 
seeks to focus on the explanation of things or relationships rather than the advantageous 
effects of faculties, Levin’s account goes as follows: F is a function of S if and only if “S is 
explained by its leading to F and is the efficient cause S’ of S is explained by its leading to 
S.”20 In regard to this account, Plantinga points out: 
 
God could have created Adam (or Eve) directly; if he had, the function of Adam’s 
heart would have been just what the function of our hearts is; namely to circulate 
the blood in a certain way. But (the second clause of) Levin’s conditions isn’t met 
                                                          
19 Ernest Sosa, ‘Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul 
Moser (New York: Oxford Press), 275. 
 
20 Michael Levin, ‘Plantinga on Functions and the Theory of Evolution,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
75, no. 1 (1997): 89. 
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in this case: it is not the case that, under these conditions, the efficient cause of 
Adam (namely God) is explained by his ‘leading to’ Adam’s heart.21 
 
If one could think of a counterexample where the efficient cause isn’t explained by its 
‘leading to’ such and such, then Levin’s account does not work. Similar to the evolutionary 
accounts that were reviewed above, this account faces the trouble of the dreaded Hitler 
scenario. Plantinga states:  
 
Take a given mutant m and his visual system S, which works in that unfortunate 
way. The existence of S is explained by its working in that way: working in that 
miserable way kept m (or m’s ancestors) from being killed by the Nazis. The 
efficient cause of S - whatever system it is, in human beings, that cause the 
existence of visual system -furthermore, is explained by its leading to S. In this 
case, then, the proposed necessary and sufficient condition is met; but it is not the 
function of m’s visual system to cause pain and display only a uniform green visual 
field with a few shadowy fires project on it.22 
 
With this, I think Plantinga has established two counterexamples (Adam & Eve and 
Hitler) that have proven successful when analyzing naturalistic proper function accounts. I 
think the failure of these accounts might help vindicate the intuition that proper function 
needs a ‘proper functioner,’ and/or a design plan needs a designer. The failures of these 
accounts do not conclusively show that no such account could work but their failures taken 
together with this prima facie intuition, should leave one to tentatively hold that there are 
no good naturalistic accounts of proper function. 
 
Having said this, however, for the purposes of this project, I will leave open the 
possibility of there being religions that don’t have a personal designer God (at least at the 
ultimate level), but nonetheless have other doctrines that might allow them to make sense 
of proper function in some relevant epistemic sense. This will be explored in more detail in 
the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
 
 
                                                          
21 Plantinga and Tooley, Knowledge of God, op. cit., 27-28. 
 
22 Ibid., 28. 
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3.5 Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) 
 
Using the work of Plantinga I will now attempt to formulate and defend an argument that 
will apply to a traditional naturalist, that is to a naturalist who both denies the existence of 
God and the immaterial soul. This will be a new problem confronting the naturalist in 
addition to the proper function issue discussed above. Plantinga has termed the sort of 
argument that I will be discussing here the evolutionary argument against naturalism. If 
successful, the argument will demonstrate that naturalism cannot be warranted because 
accepting both the tenets of naturalism and evolution implies that our faculties are neither 
directly nor indirectly aimed at producing true beliefs, but have evolved to produce beliefs 
that enable survival and reproduction. Naturalism will then fail to provide the necessary 
resources to secure a tight connection to truth.  
 
Let P stand for probability of, let R stand for the proposition that our cognitive 
faculties (and the beliefs that they produce in both basic and based ways) are reliable, and 
let N&E stand for naturalism and evolution. Plantinga latest version of the EAAN goes as 
follows: 
 
(1) P(R/N&E) is low.  
(2) Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that P(R/N&E) is low has a defeater for R. 
(3) By definition, anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other 
belief she has, including [belief in] N&E itself. 
(4) If one who accepts N&E thereby acquires a defeater for N&E, N&E is self-
defeating and cannot rationally be accepted.23  
 
I will first address the less controversial (2), before I turn to the all-important (1). 
Regarding (2), one might wonder why the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable 
could not be a basic belief. Perhaps it would appear that given N&E the chances of our 
cognitive faculties producing mostly true beliefs would be low, but given our strong 
intuition that our faculties are reliable we could still be warranted in affirming R in a basic 
way. Michael Bergmann argues for this as follows: 
 
                                                          
23 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 344-345. 
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Even if a naturalist believed that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, this needn’t give 
her a defeater for R. For she could have nonpropositional evidence for R that is 
sufficiently strong to make belief in R rational, reasonable, and warranted - even 
for someone whose total relevant propositional evidence, k, was such that P(R/k) is 
low or inscrutable.24 
 
How would a Plantigian respond to such an argument? It would first be helpful to 
concede that though one might acquire a belief in a basic way, it doesn’t follow that it 
would be immune to defeaters (as Bergmann eloquently establishes in his own work). In 
order to help make this clearer, I will use beliefs obtained through the means of perception 
and testimony as examples. Take the case of Future Flash and Cisco as an example of the 
former. Flash, a metahuman who has the ability to run at warp speeds, ran so fast that he 
traveled back in time. As it so happened, he traveled one year back in time and he found 
himself in front of his friend, Cisco. Unbeknownst to Cisco that it was the Flash from his 
future, he formed in a basic way the belief that the Flash of the present was in front of him. 
However, after he formed this belief, the Flash of the present emerged. This of course 
caused confusion. After the Flash of the future explained what had happened, Cisco 
obtained a defeater for thinking that the Flash of the present was in front of him. We can 
conclude from this that perceptual beliefs formed in a basic way can fall victim to 
defeaters. 
 
In regard to beliefs formed by way of testimony, take the example of Matt and 
Karen. Matt Murdock is lawyer by day and a superhero by night. He originally obtained 
super powers in an accident when his visual system was exposed to toxic chemicals. 
Wanting to hide his abilities, he proceeded to act completely blind. Matt, as Daredevil, 
eventually used his super powers to fight villains at night. However, fighting at night took 
a toll on his body to the point where his daytime co-worker, Karen, asked about his 
injuries. Matt told Karen that he was in a car accident and thus by way of Matt’s testimony, 
Karen formed the belief that Matt was in a car accident. Eventually, Matt stopped lying to 
Karen and he told her that he was in fact the Daredevil and that those injuries that he had 
were not from a car accident. Karen realized that the belief she formed by way of 
testimony was defeated and she formed a new belief.  
                                                          
24 Bergmann, ‘Common Sense Naturalism,’ in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary 
Argument Against Naturalism, op. cit., 68. 
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In both of these cases, upon reflection on new information beliefs originally 
obtained in a basic manner were defeated. This is what Plantinga is trying to get across; 
namely, if one has a basic belief that one’s cognitive faculties are reliable, but then reflects 
on the truths of N&E and comes to the conclusion that there is an undercutting defeater for 
all of one’s beliefs, one would then be irrational if one continued to hold that one’s 
cognitive faculties were reliable.25 Now, one would indeed have to be convinced that the 
probability of R is low or inscrutable, where it significantly deceases one’s warrant for 
believing R. But if that were the case one would have a defeater for one’s basic belief in R, 
and thus would be irrational in continuing to hold to both R and N&E.  
 
What Bergmann has shown is that this argument might be person-variable. Some 
individuals might be affected by this argument in such a way that their warrant is 
significantly decreased, even given certain non-propositional evidence. Others, however, 
(Bergmann?) might not be moved by this argument given their conviction that they have 
non-propositional evidence that ‘outweighs’ the propositional evidence for R being low or 
for S having a defeater for R. Given that this is the case, the success of Plantinga’s EAAN 
rests on (1) being plausible. If, indeed, (1) can be demonstrated, or as I will argue, 
something very close to (1), Plantinga’s EAAN should be seen as a good argument against 
naturalism.  
 
3.6 A Reformational View on Paul 
 
I will now defend Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism by arguing for 
what is at the heart of (1) and then further his argument by applying it to strictly 
metaphysical beliefs. I will not be defending the claim that given N&E the probability of R 
is low, rather I will defend the claim that given N&E the probability of R is inscrutable.26 
Defending the second claim rather than the first does not significantly weaken Plantinga’s 
conclusion, as if one lacks a reason for trusting a faculty one wouldn’t be warranted in 
accepting any belief produced from that faculty. My discussion of the Norman’s 
Clairvoyant case in the previous chapter establishes this point. Thus, the inscrutable nature 
                                                          
25 By undercutting defeater, I mean a defeater that doesn’t directly demonstrate that something is false; 
rather, the defeater demonstrates that one is in an epistemic situation where one lacks warrant for believing 
that p. 
 
26 Plantinga suggests that this is an option in Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 231. 
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of R should be seen as sufficiently troubling to the traditional naturalist. And yet, being 
that I just need to establish that the probability is inscrutable rather than low, this approach 
will seem less controversial and thus more virtuous than Plantinga’s main approach.27 
 
In Plantinga’s earlier works, he argued that in an orthodox Darwinian framework 
man’s cognitive faculties are understood to produce beliefs that are not aimed directly at 
truth, but at survival and reproductive behavior. As Patricia Churchland puts this sort of 
naturalist view: 
 
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the 
four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous 
systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may 
survive... Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: A 
fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s 
way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, 
definitely takes the hindmost.28 
 
In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga outlines the following scenario to show 
how advantageous beliefs produced by natural selection could nonetheless also be false: 
 
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always 
runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees 
will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is 
concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. ... Or perhaps he thinks the 
tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that 
the best way to pet it is to run away from it. ... Clearly there are any number of belief-
cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.29 
 
The sophomore biology major might object to this example on the grounds that in order for 
Paul to have a fighting chance at getting away from the tiger he would have to get his 
adrenaline pumping through his body. Wanting to pet a ‘nice ole pussycat,’ or perhaps 
                                                          
27 Rea takes a similar approach in, Rea, World Without Design, op. cit., 82, 84. 
 
28 Patricia Churchland, ‘Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience,’ Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 10 (1987): 
548-549. 
 
29 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 225-226. 
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being manically depressed and wanting to get eaten by a bigger one, would simply not do 
the trick.30 Thus, the biology major might complain that Plantinga’s example fails to show 
how Paul might have a belief that would aid him in surviving while failing to correspond 
with external reality.  
 
This line of reasoning is also articulated by Jerry Fodor, Evan Fales, and Stephen 
Law.31 Their objections all centre on the belief that natural selection would select mostly 
true beliefs, as true beliefs would be what are needed to give the greatest chance of 
survival. Law’s main point is somewhat different than Fodor’s and Fales’, as Law has in 
mind the idea that certain neural structures just are certain beliefs.32 Law insists that, 
ultimately, given certain neural structures combined with certain desires, a subject’s 
faculties will likely produce true beliefs that are necessary for survival and reproduction. 
Law formulates his objection to Plantinga into a scenario – let’s call it the wandering 
nomad objection.33 Law asserts the following:  
 
Consider a human residing in an arid environment. Suppose the only accessible 
water lies five miles to the south of him. Our human is desperately thirsty. My 
suggestion is that we can know a priori, just by reflecting on the matter, that if 
something is a belief that, solely in combination with a strong desire for water, 
typically results in such a human walking five miles to the south, then it is quite 
likely to be the belief that there’s water five miles to the south (or the belief that 
there’s reachable water thataway [pointing south] or whatever). It’s highly unlikely 
to be the belief that there isn’t any water five miles to the south (or isn’t any 
                                                          
30 Is there any reason to believe that natural selection couldn’t have resulted in a situation where depression 
pumps adrenaline and not wanting to become dinner triggers laughter? I am not sure why natural selection 
couldn’t have gerrymandered our emotions and desires differently in regard to what biological reactions 
they trigger.  
 
31 Jerry Fodor, ‘Is Science Biologically Possible?,’ in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s 
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 30-42; Evan Fales, ‘Darwin’s Doubt, Calvin’s Calvary,’ in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 43-58. 
 
32 Stephen Law holds that the neural structures that are selected are selected in virtue of what behavior they 
will likely produce. This leads him to argue that beliefs that enable survival and reproduction are likely 
true beliefs. The response that I will give can grant his assumption that neural structures just are beliefs and 
that those beliefs are selected because of their relation to the necessary behavior that needs to be displayed. 
 
33 Though Law has published recently on this topic, here I refer to Stephan Law, ‘Latest Version of EAAN 
Paper,’ Stephen Law, last modified November, 2010, accessed October 27, 2014, 
http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2010/11/latest-version-eaan-paper-for-comments.html. For print reference 
see, Stephen Law, ‘Naturalism, Evolution, and True Belief,’ Analysis 72 (2012): 41-48. 
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reachable water thataway), or the belief that there’s water five miles to the north (or 
thisaway [pointing north]), or the belief that there’s a mountain of dung five miles 
to the south, or that inflation is high, or that Paris is the capital of Bolivia.34 
 
Is Plantinga’s attempted defeater then deflected? In Naturalism Defeated: Essays 
on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Plantinga takes aim at the 
objection that a belief that enables survival will likely be a true belief. There he appears to 
raise a defeater-deflector of his own by asserting that the answer is in gerrymandering the 
right properties. In what seems to be a rarely responded to argument, Plantinga gives 
several examples of this. To Fales, Plantinga writes: 
 
Consider the cognitive agents who think everything is created by God and whose 
predicates express only properties entailing being created by God. Then, by the 
naturalist’s lights, their beliefs will be mainly false. Still, their beliefs can obviously 
be adaptive, that is, lead to appropriate action; all that’s required is that they ascribe 
the right properties to the right objects. Thus, for example, if they ascribe the 
property of being a tiger creature to tigers, and the property of being a dangerous 
creature to tiger creatures, they will presumably act in appropriate ways.35 
 
In a similar manner, Plantinga gives the example of a tribe who predicates the property of 
witch to everything36 – meaning that what really is a fierce and dangerous tiger is given the 
properties of dangerous, fierce, and witch. Let F be the property of fierce and let D be the 
property of dangerous. Say Paul is now in a tribe that perceives and believes all sorts of 
things have the property of witch. Paul falsely sees a witch that has the properties F and D. 
Paul now perceives imminent danger, which helps meet the conditions to get his adrenaline 
pumping so that he can flee. As long as the right properties are in place (F&D), there 
seems to be no reason why the remaining content has to be true. 
 
Perhaps one might reject this clarification, on the grounds that although Paul has 
one false belief, namely, that something is a witch, he still has true beliefs, namely that 
                                                          
34 Stephan Law, ‘Latest Version of EAAN Paper,’ op. cit..  
 
35 Plantinga, ‘Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,’ in Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary 
Argument against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 265. 
 
36 Ibid., 253. 
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something is F or something is D. In regard to predicating the property of witch to an 
appletree that is blooming, Jerry Fodor responds to Plantinga’s approach: 
 
Still, much of what a creature believes in virtue of which it believes that that 
appletree witch is blooming (and in virtue of which the thought that that apple tree 
witch is blooming leads to behavioral successes) are perfectly straightforwardly 
true. For example: that’s an appletree; that’s blooming; that’s there; something is 
blooming; something is blooming there, and so on indefinitely. The point is trivial 
enough: If a creature believes that appletree witch is blooming, then it presumably 
believes that that’s an appletree and that that’s a witch and that that’s blooming. 
And two of these are true beliefs that the creature shares with us and that enter into 
explanation of its behavioral successes vis-à-vis blooming appletrees in much of the 
same way that the corresponding beliefs of ours enter into the explanation of our 
behavior success vis-à-vis blooming appletrees.37 
 
Plantinga responds to Fodor as follows: 
 
[T]hese creatures form beliefs only of the form ‘that P-witch has Q’ for properties P 
and Q. (We may add, if we like, that they form general beliefs of the form all 
(some) P-witches are Q, together with propositions appropriately constructible out 
of these general and singular beliefs.) So the creature in question doesn’t believe 
that’s an appletree (though he may believe that witch is an appletree) or that’s 
blooming (though he may believe that witch is blooming). Why couldn’t there be 
creatures like that? Not, surely (as Fodor himself notes), because any such creatures 
would have to believe all the logical consequences (for all the obvious logical 
consequences) of what he believes; we ourselves do not do that.38 
 
Plantinga’s argument comes down to the possibility that humans could have been 
constituted in such a way that they form beliefs in a phenomenologically simple way. It 
seems biologically possible that we could have evolved in such a way that we form beliefs 
without ever coming to believe in any of the logical consequences that those beliefs entail. 
                                                          
37Fodor, ‘Is Science Biologically Possible?,’ in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary 
Argument Against Naturalism, op. cit., 34. 
 
38 Plantinga, ‘Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,’ Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary 
Argument against Naturalism op. cit., 254. 
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Thus, to believe that witchtree is blooming does not require one to believe that that’s a tree 
or that’s blooming. If this is possible, then it seems that one could form all sorts of 
different false beliefs that lead to survival and reproduction. If there are different beliefs 
that could be formed that would equally meet the Darwinian requirement, one would have 
to believe that one should remain agnostic in determining the probability of R. This is so as 
one would lack a way to determine if one’s faculties produced beliefs that both met the 
Darwinian requirement and reflected the external reality or if one’s beliefs just met the 
Darwinian requirement. I will address this further in my own version of the argument, by 
the end of the chapter. Now, having explained how Plantinga has responded to Fales and 
Fodor, I will apply his response to Law’s scenario. 
 
Instead of a man who needs to know the correct location of the water, let us change 
the content of the scenario to a man needing a magical potion. Perhaps the nomad believes 
there was a demi-god who was jealous of humankind. Along with this, he believes that the 
demi-god cursed man and the creatures below man out of that jealousy. The curse now 
makes men’s mouths shrivel up as the life is sucked slowly out of them. However, perhaps 
he also believes there is a good demi-god who countered this jealousy by giving man a 
special potion to sustain the life of man. The location of this magical potion is under the 
earth (where the demi-gods live of course) and can be seen in an abounding outflow from 
the earth. The nomad has several false beliefs in this revised scenario, but he is still being 
led by those false beliefs to meet the Darwinian requirement.  
 
Now, one may think that this nice story might help explain how one could have lots 
of false beliefs, but it does not explain why the nomad forms what seem to be true beliefs 
that are necessary for him to hold if he is to identify the location of the magical potion and 
his need to consume it. Thus, like Fodor, Law could tell Plantinga that the nomad still has 
several true beliefs. The proponent of Plantinga’s argument could then give a two-pronged 
response. First, the advocate of the EAAN could argue that if all of the beliefs that the 
nomad formed are formed in such a way that they are affirmed without reflection on any 
entailment (see the above discussion of Fales’ view), then the nomad would still have all or 
mostly all false beliefs. The nomad would believe that magical potion is over there, or I 
need that magical potion to survive. He wouldn’t need in addition to those beliefs to 
believe that there was something over there or that I need something to survive.  
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Secondly, one might argue that the proponent of the EAAN can concede that Law 
has demonstrated that there might be some true propositions that must be believed in order 
to survive and reproduce, but besides those beliefs that must be believed, all other sorts of 
important beliefs could be false. Perhaps she would focus on how metaphysical beliefs 
don’t secure such a tight connection to truth on N&E, and thus she would focus her 
attention on naturalism’s problem with metaphysical beliefs. 
 
It remains to be seen whether Plantinga’s responses will convince the sceptics. I 
will soon move the discussion forward by proposing a new way of looking at Paul, the 
friendly homo-sapiens. Before doing that I will briefly overview some evolutionary 
explanations that have been given by naturalists for certain metaphysical beliefs. After 
surveying a few of these metaphysical views and their relation to neo-Darwinian evolution, 
I will demonstrate how one might go about arguing for what I have suggested as the 
second response that the proponent of the EAAN could give to the challenge raised by 
Law, Fodor, and Fales. 
 
 
3.7 Naturalism and its Current Endeavour in Metaphysics 
 
I will now briefly go through different metaphysical beliefs that most humans currently 
hold to and which could have resulted from natural selection. By metaphysical belief(s), I 
mean a particular kind of proposition affirmed by a subject, which has traditionally been 
understood to be outside the spectrum of the empirical sciences and that is ultimately 
thought to be about what is real. Paul Churchland considers some such propositions when 
he raises the following questions, ‘[i]s our basic conception of human cognition and 
agency yet another myth, moderately useful in the past perhaps, yet false at its edge or 
core? Will a proper theory of brain function present a significantly different or 
incompatible portrait of human nature?’39 
 
Churchland himself is ‘inclined toward positive answers to all these questions.’40 
He isn’t alone in questioning our basic human experience though, as Daniel Dennett states, 
                                                          
39 Paul Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 19.  
 
40 Ibid. 
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‘[t]he human mind is something of a bag of tricks, cobbled together over the eons by the 
foresightless process of evolution by natural selection.’41  
 
Attempts have been made to explain why the vast majority of the world’s 
population has religious belief. Several naturalists such as E.O. Wilson and Michael Ruse 
have argued that natural selection could have produced belief in God for survival.42 Kai 
Nielsen has continued this line of thinking by allowing for the possibility that the notion of 
personal dignity has a religious genesis.43 Daniel Dennett seems to agree as he regards the 
notion of rights as being ‘[n]onsense on stilts.’44 
 
Of course, if the notion of human dignity did indeed have an evolutionary 
explanation, it would seem probable that ethics would as well. Mark Linville argues that if 
naturalistic Darwinian evolution were true, there would be Darwinian counterfactuals. That 
is, moral values and obligations could have been perceived differently had the 
circumstances of evolution been different.45 Linville reflects on the world that Darwin had 
envisioned: 
 
Had the circumstances of human evolution been more like those of hive bees or 
Galapagos boobies or wolves, then the directives of conscience may have led us to 
judge and behave in ways that are quite foreign to our actual moral sense. Our 
wolfish philosophers defend justice as inequality, and their erudite reasonings take 
their cue from the fund of judgments bequeathed to them by their genes. Bees and 
boobies graced with intellect would judge that siblicide and infanticide are morally 
required under certain conditions.46  
 
                                                          
41 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion As a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking, 2006), 107. 
 
42 See Plantinga’s discussion of their views in Plantinga, ‘Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,’ op. cit., 260.  
 
43 Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (London: Pemberton, 1973), 123-125. 
 
44 Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1995), 507.  
 
45 Mark Linville, ‘The Moral Argument,’ in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, eds. William 
Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 409. 
 
46 Ibid. 
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In the same manner, Michael Ruse states, ‘[n]ow you know that morality is an illusion put 
in place by your genes to make you a social cooperator.’47 
 
Just as they seek to explain moral values and obligations, naturalists often attempt 
to explain belief in free will via natural selection. In reference to free will, Patricia 
Churchland states, ‘[i]t’s like the illusion with morality. We know that moral laws are not 
specified by the gods. We know that they are, first of all, neurobiologically based or 
evolutionarily based, and, secondly, culturally based, but it’s very useful for people to have 
the illusion that these are really true.’48 One of the leading philosophers of mind, John 
Searle, admits that ‘[o]ur conception of physical reality simply does not allow for 
[libertarian] radical freedom.’49 Searle is not as certain with regard to why evolution would 
have given man the illusion of alternative possibilities, for he goes on to state, ‘[f]or that 
reason, I believe, neither this discussion nor any other will ever convince us that our 
behavior is unfree.’50 
 
Let us continue our tour of metaphysical proposals that have arrived by way of 
biological adaption. Dennett suggests that the problem of how meaning could be 
determinate in a determined and Darwinian-fashioned universe could be solved by denying 
any determinate meaning altogether. He states:  
 
Something has to give. Either you must abandon meaning rationalism -- the idea 
that you are, unlike the fledgling cuckoo not only having access, but in having 
privileged access to your meanings -- or you must abandon the naturalism that 
insists that you are, after all, just a product of natural selection, whose intentionality 
is thus derivative and hence potentially indeterminate.51   
 
                                                          
47 Michael Ruse, ‘God is Dead. Long Live Morality,’ last modified March 15, 2010, accessed October 26, 
2014,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/15/morality-evolution-philosophy.   
48 Patricia and Paul Churchland, ‘Patricia and Paul Churchland,’ in Conversations on Consciousness: What 
the Best Minds Think About the Brain, Free Will, and What It Means to Be Human, ed. Susan Blackmore 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62. 
 
49 John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 98. 
50 Ibid. 
 
51 Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 313. 
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Lastly, I would like to point out that according to Plantinga, Michael Rea argues 
that materialism implies there are no real objects but that things are really propertied goo.52 
It seems to me that regardless of Rea’s account of why this is, it is metaphysically possible 
that there are really no such things as objects (at least given how we currently understand 
physical objects), but that our system developed in a special way thereby allowing us to 
perceive ‘physical objects’ so that we could better organize our surroundings.  
 
 
3.8 A New Perspective on Paul                                                                                            
 
On the basis of the few examples considered above, I would now like to take a new look at 
Paul. However, this time instead of focusing on the relationship with the tiger I propose 
looking at Paul from his perspective. Suppose that Paul again encounters the tiger. We can 
ask what false beliefs could be produced that would also lead to a right Darwinian result. 
In this new scenario Paul lives in a world where there are no objects, perhaps one in which 
there is only proportioned goo.53 Suppose, however, that it is in this world that our minds 
have evolved in such a way as to perceive ‘objects’ in order to enhance our prospects for 
survival.54 Paul finds himself eye-to-eye with a tiger and is distressed about what he should 
do. He believes that his free will (though he is a determined being) has brought him here 
and it comforts him as he goes up against the tiger. After thinking for a while, Paul decides 
it would be best if he were to scream for help just in case any nearby hunters were 
listening. Of course, his thoughts are indeterminate, just as a cuckoo bird’s thoughts would 
be, but luckily for Paul he does not know that. Paul then makes a good conscious reflection 
about his situation and the moral obligation he feels to run up against the tiger so that his 
large family (which he has built up for religious reasons) may get away. Paul attacks the 
tiger in order that his offspring may live and reproduce. 
 
These beliefs would successfully deliver the correct Darwinian output, and yet 
these beliefs could have all been false. Thus, here is an example in which our cognitive 
faculties could be producing false metaphysical beliefs, and yet these false metaphysical 
                                                          
52 Plantinga, ‘Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,’ Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary 
Argument against Naturalism op. cit., 261. 
 
53 Ibid. 
 
54 Perhaps even the metaphysical belief in other minds is really an illusion that natural selection has provided. 
Something like a Freudian theory could be true, in that in order to survive this cold and dark world our 
mind has projected other minds to aid in our comforting. 
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beliefs could in fact be aiding survival. Notice, I have not argued that natural selection did 
make it the case that we would believe in things like free will and moral obligations for the 
evolutionary reasons that were given. Nor have I claimed that the evolutionary 
explanations for the metaphysical beliefs that have been discussed above are orthodox 
views in the naturalist community. Rather, I am arguing that given N&E, it is inscrutable 
whether these evolutionary explanations are just as likely as any other sort of explanation 
as for why a subject holds to certain beliefs. 
 
 
3.9 Natural Selection, Deism, and Naturalism 
 
Now that I have established how different metaphysical beliefs could contribute to 
fulfilling the Darwinian requirement and yet not be true beliefs, I would like to bring 
attention to some more even specific metaphysical beliefs, namely belief in deism55 and 
belief in naturalism. As mentioned above, there are certain evolutionary psychologists who 
affirm that our cognitive faculties produce belief in God as a means to survival. Perhaps 
believing in something like God is comforting, or perhaps believing in something 
transcendent to themselves helps a group’s unity and community. Now, if for such reasons 
believing in deism aided a group in meeting the Darwinian requirement, then this belief 
would seem to be a candidate for what our cognitive faculties could produce given natural 
selection. 
 
This doesn’t seem the only candidate however, as perhaps naturalism could also be 
a belief delivered to us by natural selection. We could imagine a hypothetical scenario in 
which humans who were inclined to have religious beliefs and form religious rituals in 
light of them would have been prone to fighting among themselves about these beliefs and 
rituals. This division would have led to a continually decreasing population. Now, if a 
mutation naturally occurred in some individuals leading them to naturally believe in 
naturalism, that would have allowed the predisposed naturalists to have a better chance to 
meet the Darwinian requirement.  
 
Thus, if both believing in deism and believing in naturalism are genuine 
possibilities that natural selection could have disposed people towards, there would be no 
                                                          
55 Let deism be the belief that though God exists and is responsible in some sense for our creation, he doesn’t 
intervene and in this case, hasn’t guided our cognitive faculties through the process of evolution. 
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way to know which of them, if either, is true. Both of these beliefs could have aided in 
meeting the Darwinian requirement and both would recognize certain evidence as 
supporting their views. When the Darwinian requirement could be met by two different 
and conflicting views, I fail to see how one could know if one’s cognitive faculties are 
aimed at producing true metaphysical beliefs or if one’s metaphysical beliefs have been 
produced and kept merely for the purposes of meeting the Darwinian requirement.56 
 
 
3.10 XX Pills and Undercutting Defeaters 
 
Perhaps one now might be tempted to run to science and reason (S&R) and argue that the 
empirical sciences can come to our rescue. Maybe, left without S&R, we would just have 
to work from unreliable intuitions that we have been hardwired to have. But with S&R we 
can verify in an objective way how the world really is. We can then have tangible reasons 
for believing that free will is an illusion or that there really are such things as objects. 
 
This sort of thinking misses the point entirely. For on this view humans would 
likely have beliefs about their epistemic justification that would stem from a particular 
framework resulting from natural selection. This framework would be made up of 
impulses, intuitions, background beliefs, and moral values, which would all be subjected to 
particular Darwinian factors that under different circumstances could easily not have 
actualized. This framework would then be used to interpret and analyze all of the evidence 
for God’s existence. 
 
This case would then seem similar to the one of the man who takes the XX pill. For 
the purposes of this argument, the XX pill renders it the case that there is at least a 50 
percent chance that one’s cognitive faculties would permanently malfunction. Even if the 
man having taken the pill looked around and it appeared to him that nothing had changed, 
it wouldn’t seem that he would have warrant for his belief that R. This would be so even if 
he did empirical experiments or used reason to try to prove that his cognitive faculties were 
in fact reliable.  
                                                          
56 In addition to these possibilities, given the right external factors, perhaps we could have been biologically 
constituted in such a way that we would naturally believe in god or gods, but then slowly lose that belief 
for belief in naturalism. Similarly, the opposite of this also seems possible. The point is, on N&E there is 
no way of telling if a belief came about from faculties aimed at truth or if the belief is just accepted as the 
result of the fulfillment of the Darwinian requirement.  
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3.11 The Evolutionary Argument Against Metaphysical Beliefs 
 
It is in virtue of this that I now propose a new argument within the family of Plantinga’s 
EAAN. Again, let N&E stand for naturalism and evolution.  
 
(1) Given N&E, all of our metaphysical beliefs are either the direct result of being 
produced to meet the Darwinian requirement, they are evolutionary by-products 
(spandrels) of beliefs that do, or they are beliefs that are disadvantageous for our 
survival. 
(2) Given (1) it seems possible that under different circumstances, our evolutionary 
makeup could have been such that we would have held different metaphysical 
beliefs.  
(3) (2) would include all metaphysical beliefs besides those metaphysical beliefs 
that would be required to be held in order to meet the Darwinian requirement. 
(4) Given (2) and (3), if one’s cognitive faculties could have produced different 
metaphysical beliefs, if upon reflection one lacked a reason for giving preference to 
certain metaphysical beliefs over others, one would lack a way of knowing which 
metaphysical beliefs were true. 
(5) If one lacked a way of knowing which metaphysical beliefs were true, then one 
would have a defeater for those metaphysical beliefs. 
(6) Naturalism is a metaphysical belief that one would lack a reason for giving 
preference to it over another belief. 
(7) Therefore, given (4) and (5), one has a defeater for belief in naturalism. 
 
It appears to me that (1) and (2) would be espoused by anyone who adheres to 
N&E; thus I suspect that these premises would not be controversial. However, the main 
thrust of the argument would be with regard to (4) and (6).57 If the above examples are 
sufficient to demonstrate its plausibility, at least in showing that (4) and (6) are more 
plausible than their negation, then I think the argument is a good one and can contribute to 
the literature that pertains to the evolutionary argument against naturalism. The advantage 
of this argument is that it permits the possibility of there being certain beliefs that have to 
be held in order for a person to survive and reproduce. However, as long as there are 
                                                          
57 Though I don’t foresee (5) being too controversial, for those who don’t share my intuition, see Michael 
Huemer, ‘Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief,’ in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in 
Epistemology and Ethics, eds. Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (New York: Oxford Press, 2007), 142-
157. 
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conflicting metaphysical beliefs which could all lead a subject to meet the Darwinian 
requirement, the argument can still get off the ground. 
 
 
3.12 Conclusion 
 
I first argued that naturalism lacks the resources to account for proper function. I did this 
by interacting with certain notorious naturalistic accounts of proper function as well as 
Plantinga’s critiques of them. I argued that since proper function is a necessary condition 
for warrant it would seem to follow that naturalism could not be warranted.  
 
I then explained Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. The core of 
this argument rested on the claim that, given natural selection, one’s cognitive faculties are 
not aimed at truth but at survival and reproduction. But because one can affirm all sorts of 
false propositions that despite being false, would still aid in survival and reproduction, one 
would have a defeater for the belief that one’s cognitive faculties were producing true 
beliefs. Finally, I developed my own version of the argument by focusing exclusively on 
metaphysical beliefs and, within that genre especially on naturalism and deism.  
 
I have now explained and defended Plantinga’s arguments that naturalism cannot 
account for the proper function condition and the truth-aimed condition of his theory of 
warrant. The proponent of Plantinga’s religious epistemology now has a response to the 
person who argues that naturalism could be warranted in a similar way to Christian belief. 
In moving on to the next chapter, I will engage Rose Ann Christian’s original Pandora’s 
Box Objection. I will there reject the claim that Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta Hinduism can 
supply the resources to account for and thus utilize Plantinga’s epistemology. 
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Chapter 4: Pandora’s Box: Hinduism 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
In Chapter one, I mentioned Rose Ann Christian’s suggestion that a follower of Shankara’s 
Advaita Vedanta tradition could adopt Plantinga’s religious epistemology.1 For Christian, 
this is problematic; having an epistemological system that would potentially allow a 
religious tradition that is vastly different from Christianity to also be warranted without the 
support of an argument seems to greatly weaken Plantinga’s religious epistemology. 
Again, Beilby makes the point that there might be possible objections to such a worldview, 
yet one might be able to handle these potential defeaters in a similar way as Plantinga does 
with Christianity.2 As mentioned, David Tien makes a similar argument that Neo-
Confucianism could be warranted in the same way that Plantinga’s Christianity could be 
warranted. Tien finds this troubling for it would show that the follower of Neo-
Confucianism is in the same epistemic boat as the Christian.3 And once more it is 
important to reiterate that Plantinga seems to believe that various religious traditions could 
use his system: 
 
But, you say, isn’t this just a bit of logical legerdemain; are there any systems of 
beliefs seriously analogous to Christian belief for which these claims cannot be 
made? For any such set of beliefs, couldn’t we find a model under which the beliefs 
in question have warrant, and such that given the truth of those beliefs, there are no 
philosophical objections to the truth of the model? Well, probably something like 
that is true for the other theistic religions: Judaism, Islam, some forms of Hinduism, 
and some forms of Buddhism, some forms of American Indian religion. Perhaps 
                                                          
1 Rose Ann Christian, ‘Plantinga, Epistemic Permissiveness, and Metaphysical Pluralism,’ Religious Studies 
28, no. 4 (1992): 553-573. 
 
2 James Beilby, Epistemology As Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology 
(Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), 131. 
 
3 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the 
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 4 (2004): 31-55.  
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these religions are like Christianity in that they are subject to no de jure objections 
that are independent of de facto objections.4 
 
Now, I am unsure what forms of Buddhism and Hinduism Plantinga has in mind. If 
by forms of Hinduism or Buddhism he has in mind those forms that espouse personal 
theism, I might be sympathetic to his comment. However, there are major historic 
philosophical forms of Hinduism that wouldn’t fall into this category and I am unaware of 
any Buddhist tradition that would as well. It is with this stated that I would like to 
challenge the claim that Plantinga has allowed a wide range of serious religious beliefs to 
be warranted in the same way that Christian belief could be warranted.  
 
Since the earliest formulation of this objection can be found in Christian’s work, in 
the context of her claim that the Advaita Vedanta tradition could use Plantinga’s religious 
epistemology, I will first address her argument. However, in order to properly address it, I 
will need to articulate Advaita Vedanta’s core doctrinal beliefs as seen in its central thinker 
Shankara. This will lead us to see that Shankara endorsed a type of proper functionalism. 
Since Shankara endorsed something like proper functionalism, it would seem to provide 
even more reason to think that Plantinga’s epistemology would allow the core belief of 
Advaita Veldanta to be warranted in a similar way as the core belief of Christianity. This 
will further motivate a response to Christian’s original objection and provide more 
plausibility for it being able to account for the preconditions that are necessary to make 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. 
 
After exegeting the central beliefs of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, I will argue that it 
lacks the resources to make intelligible both the proper function condition and the truth 
aimed condition. This will be due to Advaita Vedanta’s ontological commitment that all of 
reality consists of the impersonal Brahman. Having interacted with Christian’s claim about 
the Advaita Vedanta tradition, I will entertain the idea that Samkhya, its dualistic 
counterpart, could do better in accounting for the relevant preconditions. I will approach 
this tradition in a similar way in that I will first exegete its central claims. In my analysis of 
the Samkhya tradition, I will argue that it also fails to account for the proper function 
condition and the truth aimed condition. This is because its tradition is nearly an exact 
parallel to naturalism. Having surveyed these Hindu traditions, I will move on to the next 
                                                          
4 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 350. 
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chapter where I survey their religious cousin, Buddhism, in order to determine if it will do 
better in accounting for the preconditions that are necessary to make Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant intelligible. 
 
 
4.1 A Brief Biography of Shankara 
 
To help better understand Shankara’s religious claims and beliefs, it will be important to 
explain the context that he lived and taught in. Shankara was likely born around the year 
788 into a Namburdri Brahmin family in a place called Kaladi.5 Early in life, Shankara 
showed a high aptitude for abstract thinking and soon renounced the world. Shankara at a 
young age began to study under Govinda (a disciple of Guadapada)6  and he soon became 
famous for going from city to city reforming Hindu practices, starting monasteries, and 
debating famous gurus on certain metaphysical and religious epistemological claims.7 At 
the heart of all of his teaching was nirguna Brahman, that is to say, Brahman without 
qualities.8  
 
Though his debating skills were unrivalled, he is even better known for his writing. 
Shankara has commentaries on the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Vedanta 
Sutras. The most influential and well known philosophical writings that are attributed to 
him would include the Upadesasaharsri, and the Vivekachudamani.9 His writing gave 
rational thinkers a way to embrace his Hindu teachings10 and it gave the religious a way to 
interpret scriptures in a consistent and philosophically sophisticated manner.11 In 
summarizing the life of Shankara, Radhakrishnan states the following: 
 
                                                          
5 Eliot Deutschand and Rohit Dalvi, The essential Vedanta: a new source book of Advaita Vedanta 
(Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2004), 161. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Ibid., 161-62.  
 
8 Ibid., 162.   
 
9 Though Vivekachudamani might not have be written by Shankara, it is seen an orthodox text (one that 
stems from and accurately represents Shankara’s thought) within the Vedanta community.  
 
10 For both Plantinga and Shankara, religious belief is what motivates philosophy.  
 
11 Deutschand and Dalvi, The essential Vedanta: a new source book of Advaita Vedanta, op. cit., 162.  
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The life of Sankara makes a strong impression of contraries. He is a philosopher 
and a poet, a savant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer. Such diverse 
gifts did he possess that different images present themselves, if we try to recall his 
personality. One sees him in youth on fire with intellectual ambition a stiff and 
intrepid debater; another regards him as a shrewed political genius, attempting to 
impress upon the people a sense of unity; for a third, he is a calm philosopher 
engaged in the single effort to expose the contradictions of life and thought with an 
unmatched incisiveness; for a fourth he is the mystic who declares that we are all 
greater than we know.12  
 
 
4.2 Shankara’s Philosophy 
 
Shankara bases his philosophy on the formula ‘[t]hat art thou.’13 Shankara believes that 
Brahman is an absolute being, devoid of qualities. He has no genus and he is related to 
nothing.14 Shankara makes this clear as he states, ‘Brahman is the reality - the one 
existence, absolutely independent of human thought or idea. Because of the ignorance of 
our human minds, the universe seems to be composed of diverse forms. It is Brahman 
alone.’15 Thus for Shankara ultimately, all that exists is the unified and absolute oneness 
that is Brahman. Though the Scriptures seem to indicate Brahman being personal and 
interacting with creation, Shankara distinguishes different layers of reality. Victoria 
Harrison summarizes Shankara’s categories in the following way:  
 
Layer 1: Absolute reality. 
Nirguna Brahman, Qualityless Brahman, Brahman/Atman. 
Layer 2: Absolute reality seen through categories imposed by human thought. 
Saguna Brahman, Brahman with qualities. Creator and governor of the world and a 
personal god (Isvara). 
                                                          
12 S. Radhakrishnan, The Vedanta According to Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928), 
16; Paul Devanandan, The Concept of Maya (London: Lutterworth Press, 1950), 93. 
 
13 Zimmer, Philosophies of India (New York: Pantheon Books, 1951), 414. 
 
14 Devanandan, The Concept of Maya, op. cit., 98. 
 
15 Śaṅkarācārya, Prabhavananda, and Christopher Isherwood, Shankara's Crest-Jewel of Discrimination 
(Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press, 1978), 70. 
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Layer 3: Conventional reality. 
The material world, which includes ‘empirical’ selves.16 
 
Christopher Isherwood makes a similar distinction within Shankara’s thought as he asks, 
‘[a]re there then two Gods - one the impersonal Brahman, the other the personal Iswara 
[sic.]? No-for Brahman only appears as Iswara [sic.] when viewed by the relative 
ignorance of Maya. Iswara has the same degree of reality as Maya has. God the Person is 
not the ultimate nature of Brahman.’17 
 
Kant’s distinction of the phenomena and noumena is somewhat analogous to 
Shankara’s layers of reality. Given this, Kant’s distinctions can shed light on what 
Shankara argues for. For Kant, human minds attempt to understand the noumenal realm, 
that is the realm in which things exists in themselves and independent of human 
experience; but, in doing so, human minds project only things in how they appear. The 
phenomenal realm exists merely as the appearance of what is most real, but this realm or 
layer is not the most ultimate realm or layer of existence. In the same way, Shankara 
argues that, because of maya human faculties are aimed towards producing conventional 
beliefs that don’t reflect ultimate reality. Moreover, even after overcoming a sort of 
conventional way of perceiving the world, at the second layer of reality, human faculties 
still project categories onto the Divine that, at the ultimate level, lack existence. It isn’t 
until one can stop the projection of categories that ‘[a]ll sense of duality is obliterated’18 
and one is illuminated in knowing the first layer of reality, namely that all is the 
impersonal Brahman. In Kant’s terms, this layer of reality would be the noumenal realm.  
 
Zimmer draws out the consequences of this by stating, ‘[o]nly knowledge (vidya) 
effects release (moksa) from the sheaths and bondages of nescience, and moreover this 
knowledge is not something to be obtained but is already present within, as the core and 
support of our existence.’19  Zimmer goes on to state that realization can be attained 
through critical thought, following the orthodox tradition, and practicing mind-amplifying 
techniques of yoga.20 Zimmer puts as a special emphasis on yoga practices within 
                                                          
16 Victoria Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics (London: Routledge, 2012), 58. 
 
17 Śaṅkarācārya, Prabhavananda, and Isherwood, op. cit., 18. 
 
18 Ibid., 104. 
 
19 Zimmer, Philosophies of India, op. cit., 416. 
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Shankara’s thought as he states, ‘[y]ogic exercises of intensive concentration are the main 
implement for the realization of the truth communicated by the guru; but these cannot be 
undertaken by anyone who has not already prepared himself, by means of cleaning 
austerities and impeccable conduct, in a spirit of virtuous self-abnegation.’21  
 
To summarize what has been established thus far, it is important to emphasize that 
in the ultimate layer of reality there is only impersonal Brahman. Moreover, though 
impersonal Brahman is the only thing that exists in the ultimate sense, maya creates the 
illusion of diversity. Human beings are trapped as their cognitive faculties consistently 
produce belief in diversity, including the belief in the existence of empirical self. In order 
for man to escape this trap, man must have the right realization that all that exists in the 
ultimate layer of reality is impersonal Brahman. Men can come to this right realization 
through dedicating their lives to the right practices, which especially includes being 
instructed by a guru and following through with the right mind-altering yoga techniques. 
Upon faithfully doing this, according to Devanandan, one, ‘by the cogitation of absolute 
identity, finds absolute rest in the Self, consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of 
transmigratory existence.’22 
 
 
4.3 Advaita Vedanata and the Proper Function Condition 
 
Having now established the central tenets of Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta tradition, I will 
take a closer look at Shankara’s epistemology. This will help further articulate Christian’s 
claim that Advaita Vedanta could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief could 
be warranted. Using the work of Thomas Forsthoefel, I will come to the conclusion that 
Shankara’s epistemology shares much in common with Plantinga’s epistemology. 
However, I will then argue that though they share a similar epistemology, unlike 
Christianity, Advaita Vedanta lacks the resources to account for the preconditions that 
make Plantinga’s epistemology intelligible.  
 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
 
21 Ibid., 417. 
 
22 Devanandan, The Concept of Maya, op. cit., 99. 
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Forsthoefel argues that Shankara held that what ultimately brings one to the 
knowledge of impersonal Brahman is introspective access. This access would be self-
justifying as the subject would have immediate knowledge of Brahman.23 Though there is a 
strong internalist component to Shankara’s epistemology, introspective access is not 
sufficient. It is necessary to also have certain cultural and external mechanisms. Shankara 
required that the internalist component was accompanied and supported by certain external 
processes such as religious texts (Vedas), tradition, a guru,24 and the mind working in the 
way it should.25 Forsthoefel makes this clear when he states the following: 
 
It remains for Advaita, and for all traditions, I think, to establish a culture of 
liberation in which doctrine, value, text and interpretation weave together a 
coherent circuit of doxastic practices. These belief-forming mechanisms have a 
variety of internal checks – norms of exegesis, standards of argument, the 
coherence of a received tradition, and as we will see, the examples of extraordinary 
teachers and saints. When these mechanisms function properly, they contribute to a 
reliable cognitive output. And in the case of Advaita, although liberation ultimately 
negates constructive discourse, various cognitive inroads are nevertheless made to 
understand, communicate and evoke the truth and experience of Brahman. 
Teachings, texts, practices, and the examples of saints and gurus, thus help 
constitute the ‘cognitive environment’ of a subject. Combined with the subject’s 
own ‘properly functioning’ mental equipment – in a mundane sense, but also with 
respect to doxastic practices of the particular culture of liberation – the cognitive 
outputs of these processes may enjoy prima facie justification. We see, therefore, in 
addition to traditional Advaita’s internalism, a deeply implicated externalism in its 
epistemology of religious experience.26 
 
Being that Shankara’s epistemology endorses that certain external things (including 
one’s mental equipment) need to be properly functioning, it would seem that Shankara 
should and would endorse Plantinga’s proper function condition for warrant. Moreover, it 
also seems like having the right doxastic practices functioning properly will contribute to 
                                                          
23 Thomas Forsthoefel, Knowing Beyond Knowledge: Epistemologies of Religious Experience in Classical 
and Modern Advaita (Alderhot, England: Ashgate, 2002), 71. 
 
24 Ibid., 61-62. 
 
25 Ibid., 53. 
 
26 Ibid., 61-62. 
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the right sort of epistemic environment that a subject needs to be in, in order to have the 
right sort of internal access or awareness. Thus, in addition to the first condition of 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant, Shankara would likely agree with the right epistemic 
environment condition. I will now move on to discuss the commonality and distinction 
between Shankara and Plantinga in regard to Plantinga’s truth aimed condition.  
 
 
4.4 Advaita Vedanta and the Truth-Aimed Condition 
 
At some level, both Plantinga and Shankara advocate that human beliefs produced in a 
certain way lead one to knowledge. Plantinga’s emphasis is on human cognitive proper 
function and on having a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. Shankara, however, 
emphasizes how human beliefs and practices bring about certain effects that lead one to the 
right state where one can then have the appropriate internal access or awareness. For 
Shankara, this is especially the case in regard to conventional beliefs that don’t ultimately 
reflect reality (such beliefs could be considered illusions). A man who thinks he sees a 
snake when what he really sees is a piece of rope can still die from the heart attack that the 
illusion helps produce. Thus, even though human cognitive faculties are aimed toward 
producing beliefs about things that don’t exist at the ultimate layer of reality, these beliefs 
can still have a real impact on how humans function and gain knowledge.  
 
Even if one granted this, wouldn’t it still be obvious that Shankara’s worldview 
fundamentally denies Plantinga’s truth aimed condition, given that the truth aimed 
condition requires that faculties are geared towards producing true belief according to what 
is ultimately real? In responding to this, one might try to argue indirectly that our cognitive 
faculties can still be aimed toward producing true belief. One might argue that even 
granting that human faculties are aimed towards producing conventional beliefs that don’t 
reflect ultimate reality, through the effects of the Vedas and gurus, our cognitive faculties 
could indirectly be aimed at producing true belief in Brahman. Just as the illusion of a 
snake can have a real effect on a man’s heart, so the illusion of the Veda’s and the gurus 
can cause the right realization. Shankara expounds classic objections: 
 
If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right 
knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness 
deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the 
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right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented 
itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their 
purport if the distinction on which their validity depends does not really exist. And 
further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the 
distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine 
of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, 
which forms an item of that doctrine?27 
 
Shankara then responds to these objections: 
 
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex 
of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of 
Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are 
considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not 
reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his 
mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of the right knowledge 
and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks 
on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and 
belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, 
as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the 
ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed.28  
 
Shankara argues that as long as one doesn’t come to the knowledge that all is impersonal 
Brahman, the Vedas and gurus can still aid in bringing about full realization and 
enlightenment. The epistemic subject will be able to benefit from the utility of these 
conventional beliefs in the same way that a man could be affected by a heart attack from 
the illusion of seeing a snake. As long as real knowledge is lacking, the external conditions 
will still create the right sort of environment that a subject needs to become enlightened.  
Having addressed this, I will now argue that both the proper function condition that seems 
to be endorsed by the Advaita Vedanta tradition and the tradition’s attempt to ground the 
truth aimed condition fall short of the glory of warrant.  
 
                                                          
27 Samkara, Brahmasutrabhasya, in The essential Vedanta: a new source book of Advaita Vedanta, eds. Eliot 
Deutschand and Rohit Dalvi (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2004), 230. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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4.5 The Preconditions of Warrant and Advaita Vedanta 
 
There appears, at least at first, to be an obvious reason why the Advaita Vedanta tradition 
couldn’t account for the preconditions that make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. 
Namely, at the ultimate layer of reality, there are no such things as cognitive faculties that 
form beliefs via proper function and have a design plan. All that exists is Brahman without 
qualities. According to Plantinga, proper function and those things that are entailed by it, 
such as a design plan, would need to exist in ultimate reality; but given Advaita Vedanta’s 
view of reality, there could be no such things.   
 
Moreover, there is another reason to think that the Advaita Vedanta religion 
couldn’t account for the preconditions that make proper function intelligible. Earlier in this 
project, I looked at well-accepted naturalistic attempts to account for proper function. I 
argued that these accounts and others like it fail. Plantinga thinks this is due to the missing 
component of a conscious and intentional designer. If Plantinga’s critiques and observation 
about naturalistic accounts of proper function are right, it would seem to follow that 
Advaita Vedanta will likewise lack the resources to be able to account for the proper 
function condition. This is because Advaita Vedanta lacks something like a personal and 
intentional conscious designer at the ultimate level of reality. Brahman for Advaita 
Vedanta is impersonal and consists of all reality. It seems hard to see how such a view 
could provide the necessary resources that one would need to account for such a normative 
condition as proper function.  
 
Differing from naturalism, perhaps in response to these two objections, the Advaita 
Vedanta proponent could argue that Plantinga’s proper function condition is necessary 
insofar as one is referring to the second or third layer of reality; and at these layers of 
reality, things like faculties, design plans, and a personal God all exist in some sense. Thus, 
Shankara might endorse the following proper function account: 
 
(SPF) For something to be properly functioning outside of the 1st layer of reality, 
that something must be fulfilling an intention given to it by an intentional agent that 
exists outside of it. 
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Though this seems to be a possible response and it surely isn’t a response available to the 
naturalist, it wouldn’t seem to be a preferable response for at least three reasons. First, this 
would require a drastic and fundamental change to what Plantinga intends his theory of 
warrant to be about. To use Advaita Vedanta terms, Plantinga’s theory is intended to tell us 
what in ‘ultimate reality’ needs to be in place for a subject to have a warranted belief, and 
thus, introducing a theory of warrant on layers of reality, two of which that ultimately 
aren’t real would fall short of that intention. Second, if Plantinga’s theory is intended to tell 
us what in ultimate reality needs to be in place for a subject to have a warranted belief, the 
SPF account would seem to lack motivation. If, ultimately speaking, there doesn’t exist 
proper function or a personal God to account for proper function, what would be the 
motive for arguing what the conditions for warrant are in the layers of reality that aren’t 
ultimately real? Lastly, if the proponent of the Advaita Vedenta tradition were to try to use 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant to show how their belief could be warranted, but yet the 
proponent also rejects that proper function exists at the ultimate layer of reality, then for 
the Plantingian, the consequence of rejecting the proper function condition at the ultimate 
layer of reality would be to reject knowledge at the ultimate layer of reality. 
 
 Moving on to the truth aimed condition: Can the advocate of Advaita Vedanta 
establish a way to indirectly account for this condition of warrant? As discussed earlier, 
one could argue that given the causal power of illusions, it would seem possible that if 
certain illusions function in a way that they should, the illusions might reliably help a 
subject produce true beliefs. In the case of Advaita Vedanta, perhaps the conventional 
beliefs in the Veda and the guru can still cause a person to act in such a way that it points 
them to the truth of reality, which is the truth of Brahman.  
 
But would one really have a tight connection to truth given that one came to such a 
belief by an illusion? For Plantinga, the truth aimed condition is a part of the design plan 
for how cognitive faculties should operate. It would seem to follow that, if there was no 
such thing as proper function at the ultimate layer of reality, one couldn’t account for the 
truth aimed condition at the ultimate layer of reality either.  
 
Perhaps one could just deny the proper function condition and advocate that as long 
as these illusions or conventional beliefs reliably produce true beliefs, one would have 
warrant. It would seem that two things would follow from this. First, this would no longer 
be Plantinga’s theory of warrant as the proper function condition is at the heart of his 
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theory. Second, if the illusions or conventional beliefs weren’t designed to accomplish the 
goal of bringing a subject to enlightenment and it just happened to work in this way, there 
would appear to be a loose connection to truth.29  
 
In conclusion, I first argued that Shankara’s epistemology shares a lot of the same 
conditions with Plantinga’s epistemology. I moved on to addressing if Shankara’s system 
could account for the preconditions that make those conditions of warrant intelligible. I 
argued that it couldn’t account for such conditions given that Advaita Vedanta’s 
ontological commitment about ultimate reality would seem to indicate that there is no such 
thing as proper function or a design plan. In addition to this, it appears that the Advaita 
Vedanta tradition wouldn’t contain any resources over naturalism, in leading one to think 
that it would fare better in accounting for proper function without a personal God. After 
arguing this, I moved on to argue that Advaita Vedanta could not account for the truth-
aimed condition of Plantinga’s theory. I argued that Plantinga’s truth-aimed condition is 
part of the overall design plan of how one’s faculties should function. If the truth-aimed 
condition can’t be separated from the proper function condition, the Advaita Vedanta 
tradition wouldn’t be able to account for this condition either. In taking these arguments in 
a cumulative manner, I have established good reason for thinking that Advaita Vedanta 
fails in accounting for the relevant preconditions that are required to make intelligible 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant. This would mean that the core belief of the Advaita Vedanta 
religion could not be warranted in the same way that the core belief of Christianity can be 
warranted. Having now addressed this Hindu tradition, I will entertain and then reject the 
possibility of the Samkhya tradition being able to be warranted, given Plantinga’s 
epistemology. 
 
 
4.6 The System of Kapila 
 
Kapila is the assumed founder of the Samkhya religion. Tradition informs us that Kapila 
was seen as a mystical and legendary figure. He was thought to be the incarnation of 
Visnu, the incarnation of Agni, and even the very son of Brahman.30 The man Kapila likely 
                                                          
29 The Swampman example demonstrates this. 
 
30 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnanand and Charles A. Moore, The Samkhya-Karika, in A Sourcebook in Indian 
Philosophy, eds. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnanand and Charles A. Moore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), 425.  
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lived before the Common Era during the seventh century.31 This would make the Samkhya 
tradition one of the oldest philosophical traditions in all of Hinduism.  
 
During Kapila’s time, the contemporary cultic practice and the theological 
emphasis was that of trusting in ritual practices. Vedic priests performing the right animal 
sacrifices and doing the right rituals was part of the central paradigm makeup of pre-Kapila 
Vedic religion.32 The Samkhya system challenged this paradigm by criticizing both the 
traditional understanding of heaven and its emphasis on cultic practices. It is important to 
note that though Kapila’s system was a critique to such practices, it didn’t hold that these 
practices and views were totally useless or wrong.  
 
Samkhya contrasts sharply with Advaita Vedanta Hinduism as it actually shares 
much more in common with contemporary Western naturalistic philosophy. Unlike 
Advaita Vedanta, Samkhya is a dualistic philosophy, recognizing the existence of 
ultimately two substances: prakrti and purusa. Prakrti is that which is primordial matter.33 
It is the stuff that all of the world evolves from. It is unmanifested, undifferentiated, 
undecaying, and unconscious.34 Harrison states, ‘[p]rakrti can be imagined as an inert mass 
of dark matter that only becomes active when purusa [consciousness] starts taking an 
interest in it.’35  
 
Prakrti is made up of distinct infra-atomic like particles called gunas.36 The three 
gunas that make up prakrti include: Sattva (light), Rajas (passion or energy), and Tamas 
(inertia).37  These gunas are always in a state of flux.38 The gunas can assemble and 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Pulinbihari Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought (New Delhi: Oriental 
Books Reprint Corp, 1975), 4. 
 
33 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics, op. cit., 63. 
 
34 Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, op. cit., 208.  
 
35 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics, op. cit., 63. 
 
36 Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, op. cit., 93; Ishvara Krishna, The 
Samkhya-Karika, in A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, eds. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnanand and Charles A. 
Moore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 431. 
 
37 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics, op. cit., 63. 
 
38 Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, op. cit., 209. 
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connect in different ways and when they do, the gunas are called dharmas.39 These 
different combinations of the gunas (dharmas) are primarily responsible for our illusions of 
pleasure, pain, and cognitive malfunction.40 One could properly call these illusions maya.41  
 
The other fundamental substance that exists is referred to as purusa. Purusa is pure 
consciousness. By consciousness, it is important to note that the claim isn’t that reality is 
an individual or a self as one might understand consciousness in Western philosophy; 
rather, consciousness is thought to be something more analogous to what the Advaita 
Vedanta tradition understands about Brahman on the 1st layer of reality (Brahman without 
qualities).  
 
Pulinbihari Chakravarti schematizes the arguments that Isvarakrsna, the name 
connected with the oldest work in the Samkhya tradition, and his commentators advance to 
establish the existence of the purusa: 
 
(1) Since all composite bodies are for the use of some one other than themselves, so 
purusa exists. 
(2) Since all manifestations of prakrti are objects forming different permutations 
and combinations of the gunas, there must be a subject, a knower of these 
manifestations, who should be devoid of gunas.  
(3) Since there must be a presiding entity for which prakrti produces this variegated 
universe, that is no other but purusa. 
(4) Since there must be some one to enjoy the products of prakrti which are either 
agreeable or disagreeable, that is none but purusa who exists for the sake of 
enjoying them. 
(5) Since there is a tendency towards liberation, purusa must exist. 42 
 
(1) is supported by recognizing certain observations in scenarios like the following:  
 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
 
40 Ibid., 213. 
 
41 Ibid., 209. 
 
42 Ibid., 315. 
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You look around in your bedroom and you realize that the bed exists for a body to 
lie in it. The sheets exist for a person to cover up with on the bed. The mosquito net 
exists to keep out misquotes for the person lying in the bed. Everything that we 
experience exists for the purpose of something else.43  
 
Arguments like the ones formulated here help explain why the Samkhya advocates felt that 
it was rational to accept the doctrine of the pursua. Now that I have introduced the two 
fundamental substances that exist, according to the Samkhya system, I will move the 
discussion to addressing how these substances are thought to have come together. 
 
Though Samkhya would deny that these two substances had a beginning,44 there 
was a time when purusa and prakrti existed apart from one another. Thus, purusa and 
prakrti are not inherently connected, they are only superficially connected. It is unnatural 
for one to be affected by the other, but just as a transparent crystal lying close to a red 
flower can be contaminated, so can purusa be contaminated by prakrti.45 Samkhya is nearly 
silent on the matter of what caused purusa to become contaminated with prakrti. This is 
seen as a sort of ‘cosmic blip.’46 Samkhya is largely an atheistic philosophy47 and denies 
that God had any role in it.48 In fact, the gods that do exist are only temporary 
superhumans who upon dying, go back into the cycle of rebirth.49 
 
Like in contemporary Western naturalistic philosophy, there is thought to be an 
evolutionary process that took place when the purusa came into contact with the prakrti. 
And like in contemporary naturalism, this evolutionary process is not thought to be guided 
by any intentional being. In the Samkhya tradition, the prakrti is responsible for the cause 
of the universe and all causes within it, thus a postulation of the Divine would be 
considered useless and unwarranted.50   
                                                          
43 Ibid., 315. 
 
44 Ibid., 12. 
 
45 Ibid., 319. 
 
46 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics, op. cit., 63-64. 
 
47 Ibid., 66. 
 
48 Ishvara Krishna, The Sāṃkhya-Karika, in A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, op. cit., 442. 
 
49 Zimmer, Philosophies of India, op. cit., 298; 305. 
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The evolutionary process that took place, according to the Samkhya tradition, is 
supposed to explain why the world looks the way that it does, which would include an 
explanation of why people experience pain and evil. The problem with the current 
condition of humankind is that humans lack the ability to discriminate between the purusa 
and the praktri. In reality, ‘the individual is not body, life, or mind, but the informing self, 
silent, peaceful, eternal. The self is pure spirit.’51 The empirical self that exists is the free 
soul combined with evolved prakrti. The purusa has forgotten its true nature as it has 
become deluded with the belief that it thinks, feels, and acts.52 According to Chakravarti, 
‘[s]o long as this conjunction exists, it thinks itself to be one with prakrti and thereby 
attributes to its own self miseries and such other properties which actually belong to the 
latter…[t]his is where one cognizes the non-eternal as eternal and the impure as the pure. It 
is opposed to right knowledge.’53  
 
Because one is trapped into thinking that the purusa is one with the prakrti, one 
needs liberation. This liberation comes by way of right knowledge. According to Zimmer, 
‘[t]rue insight, “discriminating knowledge” (viveka), can be achieved only by bringing this 
mind to a state of rest.’54 One must suppress certain activities of the mind in order for 
desire to disappear. The five things that need to be suppressed go as follows: 
 
1. Right notions, derived from accurate perception (right perception, inference, and 
testimony) 
2. Erroneous notions, derived from misapprehension 
3. Fantasy or fancy 
4. Sleep 
5. And memory.55 
 
                                                          
50 Matthew Dasti, ‘Hindu Theism,’ in Routledge Companion to Theism, eds. Charles Taliaferro, Victoria 
Harrison, and Stewart Goetz (New York: Routledge, 2013), 35; Ishvara Krishna, The Sāṃkhya-Karika, in 
A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, op. cit., 442. 
 
51 Radhakrishnan and Moore, A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, op. cit., 425.  
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 Chakravarti., Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, op. cit., 319. 
 
54 Zimmer, Philosophies of India, op. cit., 287. 
 
55 Ibid., 287-288. 
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For the Samkhya tradition, in order to achieve enlightenment, our minds need to enter into 
a state of rest. Being that all of these activities are mental activities (mental activity still 
goes on while one sleeps), these things need to be suppressed. In suppressing these items, 
all other mental activities and desire will automatically disappear.56 Through the 
appropriate practice of yoga and through the suppression of certain mental activity, one 
will have the capacity to rightly discriminate between the prakrti and the purusa. This will 
lead to the realization that there exists an ontological distinction between oneself and the 
prakrti. Only when this occurs, does one enter enlightenment and obtain salvation from the 
pain and evil in the world.  
 
 
4.7 Samkhya and Warrant-As-Proper Function 
 
Having articulated the central tenets of the Samkhya tradition, I will now argue that like 
the Advaita Vedanta tradition it seems to require proper function in order for one to be 
warranted in believing in its core doctrines. I will briefly argue this for two reasons. First, 
formulating Samkhya’s epistemology in a more systematic way will enable a clearer 
interaction with it. Second, if the Samkhya tradition would endorse aspects of Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant, it would seem to bolster the Pandora’s Box Objection in that not only 
can the Samkhya tradition use Plantinga’s epistemology to be warranted, but his 
epistemology is actually entailed by the Samkhya tradition. After addressing Samkhya’s 
epistemology, I will then move on to arguing that, like naturalism, it predicts its own 
unwarrantedness. 
 
 
4.8 Samkhya and the Proper Function Condition 
 
Just as Advaita Vedanta requires the practice of yoga working in a certain way, that is the 
practice of certain mind and body techniques that enable one to get into a particular 
cognitive state, so Samkhya emphasizes the necessity of yoga working in a certain way in 
order for one to properly discriminate between the purusa and prakrti. The right practice of 
yoga is thus essential to the Samkhya tradition. This being the case, there appears to be a 
way in which yoga should be done to achieve the right goal and this would presuppose 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 288. 
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both a design plan for how to rightly do yoga and the actual carrying out of this plan 
(proper function). Moreover, as with Shankara’s epistemology, when the act of yoga is 
functioning properly, a particular epistemic environment becomes a favorable one to 
produce a true belief. The design plan might even be a good one to the degree this belief is 
produced with a high objective probability of it being true. 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of Samkhya’s traditional 
arguments for the purusa is that everything that we perceive to exist, exists for something 
else. If this is the case, it would seem that each thing has a function that is connected with 
its existence for something else. In the classic example that was given, the function of a 
bed is to let a person sleep and the function of the sheets is to keep the person sleeping 
warm. These items fulfilling the purpose of allowing a person to sleep or keeping a person 
warm would mean that these items are properly functioning according to what these items 
were designed to do. If this sort of argument is fundamental to the Samkhya tradition, then 
one would have another reason for affirming that the Samkhya tradition would likely 
endorse the proper function condition. 
 
 
4.9 Samkhya and the Preconditions for Warrant 
 
Having now established certain parts of Samkhya’s epistemology, I will argue that 
Samkhya lacks the needed resources to account for the proper function condition and the 
truth-aimed condition. I will do this by briefly reiterating the proper function dilemma that 
its Western counterpart naturalism, and its related Hindu tradition Advaita Vedanta, both 
face. I will then move onto arguing that it likewise can’t account for these conditions 
because of its ontological commitments. 
 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that Shankara failed to account for the proper 
function condition. I argued this for two reasons. One of those reasons emerged as a result 
of using Plantinga’s critiques against naturalism and arguing that all of the current well-
known accounts of proper function seem to fall prey to two sorts of counterexample. I 
argued that the reason they fall short is because proper function seems to require a 
designer. If this is right, then for the reasons argued, Advaita Vedanta Hinduism would 
likewise fail in accounting for proper function. This critique seems like it could further be 
extended to the Samkhya tradition as it likewise lacks a conscious and intentional designer. 
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Again, in this tradition, humans came about through an evolutionary process that was not 
guided by the gods or any other agent. Thus, Samkhya actually shares the exact reason 
with naturalism as to why something like proper function is not attainable. As long as there 
is nothing within the Samkhya tradition that will add any extra advantage in accounting for 
proper function compared to naturalism, I think if naturalism entails the rejection of the 
proper function condition, then it would follow that Samkhya would as well. This can be 
seen in the following syllogism: 
 
(1) If naturalism cannot account for the proper function condition, then the 
Samkhya tradition cannot account for the proper function condition.                                     
(2) Naturalism cannot account for proper function.                                                               
(3) Therefore, the Samkhya tradition cannot account for the proper function 
condition. 
 
 
4.10 Samkhya and the Truth-Aimed Condition 
 
In the regard to the truth-aimed condition, according to Samkhya, our cognitive faculties 
have come about by the way of unguided evolution, which began to take place from a 
‘cosmic blip.’ This would mean that all of our cognitive equipment has been driven from 
this accidental process. Regarding this, Harrison states, ‘[t]hey claimed, for instance, that 
our capacities of sense - hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling-evolved from the ego 
(the sense we have of being a self), which itself is an evolutionary product, once removed, 
from primordial matter.’57 Now, even if one were to grant that one could have properly 
functioning faculties, what reason would one have to think that there is an objectively high 
probability that one’s faculties would be producing true beliefs? What reason would one 
have to trust faculties that come about through an accidental and unguided process? I will 
now give an example of why, in most cases, one would be irrational in holding that their 
faculties are reliable, that is given the fact that they came about by accident. If this is so, 
any beliefs that are formed after realizing that one’s faculties aren’t reliable, could not be 
warranted.  
 
                                                          
57 Victoria Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics, op. cit., 63. 
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The Junkyard Aircraft Example goes as follows: Imagine a junkyard that contains a 
sufficient amount of material to create an X-15 aircraft (the world’s fastest aircraft) if the 
material was rightly assembled. Now, imagine that all of the material that would be needed 
was spread about in the junkyard. If a tornado came through the junkyard and hit all of the 
material in such a way that what appeared to be an X-15 emerged, would one be rational in 
trusting the equipment of the aircraft? Is there a likely chance that the aircraft is a reliable 
one? 
 
There is a strong intuition that would lead us to believe that the aircraft is not 
reliable. Even if it were, in fact, constructed in such a way as to be reliable, the probability 
of this would be so low that one wouldn’t be warranted in holding to it. In the same way, I 
fail to see how the Samkhya advocate could show that this case would not be analogous to 
her own faculties. It would seem that the best the Samkhya advocate could do would be to 
advocate for a principle like natural selection in order to explain how faculties could be 
accidental products of evolution and yet trustworthy in that there is a high probability of 
them producing true beliefs. However, as I argued in Chapter three, this sort of solution 
doesn’t seem promising as beliefs could fulfill a certain evolutionary requirement and yet 
be false.  
 
This leads me to believe that even if one could grant that Samkhya could account 
for the proper function condition (and thus the design plan that is aimed at producing true 
belief), the Samkhya tradition would still predict its own unwarrantedness. If the advocate 
for Samkhya is convinced that the chances of his faculties actually being reliable is low or 
inscrutable, and the advocate was without any further faculty or reason that could override 
this low probability or inscrutability,58 the advocate would have a defeater for his belief in 
the reliability of his faculties. Moreover, if there was a defeater that came about from 
certain inherent doctrines that belonged to the tradition, and if the defeater led to one not 
being able to affirm that he had reliable truth producing faculties, it would follow that the 
tradition is also inherently self-defeating. Let SM stand for the Samkhya tradition and let R 
stand for the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. One could formulate the following 
syllogism to express this concern: 
 
(1) Anyone who accepts that P(R/SM) is low or inscrutable has a defeater for R. 
                                                          
58 I have in mind here that a faculty might produce non-propositional evidence which could then outweigh 
the propositional evidence against the reliability of one’s faculties. 
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(2) Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she 
thinks she has, including her belief in the Samkhya tradition. 
(3) If one who accepts the Samkhya tradition thereby acquires a defeater for the 
Samkhya tradition, the Samkhya tradition is self-defeating and cannot rationally 
be accepted.59 
 
It seems that this argument hinges on it being plausible that P(R/SM) is low or inscrutable. 
If my argument above gives one good reason to affirm (1), it would follow that there is 
further reason to affirm that even if the Samkhya tradition could account for proper 
function, one wouldn’t be warranted in believing that the truth-aimed condition could be 
satisfied, and thus the Samkhya tradition would still predict its own unwarrantedness 
(which would entail that the Samkhya advocate wouldn’t be able to have his religious 
belief warranted by way of Plantinga’s epistemology).    
 
 
4.11 Possible Responses 
 
Perhaps the advocate of the Samkhya tradition could argue that, though the process of 
evolution began by a cosmic blip (unintended by anyone or anything), there is a sense in 
which the purusa evolves with the prakrti by way of certain intelligible laws or by itself 
becoming in some sense an intelligent being. These possible responses could aid the 
Samkhya advocate in accounting for the proper function of human faculties. I am not 
saying that these responses fit within a traditional Samkhya view; however, I do want to 
raise them as possible responses that the advocate of the Samkhya tradition could give. 
 
I don’t think, however, that either of these responses would be adequate. In regard 
to the first, even if the purusa evolved in an intelligible law-like way, there would still be a 
question of explaining the teleological nature of this law-like development. If there is an 
intelligible way in which the purusa should evolve, the evolution that takes place has in 
some sense, a design plan. But what could account for this design plan? All that the 
advocate has done is pushed the problem back. 
 
                                                          
59 This is essentially Plantinga’s evolutionary argument but it replaces naturalism with the Samkhya tradition. 
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In regard to the second response that the Samkhya advocate could give, one could 
say at least two things. First, purusa would just be another version of Swampman who 
would also lack a design plan. On this modified view, purusa would be an intelligent being 
who would have come about by a mere accident. And thus, the purusa (and by way of the 
purusa, humans) would still lack a way in which it (they) should act or produce beliefs. 
 
Second, even if there is a conscious and intentional being that begins to emerge, 
that is the purusa, the evolutionary process that would take place in developing our 
cognitive faculties wouldn’t be one that is aimed toward producing true beliefs. As 
addressed earlier, when the purusa and the prakrti came together, a superficial connection 
between these two substances developed to the point at which our faculties would produce 
false beliefs. Thus, according to the Samkhya tradition, humans have to perform certain 
techniques in order to get their faculties aimed towards producing true beliefs. But under 
such conditions how could the beliefs produced ever be warranted? 
 
Let us briefly return to the example of the individual who comes to believe that he 
has taken the XX pill (for the sake of this example, let us say that there is a 90 percent 
chance of having cognitive malfunction upon taking such a pill). If someone comes up to 
you telling you that they have a solution to avoid the effects of taking the XX pill (after 
you have already taken it), even if you followed the instructions correctly, it wouldn’t 
appear that you would be warranted in your belief about such a corrective process or be 
warranted in the beliefs that result from doing this process. This would be because the 
corrective process and the results that it achieves would be understood and obtained from 
faculties that you have a defeater for trusting. Moreover, if one has a defeater for one’s 
beliefs, then one would be irrational and thus unwarranted in holding to them.  
 
Perhaps the advocate of the Samkhya tradition would accept that human faculties 
are hindered to such an extent and also agrees that she has a defeater for most of her beliefs 
(including the beliefs that are required for the process of liberation), but she nonetheless 
thinks that upon coming to enlightenment through a reliable process there would be a sort 
of transcendent awareness of ‘p’ such that, when she has it she has an incorrigible belief. 
As glossed in contemporary truth-maker terminology, perhaps she can ‘see’ the 
relationship between the truth-maker and truth-bearer and can thus ‘see’ the truth of this 
belief. Since this apparently incorrigible belief can’t be mistaken, the advocate could think 
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that it has a tight enough connection to truth for it to be warranted. This would be so even 
if it were obtained through an unwarranted system of beliefs.  
 
I think there are two important points to be made here. First, I am not convinced 
that the Samkhya advocate would be willing to accept this option. The Samkhya tradition 
is known for being an atheistic tradition. Traditional Samkhya philosophy maintains that 
only prakrti is responsible for the cause of the universe and all causes within it.60 This 
doesn’t leave room for purusa to have the sort of role that has been described.  
 
Second, even if one thought that this approach could be consistent with the 
orthodox realm Samkhya position, or the advocate was fine with substantially modifying 
her tradition, the core belief of the Samkhya tradition could still not be warranted in the 
same way that the core belief of Christianity can be warranted. This is due to the proper 
functionalist conditions not being sufficient for grounding warrant on this Samkhya view. 
Such a view is disanalogous to Plantinga’s epistemology, as for a belief to be warranted on 
his epistemology, it isn’t required that it be an infallible one. This distinction is significant 
enough that it would weaken the Pandora’s Box Objection as one simply couldn’t invoke 
Plantinga’s epistemology in this case to warrant religious belief. 
 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was partly to respond to Rose Ann Christian’s claim that the 
core belief of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism could be warranted by way of Plantinga’s 
epistemology. After summarizing its central tenets and epistemological commitments, I 
argued that due to its ontological commitments Advaita Vedanta couldn’t account for the 
required preconditions that make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. This can be 
seen both in it not espousing an intentional and conscious designer (all is the impersonal 
Brahman), as well as in it denying that things like faculties, beliefs, design plans, and 
proper function, ultimately exist.  
 
After responding to Christian’s direct challenge, I then entertained an opposing 
dualistic tradition of Hinduism, that is, the Samkhya tradition. I took the critiques that I 
                                                          
60 Dasti, ‘Hindu Theism,’ in Routledge Companion to Theism, op. cit., 35. 
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established in chapter three against naturalism, and the critiques laid out in the earlier part 
of this chapter, and applied them to the Samkhya tradition. Like the Advaita Vedanta 
tradition, I argued that it fails in accounting for the relevant preconditions. I argued this 
was because on this tradition, humans came about by mere accident, not intended by the 
gods. With what I established in chapter three regarding naturalistic accounts of proper 
function, this doctrine would support the thesis that the Samkhya tradition lacks a way to 
account for the proper function of human faculties. Moreover, in addition to this, I argued 
that Samkhya suffers from the same cognitive defeater as naturalism, given its 
commitment to unguided evolution. Having established this much, in the following 
chapter, I will continue to respond to the Pandora’s Box Objection by interacting with 
forms of Buddhist and Neo-Confucian traditions.  
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Chapter 5: Closing Pandora’s Box: Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism 
 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Having considered the Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya traditions, I will turn my attention to 
Nagarjuna’s ‘Middle Way’ Buddhist tradition and Wang Yangming’s Neo-Confucian 
tradition. I will argue that, like the two traditions of Hinduism that were addressed in the 
previous chapter, both the core belief of Nagarjuna’s ‘Middle Way’ Mahayana Buddhism 
and the core belief of Wangming’s Neo-Confucianism cannot be warranted by means of 
Plantinga’s epistemology in the same way that core Christian belief can be. In order to 
articulate the different tenets that can be found within the Middle Way tradition, I will need 
to first articulate certain central tenets that are common to all traditions within Buddhism. 
Preceding this, in order to give a more clear understanding of these tenets, I will provide 
some brief historical background. On this basis, I will proceed to engage this tradition in 
examining its credentials for accounting for the preconditions that make Plantinga’s theory 
of warrant intelligible. After engaging the Middle Way tradition, I will follow the same 
strategy as I engage with the claim that Wang Yangming’s Neo-Confucianism can use 
Plantinga’s epistemology to be warranted. 
 
 
5.1 Buddhism 101 
 
The historical Buddha was born in 485 B.C.E., into a small kingdom, which nowadays 
would be considered Nepal.1 Prince Gautama grew up in very privileged circumstances, 
with some sources even stating that he had three palaces. Coming from such a privileged 
background, his father wanted to shelter him from the true nature of the world. Legends 
recount that, in his late twenties, Gautama left his palace searching for something other 
than material wealth. During this time, he ran across a handful of sick, ageing and dying 
men. Upon seeing such men, Gautama became greatly disturbed. This experience furthered 
his desire to know the truth about reality, in particular, the truth about suffering. He began 
                                                          
1 This section also appears in Tyler Dalton McNabb, Warranted Religion: Alvin Plantinga's Theory of 
Warrant Defended and Applied to Different World Religions (MA Thesis, Southeastern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 2012), 94. 
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starving himself to the point where he would almost die; and he deprived himself of all his 
possessions. This seemed to be going nowhere when, finally, while sitting under a tree, he 
came to a realization about reality, which allowed him to be ‘enlightened.’ This is where 
he got the title Buddha, which means ‘enlightened’ or ‘awakened one.’ The Buddha’s 
thought can be summarized in the Four-Noble Truths: 
 
1. Life is suffering. 
2. The cause of suffering is desire. 
3. The cure of suffering is through overcoming desire. 
4. One can overcome desire through the Eight-Fold Path.2 
 
According to the Buddha, the problem with human beings is that they suffer. Human 
beings continue to hold onto and desire materialistic goods and ultimately non-real entities 
(e.g. the self), and in doing so is subjected to suffering, in this life and the ones to follow. 
As long as human beings continue to hold onto such things, they will continue to suffer in 
a vicious cycle of rebirth.  However, Buddhism does teach that there is a way out of this 
almost never-ending cycle of suffering. The Buddhist worldview adheres to the Eight-Fold 
Path as the means to arrive at Nirvana and escape such a cycle. The Eight-Fold Path goes 
as follows: 
1. Right vision – to perceive that the human experience is intolerable. 
2. Right aims – not to be lost in luxury, not to exploit others, but to love them. 
3. Right speech – to hold one’s tongue, to be truthful. 
4. Right action – to never kill, steal, or fornicate, but to do positive things that 
benefit others. 
5. Right livelihood – to make one’s living without harming others or society. 
6. Right mindfulness – to abjure all evil thoughts and focus only on good thoughts. 
7. Right awareness – to constantly avoid attachments to body and desires. 
8. Right meditation – to adopt the elaborate mental procedures worked out by the 
Buddha.3 
 
                                                          
2 Huston Smith, The World's Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions (San Francisco, CA: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 101-103. 
 
3 Rodney Stark, Discovering God: The Origins of the Great Religions and the Evolution of Belief (New York: 
HarperOne, 2007), 240. 
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Once an individual is ‘enlightened’ by following this path he or she is finally set free and 
liberated from suffering.  
 
 
5.2 Different Traditions of Buddhist Thought 
 
Thus far, for the most part, all streams within the wider tradition of Buddhism share what 
has been discussed. However, there are important concepts that must be interpreted and 
explained. For example, different traditions might diverge with regard to what Nirvana is, 
who exactly can obtain Nirvana, and what the greatest ideal is. I will now move on to 
interacting with the Mahayana tradition, and particularly Nagarjuna’s Middle Way 
tradition. 
 
Nagarjuna, who the Mahayana tradition takes as the first teacher after Buddha, was 
born into a Brahmin family toward the end of the second century (C.E.).4 Nagarjuna’s 
Brahamanical background might explain many of the similarities that exist between certain 
views in both Hinduism and Buddhism. As opposed to Theravada Buddhism, the 
Mahayana tradition emphasizes an elaborate system of metaphysics, which the Advaita 
Vedanta tradition would later follow. Though all forms of classical Mahayana thought are 
characterized by a certain metaphysic, there exist, tensions and distinctions between 
various schools, at least in regard to how one should express certain metaphysical beliefs. 
The two main traditions that express different metaphysics in Mahayana thought are the 
Nagarjuna’s Middle Way tradition (i.e. School of Madhyamika) and the School of 
Yogacara. Being that the former has received the greatest philosophical attention from the 
West, I will focus on it in the first half of this chapter.5 
 
The Middle Way tradition arose around the 2nd century C.E. and its earliest 
religious texts form The Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (includes the famous Diamond 
Sutra).6 The main philosophical treaties that is attributed to Nagarjuna and that was largely 
inspired by The Perfection of Wisdoms is the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way 
(abbreviated as the MMK). Since this is seen as Nagarjuna’s most important philosophical 
                                                          
4 Allie Frazier, Readings in Eastern Religious Thought (PA: Westminster Press, 1969), 207. 
 
5 Nāgārjuna and Kenneth K. Inada, Nagarjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an 
Introductory Essay of Kenneth K. Inada (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970), 3. 
 
6 For an anthology of Buddhist texts, see Donald Lopez, Buddhist Scriptures (London: Penguin), 2004. 
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work, in order to establish the central philosophical commitments that this tradition 
adheres to, I will use this work and commentators Jay Garfield, Jan Westerhoff, and 
Kenneth Inada to interact with the Madhyamika tradition.7  
 
 
5.3 The Middle Way Tradition 
 
According to Inada, the Madhyamika Creed summarizes the tradition by stating the 
following:  
 
I pay homage to the Fully Awakened One, 
the supreme teacher who has taught 
The doctrine of relational origination 
The blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions. 
(Therein, every event is ‘marked’ by) 
Non-origination, non-extinction, 
Non-destruction, non-permanence, 
Non-identity, non-differentiation 
Non-coming (into being), non-going (out of being).8 
 
One of the ways Nagarjuna reaches the last conclusion that was mentioned is by reasoning 
about causation in the following way: 
 
(1) Neither from itself,  
(2) Nor from another, 
(3) Nor from both, 
(4) Nor without a cause, 
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise. 
 
                                                          
7 Though the MMK is the only work that is universally recognized as being written by Nagarjuna, there are 
other works that he could be responsible for. These works would include Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning, 
Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, Dispeller of Objections, Treatise on Pulverization, and ‘Precious Garland.’ 
See Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 5-6. 
 
8 Nāgārjuna and Inada, Nagarjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay 
of Kenneth K. Inada, op. cit., 37-39. 
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Nagarjuna was well aware of contemporary philosophical schools that endorsed each of 
these four options. Thus, Nagarjuna makes a conscious attempt to argue why each of these 
views are wrong and why this helps establish his particular metaphysic. In regard to (1), 
Samkhya philosophers argue that in order for there to be a cause, the effect of the cause 
must exist potentially in the cause.9 If it didn’t then the effect wouldn’t come about from 
the cause necessarily and thus can be imagined to exist without that cause.10 If the effect 
can exist without the cause then one might argue that the cause isn’t a genuine cause. 
According to Garfield, this view of self-causation is supposed to be analogous to that of a 
seed and a sprout; in the seed there exists the potential for the sprout to come about. Upon 
this potential being actualized, one would have a case of self-causation.11 There seems to 
be two fundamental problems with this however. First, the seed still needs to be watered in 
order for it to sprout, so the analogy doesn’t seem to be a good one.12 Second, if a 
substance already has the necessary and sufficient conditions within it, then wouldn’t it be 
displaying the effect eternally?13 What would cause a change in the substance?  
 
In regard to (2), causation from another is a causation that is more familiar both 
within Buddhism and in contemporary Western metaphysics. This is the view of causation 
that has the cause and the effect as two completely independent phenomena. These distinct 
phenomena can be compared to parents who give life to their children.14 When this 
happens, there are clearly new entities (the children) that didn’t exist potentially in the 
cause (the parents). Westerhoff argues that this conception of causation was rejected by 
Nagarjuna as given his presentism, when an effect would come about, the cause literally 
might no longer exist. For Nagarjuna, if this is the case, how could one account for a 
relationship between two items when one of the items doesn’t even exist?  This 
relationship can’t be accounted for by human expectation or memory, as the relationship 
                                                          
9 Presumably, they didn’t have in mind the possibility of a hybrid cause/effect view like the one that will be 
mentioned in regard to (3). 
 
10 Nāgārjuna and Jay Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's 
‘mulamadhymakakarika’ with a Philosophical Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 105-
106. 
 
11 Ibid., 106. 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 I take this to be what Westerhoff is getting at when he states, ‘First of all this would mean that the effect 
would not have to be produced, since it is already present within the causal field.’ See Westerhoff. 
Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, op. cit., 202. 
 
14 Nāgārjuna and Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's ‘mulamadhymakakarika’ 
with a Philosophical Commentary, op. cit., 106. 
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would then depend on the mind.15 This of course would mean that the relationship didn’t 
really exist in an objective sense. 
 
Regarding (3), this view argues that effects come about through both self-causation 
and other outside causes. Garfield points out that one might go back to the sprout example 
and argue that the seed still needs to be planted, watered, and so on, in order for it to 
actualize the potential to sprout.16 In this case, there still needs to be a potential to actualize 
the effect within the seed but the mere potential won’t be enough to actualize the effect as 
the seed will need to have some sort of outside cause that works in conjunction with the 
potential. Though this might initially seem like the most plausible option, Nagarjuna seems 
to take it that this view isn’t worth considering, given the fact that both views were already 
refuted separately.17 
 
Lastly, in regard to (4), Nagarjuna mentions the view of no-cause. That is the view 
that effects can simply and spontaneously arise from nothing. Garfield suggests that 
arguments similar to those proposed by Sextus Empiricus, Hume, or Wittgenstein might 
motivate one to adhere to such a view.18 This is likely to be seen as the least likely option 
for how cause and effect are related, as the nihilist position seems the least intuitive. 
 
Nagarjuna, holding that all these options are implausible, argues that things do not 
arise at all. In fact, Nagarjuna’s philosophy can be summarized as a philosophy of 
emptiness (sunyata). Harrison clarifies that by a philosophy of emptiness, Nagarjuna 
doesn’t mean that those things that we experience either exist or that they do not exist.19 
Nagarjuna wouldn’t adhere to such a strictly binary conclusion. Rather, Nagarjuna argues 
for a Middle Way for this and all other metaphysical problems.  
                                                          
15 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, op. cit., 201. 
 
16 Nāgārjuna and Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, op. cit., 106. 
 
17 Though Westerhoff seems to see Nagarjuna’s argument against this view in a slightly different light, he 
acknowledges that this view is commonly dismissed for this reason within the Madhyamaka literature. 
Westerhoff expresses his view as he states, ‘[w]hat he wants to show in this context is that if we have 
disproved each of a set of two propositions, we do not need a further argument to disprove their 
conjunction, since this is entailed by the individual refutations.’ Though I am not even sure if there is a 
significant difference between these two views, for the purposes of this project, it isn’t important to 
demonstrate which view is right. See Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical 
Introduction, op. cit., 109. 
 
18 Nāgārjuna and Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's ‘mulamadhymakakarika’ 
with a Philosophical Commentary, op. cit., 107. 
 
19 Victoria Harrison, Eastern Philosophy: The Basics (New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2013), 98. 
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At the beginning of the previous chapter, I mentioned that the Advaita Vedanta 
tradition could be better understood by Westerners if it was interpreted through the lenses 
of Kantian philosophy. According to Garfield, something very similar could be said about 
the Middle Way tradition.20 Using a Tibetan translation and incorporating a particular 
Tibetan commentarial tradition, Garfield argues that by reality being empty, Nagarjuna has 
in mind a level of reality that is independent of human experience, in other words the 
noumenal level.21 Moreover, to use the language of Shankara, for Nagarjuna, one could 
also say that the first layer of reality is ultimately empty and void. And again, similar to 
Shankara, this doesn’t mean that the phenomena that we experience do not exist on any 
level, as there is a conventional or phenomenal level where the phenomena that we 
experience do exist. Thus, reality is neither totally empty nor is it not totally empty, rather 
it is empty in the noumenal sense but not in the phenomenal sense. Garfield summarizes 
his thought: 
 
So from the standpoint of Madhymaika philosophy, when we ask of a phenomenon, 
Does it exist?, we must always pay careful attention to the sense of the world 
‘exist’ that is at work. We might mean exist inherently, that is, in virtue of being a 
substance independent of attributes, in virtue of having an essence, and so forth, or 
we might mean exist conventionally, that is to exist dependently, to be the 
conventional referent of a term, but not to have any independent existence…Rather, 
to the degree that anything exists, it exists in the latter sense, that is, nominally, or 
conventionally.22 
 
It is important to also point out that though I will be following Garfield in interpreting 
Nagarjuna in a Kantian fashion, there are other approaches to interpreting Nagarjuna. 
There is an approach that uses a post-Wittgensteinian framework to make more accessible 
Nagarjuna’s critiques of his opponents. This can be done as Nagarjuna’s critiques and 
opponents are analogous to Wittgenstein’s critiques and his analytic opponents.23 There is 
                                                          
20 Nāgārjuna and Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's ‘mulamadhymakakarika’ 
with a Philosophical Commentary, op. cit., 88-89. 
 
21  Garfield’s interpretation is based on an Indo-Tibetan Buddhist hermeneutic and could itself be considered 
closely in line with the Nyingma-pa reading. See ibid., 98.   
 
22 Ibid., 90. 
 
23 In addition to this, Westerhoff points out that, for the Wittgensteinian approach, the chief concern in 
comparing the two traditions is in understanding ‘dependent origination.’ Westerhoff states, ‘[t]his was 
regarded primarily as reflecting the underlying idea of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of language according 
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also an approach that attempts to clarify Nagarjuna’s argument by putting his work into 
logical notations. According to Westerhoff, this has been done by Richard Robinson.24 In 
addition to these interpretations or frameworks, there is an approach that Westerhoff seems 
most sympathetic to, which is to not Westernize Nagarjuna and, instead, to try to read him 
in his own context.25 Westerhoff thinks that this can be done due to the recent maturity that 
has taken place in Nagarjuna studies.26 Westerhoff doesn’t go into much detail as to why 
the other interpretations or frameworks aren’t good besides expressing their limitations.27 
He does appear however, to be open to using such interpretations or frameworks for 
introducing Westerners to Nagarjuna’s philosophical thought.28 With this stated, I don’t 
see a problem with using Garfield’s favoured Kantian approach for the purposes of this 
project. 
 
 
5.4 Enlightenment 
 
According to Westerhoff, for Nagarjuna, human faculties are cognitively defaulted to 
produce belief in substances,29 which govern our representation of the world.30 Human 
faculties producing belief in substances aid in creating illusions that humans desire. This 
desire then causes suffering and pain.  
 
The only way for humans to rid themselves of this suffering is to come to the right 
realization that all the phenomena that we encounter (including the self) are actually empty 
and that the desires for such phenomena are baseless on the noumenal level. This would 
                                                          
to which language, and in particular the language of philosophical statements, could not be regarded as 
independent of the interrelated nature of conceptual thought and conventional language.’ Westerhoff, 
Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, op. cit., 11. Also, see Frederick J. Streng, 
Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press,1967); Chris Gudmunsen, 
Wittgenstein and Buddhism (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1977).  
 
24 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, op. cit., 10. 
 
25 Ibid., 11-12. 
 
26 Ibid., 12. 
 
27 Ibid., 9-12. 
 
28 Ibid., 12 
 
29 By substances here, Westerhoff just has in mind the phenomena that we experience that lack ultimate 
mind-independent existence.  
 
30 Ibid., 50-51. 
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include coming to the realization that there is no ultimate difference between nirvana and 
the phenomenal level of reality.31 This will then end the process of samsara (rebirth). 
Garfield makes this point clear by stating, ‘[t]o distinguish between samsara and nirvana 
would be to suppose that each had a nature and that they were different natures. But each is 
empty, and so there can be no inherent difference.’32 Harrison states, ‘[e]scaping samsara 
(rebirth) simply requires that we stop regarding it as separate from nirvana. This realization 
would in fact be enlightenment as it would free the enlightened one from further rebirth.’ 33 
In summary, since the noumenal level of reality is empty, both samsara and nirvana are 
empty and coming to realize this will free the person from the conventional level of reality, 
and as a result, end suffering. 
 
 
5.5 Nagarjuna’s Epistemology 
 
As previously mentioned, Nagarjuna argues that all that we experience exists in the 
conventional realm but not in the noumenal realm, all of these things are empty. His main 
tool of discerning this truth is through an extensive use of the reductio ad absurdum.34 
Throughout all of the MMK, Nagarjuna continually relies on this argumentative technique 
in order to establish his metaphysic. It thus appears that Nagarjuna relies on a brand of 
rationalism in order to reach his conclusions.  
 
However, according to Westerhoff, Nagarjuna denies a realist way of accounting 
for a means and objects of knowledge.35 Westerhoff defines what he means by a realist 
view by stating, ‘[f]or the realist, means and objects of knowledge have intrinsic 
characteristics, and there are invariant relations of epistemic priority, that is, cognitive 
procedures which are means of knowledge in all possible contexts. On this account of 
                                                          
31 Nāgārjuna and Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, op. cit., 98. 
 
32 Ibid., 331. 
 
33 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy, op. cit., 98. 
 
34 Richard King argues that, ‘[t]he Prasangika Madhyamaka (exemplified by Candrakirti, seventh CE) argued 
that the truth of emptiness could be established only through the use of reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) 
arguments. On this view the Madhyamaka does not put forward independent arguments of its own but 
instead establishes internal inconsistencies in the presuppositions of others, thereby undermining their 
position from within.’ See Richard King, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist 
Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 139. 
 
35 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, op. cit., 181. 
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epistemology it is indeed impossible to try to establish emptiness.’36 Given Nagarjuna’s 
ontological commitment that ultimate reality is empty, one couldn’t ultimately have certain 
cognitive procedures that are a means to knowledge as then reality would no longer be 
empty.  
 
Moreover, it seems that if Nagarjuna did endorse necessary and sufficient 
conditions for warrant, one could make the following objection: If ultimate reality is 
empty, then ultimately, there are no conditions for warrant. If there are no conditions for 
warrant, then one could never be warranted in actually believing that reality was empty. 
Thus, even if true, one could never actually be warranted in accepting the Middle Way 
tradition.37 
 
In order to avoid this, Nagarjuna takes a similar though not identical approach to 
Shankara. He argues that conventional level actions can lead to the right awareness or 
access. Westerhoff clarifies, ‘even though there are no means of knowledge that are 
intrinsically such, that deliver knowledge in every context, there are still cognitive 
procedures which function as means of knowledge in the specific context in which they are 
employed, regimented by certain background constraints and other pragmatic features.’38 
In summarizing the above statements, there just so happens to exist certain epistemic 
procedures that, if done within the right context, could act in a reliable way to bring about 
awareness or knowledge that all is empty.  
 
It is interesting to inquire if these cognitive procedures have a design plan on the 
conventional level, in a similar way as they do on Shankara’s view. Presumably, these 
cognitive procedures just are or would depend on cognitive faculties that, on the 
conventional level, still need to behave in a certain way. Though, I suppose one could just 
say that these cognitive procedures just so happen to function in a certain way for 
accidental reasons.39 Regardless of which option the Middle Way advocate wants to argue 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Ibid.  
 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 By accidental reasons, I just mean that there is nothing behind why the procedure is reliable like a design 
plan. It just so happens that this procedure is reliable in obtaining such and such result but it isn’t as if it 
should be producing such and such result. As mentioned earlier in this project, I think the Swampman 
counterexample demonstrates that this view falls short of securing a tight connection to truth. 
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for, I don’t think much would really rest on if Nagarjuna does or doesn’t endorse proper 
functionalism at the conventional level, that is, besides establishing commonality between 
Nagarjuna’s and Plantinga’s epistemology. 
 
 
5.6 Warranted Middle Way?  
 
I have now established potential commonalities with Plantinga’s epistemology and 
Nagarjuna’s epistemology in order to help both further define Nagarjuna’s worldview and 
to help strengthen the Pandora’s Box Objection. However, one may now ask if there are 
any reasons to believe that the Middle Way tradition could account for the preconditions 
that make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. As I have shown in this chapter, the 
Middle Way tradition shares many of the same central tenets as the Advaita Vedanta 
tradition. Similar to the Advaita Vedanta tradition, one reason to think that the Middle Way 
tradition couldn’t account for the proper function or truth-aimed condition is because on 
the noumenal level there doesn’t exist design plans or faculties aimed at producing true 
beliefs. These things in reality are really empty and void. Moreover, in addition to this 
reason, since reality on this tradition is ultimately void and empty, there would be no 
personal God on the noumenal level to account for the proper function condition. And 
given the additional doctrines which I have just articulated (reality is empty), I am not 
aware of any reason for why this tradition would be able to account for proper function any 
better than naturalism or Advaita Vedanta Hinduism.  
 
Now, like the advocate of the Advaita Vedanta tradition, in order to respond to 
these objections one might be tempted to formulate a proper function account that only 
pertains to the phenomenal realm. Consider, for example the following: 
 
MW Proper Function: For something to be properly functioning outside of the 
noumenal realm, that something must be fulfilling an intention given to it by an 
intentional agent that exists outside of it. 
 
This account, however, would seem to face the same dilemmas as Shankara’s account as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. In summary of my critiques in the last chapter, an 
account like this would (1) ultimately change Plantinga’s theory of warrant as Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant is intended to be a theory that applies to ultimate reality, (2) lack 
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motivation, and (3) fail to allow for things to be warranted via Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant on the noumenal or ultimate level of reality.  
 
In addition to these reasons, it is important to mention that Nagarjuna openly rejects 
a realist view of warrant. This is, again, the view that endorses that there are particular 
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for warrant that need to be satisfied in all 
contexts. Nagarjuna develops his epistemology based partly off the problem that his view 
is self-defeating if he does take a realist epistemology. If there aren’t any other ways 
around the self-defeating problem than rejecting a realist view, then it would appear that 
Nagarjuna’s ontology necessitates his epistemology. This would mean that to endorse 
Nagarjuna’s ontology one must consistently endorse his epistemology. But since 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant is a realist view of warrant, it would appear that Nagarjuna 
would openly reject Plantinga’s epistemology. If this is the case, then an advocate of the 
Middle Way tradition cannot have her belief in the core tenets of Middle Way Buddhism 
warranted by way of Plantinga’s epistemology. Thus, the project of attempting to use 
Plantinga’s epistemology doesn’t even get off the ground for the Middle Way advocate. 
 
Regarding the truth-aimed condition, it seems like Nagarjuna might argue in the 
same way as Shankara argues, in arguing that conventional beliefs can indirectly lead one 
to knowledge. I fail to see why he couldn’t do this and why he couldn’t even meet a 
general reliabilist requirement as well. However, similar to my critique in the above 
paragraph, I also fail to see how Nagarjuna’s approach would fare any better than 
Shankara’s approach, given my critique that Plantinga’s truth-aimed condition is tied to the 
proper function condition. If proper function couldn’t be accounted for, the truth-aimed 
condition still couldn’t be accounted for. Moreover, even if one wanted to grant that 
Nagarjuna didn’t need to exactly account for Plantinga’s truth-aimed condition, but granted 
that generally speaking he could argue for something similar (namely that one’s faculties 
have to reliably produce true beliefs), it would still be insufficient to secure a tight 
connection to truth which is needed for warrant.40 
 
Finally, an argument for why the Middle Way tradition cannot account for 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized by the following syllogism: 
 
                                                          
40 See Chapter two of this thesis. 
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(1) If the Advaita Vedanta tradition cannot use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to be 
warranted, then the Middle Way tradition cannot use Plantinga’s theory of warrant 
to be warranted. 
(2) The Advaita Vedanta tradition cannot use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to be 
warranted. 
(3) Therefore, the Middle Way tradition cannot use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to 
be warranted. 
 
As long as my work in this chapter has established enough similarities between Shankara’s 
Hinduism and Nagarjuna’s Buddhism, (1) will appear very plausible. In regard to (2), if 
my critiques given in the previous chapter (and summarized in this chapter) are good, then 
it would necessarily follow that the Middle Way tradition cannot account for the 
preconditions that make Plantinga’s epistemology intelligible (and thus it cannot use 
Plantinga’s epistemology to be warranted). Having now interacted with Mahayana 
Buddhism and in particular Nagarjuna’s Middle Way tradition, I will now move this 
project’s survey to completion by interacting with David Tien’s claim that core Neo-
Confucian belief can be warranted by way of Plantinga’s epistemology. Before I do this, 
however, I will continue in the tradition of this project in first giving a historical 
background to Confucian religious philosophy.  
 
 
5.7 Confucianism 101 
 
Confucianism’s fundamental origin lies with Kongzi, who lived around 551-479 B.C.E.41 
Little is known about his life besides the fact that he was a very educated individual and 
yet came from poverty.42 Kongzi’s philosophy grew out of his view of the society that he 
had grown up in, one that appeared degenerate to him. At the heart of Kongzi’s 
philosophy, was the belief that wisdom or philosophy was the remedy for the society’s 
needs.43 Kongzi focused largely on what we now regard as ethical and political philosophy. 
He focused on teaching Dao or ‘the Way.’44 ‘The Way’ is in regard to how societies, and 
                                                          
41 Harrison, Eastern Philosophy, op. cit., 101. 
 
42 Ibid., 103. 
 
43 Ibid., 102. 
 
44 Ibid., 105. 
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members within them, should act. He taught that cultivating virtue (De) and acting 
appropriately according to the right social and ritual context was the only way to not only 
live the good life but also to have a flourishing society.45 A person who would reach the 
highest virtuous state (ren) would be considered a well-rounded cultivated individual or 
what is also called a gentleman (junzi).46 The ultimate goal is to have a society governed 
by gentlemen. 
 
Toward the end of the first millennium (C.E.), Han Yu wrote an essay that cemented 
orthodoxy for those who continued in the thought of Kongzi, entitled An Inquiry into the 
Way. This acted as a polemic against contemporary philosophies (e.g. Daoism), in addition 
to arguing for the need for a sage-king.47 There have since been several successors and 
traditions that have grown from this work. These traditions are categorized together under 
the label Neo-Confucianism. T’ang Chun-I defines Neo-Confucianism as, ‘a revival of the 
Confucian faith in man’ and as an ‘acceptance of the need to face all the negative factors 
(of man’s nature) and to find a way of…realizing the positive ideal.’48 One important 
tradition within this larger Neo-Confucian tradition is the Wang Yangming tradition, or 
what is also known as the Learning of the Mind tradition. 
 
 
5.8 Neo-Confucianism: The Metaphysics of The Learning of the Mind Tradition  
 
Carsun Chung calls Wang the most powerful and influential person in the history of 
China.49 Chung’s support for this claim includes Wang’s ‘commanding personality,’ Wang 
possessing a great amount of followers that existed in different geographical regions of 
China, and the boldness he displayed when he challenged the philosophical orthodoxy of 
his day.50 Of course, above all of these reasons for being so influential was his unique 
philosophical tradition. I will now give Chung’s summary of Wang’s metaphysical 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 107. 
 
46  P.J. Ivanhoe and B. Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seven Bridges 
Press, 2001), 2. 
 
47 William De Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981), 2. 
 
48 Quoted in ibid., 9. 
 
49 Carson Chung, ‘Wang Yang-Ming’s Philosophy,’ Philosophy East and West 5 (1955): 3. 
 
50 Ibid., 3. 
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commitments, and I will follow it up by using Chung’s work to elaborate more on these 
points. Chung summarizes Wang’s philosophy by stating the following:  
 
(1) Mind is reason. While mind is free from selfishness, it is intelligence 
per se, and embodies right principles, or categorical imperatives. 
(2) The external world, which, according to common sense, consists of things of 
hard fact, is the object of consciousness. Berkeley’s principle, esse est percipi, was 
discovered also by this Chinese thinker. 
(3) While according to common sense willing and knowing are separate functions 
of mind, they are correlated in Wang’s system. Mind’s working with a directive 
effort is called willing. Its working in sheer distinctness or clarity is called 
knowing. For Wang volition is a part of cognition. 
(4) Knowing is the core of reality, that is to say, reality is comprised of 
consciousness. 
(5) The universe is an integration of which man is the mind or center. All men 
constitute a brotherhood. Physical objects have spiritual affinity with mind. 
(6) If there were no mind or intuitive knowledge, the universe would not function. 
(7) Matter or the world of nature is the material with which mind functions.51 
 
According to Chung, Wang sees the world as intelligible.52 Knowing isn’t just for 
humans, but all animate beings and even physical objects.53 However, for Wang, the 
universe is dependent on the human mind.54 The nature of the world all depends upon 
human’s having knowledge of the world. Moreover, the human mind needs the universe in 
order for it to know. Here there is a harmonious circular relationship that exists that is said 
to be like an ear or an eye that has no substantiality without there being noise or colors and 
shapes.55 In order to understand why Wang thinks the world as we experience it isn’t the 
way it should be, and in order to articulate Wang’s solution to this fundamental problem, 
Wang’s epistemology must be invoked. In addition to better understanding Wang’s overall 
metaphysical views, exegeting his epistemology will allow for more critical interaction 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 3-4. 
 
52 Ibid., 4. 
 
53 Ibid. 
 
54 Ibid., 6. 
 
55 Ibid.  
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with his tradition. This will be helpful as I will argue that it doesn’t have the necessary 
criteria that is needed to account for the preconditions that make Plantinga’s epistemology 
intelligible.  
 
 
5.9 Wang Yangming’s Epistemology 
 
According to David Tien, Wang’s Learning of the Mind tradition can endorse, and can be 
reformulated to essentially share Plantinga’s epistemology.56 Tien focuses on exegeting 
Wang’s concepts of li (理) and liangzhi (良知).57 For Wang, Li is a normative notion of the 
way things ought to be. According to Tien, when things are working according to li, things 
are working naturally and are not working in a deviant way.58 I take it that the phrase 
‘working naturally’ could be interchangeable with ‘properly functioning’ and the word 
‘deviant’ could be used interchangeably with something like malfunction. In regard to the 
concept of liangzhi, according to Tien, it is the innate fully formed cognitive faculty that 
enables one to know li (or the principle).59 For Wang, the mind is the conscious aspect of 
li.60 From birth everyone has the original mind, that is to say that everything is working in 
accordance with li. However, according to Tien, from this point, dispositions still 
emerge.61 One of those dispositions is pure knowledge. This is the aspect of the cognitive 
faculty that produces moral knowledge of what is right and wrong. However, as the Neo-
Confucian story goes, there also exists qi (氣). Qi is the lively matter that the world is all 
made up of. Because qi exists in the mind, the mind becomes distorted and produces wrong 
moral judgments. In this way, qi acts like sin in the Christian story where it damages 
human faculties (which would include human moral and religious faculties). For the Neo-
Confucian, this distortion can most clearly be seen in self-centre thoughts and desires. 
Salvation, that is unimpeded knowledge, can then only happen when we rid ourselves of 
such selfishness. We must reverse the distortion that has taken place as a result of the qi 
                                                          
56 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the 
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 4 (2004): 35. 
 
57 Ibid., 31. 
 
58 Ibid., 32. 
 
59 Ibid., 35. 
 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Ibid., 33. 
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and regain optimal effectiveness by ending our selfish desires. I take it that Confucian 
philosophy can then aid in helping this need. Having now briefly used Tien’s work to 
outline Wang’s epistemology and thus, the rest of Wang’s metaphysical view, I will 
explain Tien’s argument that Wang can share Plantinga’s epistemology.  
 
 
5.10 Warranted Neo-Confucianism? 
 
After Tien articulates this much, he moves on to explicitly demonstrate how Plantinga and 
Wang share the proper function model for warrant.62 He argues for this by first asserting 
that, given that liangzhi is utilized, one has a properly functioning faculty.63 Moreover, 
since the mind is the conscious aspect of li (li is again the principle of how things should 
be), Tien thinks that liangzhi (the faculty of the mind) is aimed toward producing true 
beliefs.64 Given that qi is suppressed, it should become obvious that there does appear to be 
a favourable epistemic environment that also emerges. Tien takes all of this as good reason 
to affirm that core Neo-Confucian belief could be warranted the same way that core 
Christian belief can be warranted. This being said, I think Tien is mistaken for one very 
important reason. Though he does a great job at comparing and showing the similarities 
between Wang’s epistemology and Plantinga’s, he seems to miss Plantinga’s point about 
there being a need for a conscious, intentional, and intelligent designer in order to account 
for the proper function of faculties. Though we have a way for how liangzhi should 
function (it should function in accordance with li), we don’t have an answer from Tien as 
to what ultimately makes it the case that liangzhi should function in a particular way. For 
the Christian theist, she can say that her faculties should function in a particular way and 
that way is determined by the design plan of her faculties. However, in order to make sense 
of having a design plan, she would need to ultimately invoke God. The question that Tien 
fails to answer then, is what makes li intelligible? What gives the design plan associated 
with li, its telos65 or design? It doesn’t seem that an impersonal principle could be invoked 
                                                          
62 Ibid., 35. 
 
63 Ibid., 35-36. 
 
64 Ibid. 
 
65 Perhaps one might accuse me of using telos in such a way that reflects Western understanding, when really 
I should understand the term in an Eastern context. Maybe within an Eastern context the Neo-Confucian 
claim about li being a normative principle might become more plausible. This might be so, but given that 
Tien has in mind Plantinga’s conception of a design plan (which presupposes a Western understanding of 
telos), for the sake of his interpretation of Wang, a Western understanding should be accepted. 
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to explain a design plan; nor does it seem that one could merely appeal to the nature of 
things to explain it.66 Perhaps being idealists, the followers of Wang would insist on 
grounding li (and those things entailed by it) in one’s own mind or a collective mind. In 
fact, according to Tien, for humans, in some since li just is the mind.67 This of course 
wouldn’t answer the question though as you can’t explain the design plan of your mind by 
appealing to li which just is your mind. In summary, it isn’t enough to point out that some 
faculty has a way in which it should function or that we can know how a faculty should 
function, but one must ask what ultimately made it the case that the faculty ought to 
operate in the appropriate manner.  
 
The argument that has been developed throughout this project, is that something 
that dictates (that is a design plan) how things should operate (proper function), seems to 
need a conscious, intentional, and intelligent designer.68 And though I have left room for 
the possibility of additional non-naturalistic religious doctrines aiding a non-personal 
theistic tradition in accounting for proper function, given the bare facts of Neo-
Confucianism that have been given, an intelligible Neo-Confucianism account of proper 
function seems unlikely. 
 
If the Neo-Confucian is willing to acknowledge Plantinga’s argument that a design 
plan requires a conscious and intentional agent, but he refuses to acknowledge this in 
reference to what ultimately gives liangzhi its design plan, the Neo-Confucian needs to be 
wary of committing the taxi-cab fallacy in this context. This is the informal fallacy that is 
committed whenever one wants to advocate for a certain principle that is binding on all 
relevant things, except for an area of one’s arbitrary choice. It is likened to an individual 
who rides a taxi, but gets out whenever it is convenient. The Neo-Confucian can’t advocate 
for a principle that there always needs to be a conscious, intentional, and intelligent 
designer in the context of accounting for proper function, except when it comes to 
accounting for liangzhi’s design plan. 
                                                          
66 I engage with an Aristotelian or Thomistic approach of using natures to ground proper function in 
Appendix two. My argument there could be used here to support my claim. 
 
67 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the 
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 4 (2004): 32. 
 
68 For a discussion on additional preconditions to Plantinga’s epistemology, see Appendix two of this thesis. 
There I argue that in addition to needing a personal God to account for the proper function of cognitive 
faculties, the character of that God needs to be compatible with Plantinga’s truth-aimed condition. 
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Perhaps the Neo-Confucian might accuse the Christian of committing the same 
fallacy regarding God’s faculties, and if the Christian can do it then the Neo-Confucian can 
also do it. This would then still put the Neo-Confucian in the same epistemic position as 
the Christian. There is a problem however, with advocating this response. A person who 
articulates this response doesn’t understand classical Christian theism. For classical 
Christian theists, God doesn’t possess faculties, rather faculties are just something 
analogous or approximate to what God has (presumably, something that doesn’t have to 
have an intellect behind it). So though it may be said that God has something like faculties 
in order for humans to have a better understanding of what God is like, the Christian can 
still deny that God’s faculties need to be functioning properly as God doesn’t actually have 
such faculties. But given Wang’s take that liangzhi is a faculty, the Neo-Confucian can’t 
say the same. In this case, there is a genuine faculty and there is a genuine design plan, but 
as stated earlier, the problem arises when one asks how it is the case that there is a design 
plan. If this is the case, and given that there don’t seem to be any additional doctrines 
within this tradition that might help this tradition in accounting for this, I fail to see how, 
without a conscious, intentional, and intelligent designer, one could make sense of 
liangzhi’s design plan. It seems that Tien, though having made some interesting points, has 
merely moved the debate from discussing accounts of proper function to making sense of 
li. For this reason, I think one is only left with the option of seeing Tien’s Neo-Confucian 
account as missing the mark.  
 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter by arguing that Nagarjuna’s Middle Way tradition couldn’t account for 
the relevant preconditions that make Plantinga’s proper functionalism intelligible. I argued 
this by reiterating and applying my critiques that pertained to the Advaita Vedanta tradition 
to the Middle Way tradition. In addition to this, I argued that an attempt to use Plantinga’s 
epistemology to warrant the Middle Way tradition isn’t likely to even get off the ground as 
it doesn’t seem likely that one could get away from needing to endorse a non-realist 
approach to epistemology. After engaging with this Buddhist tradition, I interacted with 
Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. In particular, I interacted with Tien’s claim that Wang’s Neo-
Confucianism can both be glossed in proper functionalist terms and can use Plantinga’s 
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epistemology to be warranted. I argued that Tien has failed to recognize the problem with 
Neo-Confucianism in accounting for Plantinga’s design plan requirements.  
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Chapter 6: The Implications of the Success and Failure of Closing Pandora’s Box 
 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
At the beginning of this project, I introduced and summarized Plantinga’s trilogy on 
warrant. I then brought up several objections (which included The Problem of Evil, The 
Problem of Religious Diversity, and The Great Pumpkin Objection) to his epistemology, 
and discussed several responses given by Plantinga and his disciples. After this, I 
introduced the Pandora’s Box Objection and stated that it hadn’t received the sort of 
attention that it deserved. This is an objection that has been given by Rose Ann Christian, 
James Beilby, David Tien, and others, as they argue that Plantinga’s religious 
epistemology is greatly weakened by the fact that all sorts of serious (contra Great 
Pumpkin) and diverse religions could use his epistemology to be warranted in the same 
way that Christian belief can be warranted.  
 
After I articulated this objection, I clarified that my project would have a two-fold 
purpose. I stated that in order to provide motivation for answering The Pandora’s Box 
Objection, I would first need to argue that (1) Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausibly 
true. This would then lead me to argue that (2) there are certain serious world religions that 
cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their core belief could be 
warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. 
 
I then quickly moved to the next chapter to defend my first point. I introduced The 
Swampman counterexample that was originally given by Sosa in regard to Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant. This counterexample attempts to demonstrate that Plantinga’s proper 
function condition is not a necessary condition for warrant. I, however, used Swampman in 
order to demonstrate contra Sosa that the proper function condition is a necessary 
condition for warrant. After establishing this much, I fleshed out the rest of Plantinga’s 
conditions for warrant by way of answering contemporary objections that are directed 
toward them. 
 
In chapter three, I established the ground work for arguing for the second part of 
my thesis. I needed to introduce Plantinga’s arguments against naturalism as they relate to 
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his theory of warrant. In doing so, I summarized Plantinga’s critiques of naturalistic 
accounts of proper function and I defended and reformulated his evolutionary argument 
against naturalism.   
 
Moving on from establishing the necessary tools and framework that I needed for 
the rest of the thesis, in Chapter four, I critiqued two Brahmanical (Hindu) traditions. In 
regard to the Advaita Vedanta tradition, I argued that due to its commitment to radical 
monism and there not existing such things as proper function or faculties at the ultimate 
level of reality, it wouldn’t be able to use Plantinga’s epistemology. As for the Samkhya 
tradition, I paralleled it to naturalism and argued that it couldn’t account for the proper 
function condition or the truth-aimed condition for the same reasons that naturalism 
couldn’t account for such conditions.  
 
In chapter five, I interacted with Nagarjuna’s Mahayana Buddhism along with 
Tien’s interpretation of Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. I argued, as in the previous chapter, 
that both of these religions failed to account for the necessary preconditions that are needed 
to make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. In regard to Mahayana Buddhism, I 
argued that the same ontological commitments (an anti-realist view of reality) that plagued 
Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, also plagued it. In regard to Neo-Confucianism, I argued that 
it failed to make intelligible li’s design plan, which would preclude it from accounting for 
Plantinga’s prescribed preconditions of warrant.  
 
For these reasons and more, I take it that I have established that there are all sorts of 
serious and diverse religious traditions that fail to be able to account for the preconditions 
that make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible. And thus I have established that there 
are certain serious world religions that cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate 
that their core belief could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be 
warranted. With this being stated, I believe that I have answered the Pandora’s Box 
Objection and have successfully argued for my two-fold thesis. Having argued for my 
thesis, I will now flesh out some of its further implications as these relate to the debate on 
pluralism and religious diversity. I will argue that, if I have been successful in my overall 
project, there is a new response to the problem of religious diversity that is available to the 
Plantigian. Here I will briefly suggest where further work could be done that follows from 
my project. I will then discuss what would have followed if my two-part project had 
ultimately failed. Following the outline of my thesis, I will first entertain the question: If 
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Plantinga’s theory of warrant is not correct, would it follow that the larger thesis of 
reformed epistemology is false. After this, I will draw out what it would mean if all sorts of 
serious and diverse religions could use Plantinga’s epistemology. I will. particularly, 
engage David Tien’s and Erik Baldwin’s work and their claim that other religions being 
able to deploy Plantinga’s epistemology is troubling for the reformed epistemologist. 
Having addressed this much, for the rest of the chapter, I will argue that, (1*) reformed 
epistemology’s success ultimately does not depend on proper functionalism and (2*) even 
if all sorts of serious and diverse world religions could use Plantinga’s epistemology to be 
warranted, it wouldn’t necessarily follow that the reformed epistemologist is without 
warrant for her belief. 
 
 
6.1 Pluralism, Plantinga, and the Problem of Religious Disagreement 
 
In chapter one, I used Joseph Kim’s work to articulate and engage the problem of religious 
disagreement, at least the version that is driven by the following equal-weight theory: 
 
(1) It is unreasonable to hold to one’s views in the face of disagreement since one 
would need some positive reason to privilege one’s views over one’s opponent[‘s 
view]. 
 
(2) No such reason is available since the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers and 
have access to the same evidence. 
 
(3) Therefore, one should give equal weight to the opinion of an epistemic peer and 
to one’s own opinion in the case of epistemic disagreement.1 
 
It is typically argued that those who have religious peers that differ on issues of theology 
should give equal weight to their peers, and, in what would often be the case, withhold 
their belief in their religious dogma. I stated that, typically, those within the Plantigian 
tradition argue against this in at least three ways. First, one could reject that (1) would act 
as a defeater for their belief, as one could argue that those who would disagree with their 
                                                          
1 Joseph Kim, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity: Proper Function, Epistemic 
Disagreement, and Christian Exclusivism (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 49-50.  
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religious belief would actually not be epistemic peers; for if Christianity were true, their 
peers’ (non-Christians) faculties would not be functioning properly. Secondly, one could 
argue in an ad absurdum fashion that equal-weight theory would require us to be agnostic 
about a whole host of beliefs that we think we have warrant for. This would include beliefs 
pertaining to politics, metaphysics, ethics, and even science. This in itself might act as 
motivation to reject equal-weight theory. Lastly, the Plantigian could reject it as it appears 
to be self-defeating, given the fact that there are epistemic peers who disagree about equal-
weight theory.  
 
Given the success of my argument, I think there is at least one other response that 
could be given by the Plantigian. If one is willing to grant that Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant is accurate and that no such beliefs could be warranted without his specified 
conditions being met, then it would follow that it would be impossible for many of the 
religions mentioned in this project to have their core belief warranted. If there are, then, no 
possible circumstances in which the core beliefs of such religions could be warranted, is 
one really obligated to give equal-weight to these religious views? It seems that something 
like the following principle is right: 
 
If S holds belief P and P is a belief that could be warranted, then S could be within 
her epistemic right in holding to P over her peer’s belief that P’ if it is not 
epistemically possible that P’ could be warranted. 
 
If this principle is approximately right, then the advocate of equal-weight theory should at 
least refine (3) to state something like the following:  
 
(3*)Therefore, one should give equal weight to the opinion of an epistemic peer 
and to one’s own opinion in the case of epistemic disagreement, unless the 
epistemic peer’s view cannot possibly be warranted. 
 
As seen in this project, this would reduce the amount of religious disagreement that the 
Plantigian would need to contend with. The number of epistemic peers in this case literally 
could shrink by the billions. Though this wouldn’t be a complete victory for the Plantigian, 
surely this would be an important achievement. And thus, though it wouldn’t be a robust 
response to the problem of religious disagreement (is there such a thing?) as there would 
be other religions (e.g. Judaism) that could still have their core belief warranted, it surely 
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could act as one of several possible responses that the Plantigian could give to the 
proponent of equal-weight theory. 
 
 
6.2 Suggested Work for the Future  
 
Though significant headway has been made in this project at understanding how much 
religious disagreement could be avoided, many questions are yet to be explored. Could 
classic pagan religions use Plantinga’s epistemology to be warranted? What about Native 
American religions? Do other traditions within the Hindu tradition stand a better chance in 
accounting for the preconditions that are needed to make use of Plantinga’s epistemology 
than the Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya traditions? These are just some of the outstanding 
questions that could be usefully pursued. 
 
In addition to this, it could be beneficial to investigate the compatibility of other 
theories of warrant (given that not all epistemologists will be convinced proper 
functionalists) with the religions discussed here.2 In this case, we might ask whether 
Advaita Vedanta Hinduism could account for the preconditions needed to make intelligible 
virtue reliabilism? What about Mahayana Buddhism? There is a whole sub-field in 
religious epistemology that could be created for the exploration of the compatibility of 
religions with theories of warrant. The subfield that I am proposing could be referred to as 
‘epistemological compatibility studies.’ Of course, it might be found that some theories of 
warrant are given greater attention as such theories to the current date might seem more 
plausible than others, however; it would still appear to be a worthy enterprise to investigate 
all sorts of contemporaries theories, especially in light of new epistemological 
developments that are bound to happen. Such a detailed investigation would not only 
provide a more robust response to the Pandora’s Box Objection, but, as briefly argued 
above, it could also aid in the potential massive decrease of epistemic peers by way of 
decreasing the amount of religions that could have their core belief warranted. Having 
mentioned other theories of warrant and their compatibility with religious belief, we can 
now explore if the broader project of reformed epistemology depends on the success of 
proper functionalism. 
 
                                                          
2 See the next section for a primer on other theories of warrant and their compatibility with reformed 
epistemology. 
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6.3 Does Reformed epistemology Rise or Fall with Proper Functionalism? 
 
The modern day reformed epistemology project began in 1967 with Plantinga’s God and 
Other Minds.3 There Plantinga uses the traditional internalist conception of justification 
and argues that belief in God could be justified in an analogous way to how belief in other 
minds could be justified. Both belief in God and belief in other minds, for Plantinga, lack 
good convincing arguments, but nonetheless, they could be rationally held. This paved the 
way for new literature on the rationality of theism, which would include William Alston’s 
Perceiving God4 and Plantinga’s later trilogy which was discussed in chapter one of this 
project. At the heart of reformed epistemology is the claim that belief in God (or a specific 
religion) could be justified or warranted without arguments. As this is the case, we can ask 
whether the success of reformed epistemology depends on the success of proper 
functionalism? 
 
While I do think that it is important to establish proper functionalism, I by no 
means think that proper functionalism is the only theory of warrant or justification that is 
compatible with reformed epistemology. And thus, even if Plantinga’s theory of warrant 
turns out to be false, this doesn’t entail that reformed epistemology is false. In order to 
show this, I will first articulate two internalist conceptions of justification (classical 
foundationalism and phenomenal conservatism) and argue that each of these can be 
consistent with reformed epistemology. I will then move on to demonstrate this within the 
framework of a general reliabilist theory and a virtue reliabilist theory of justification and 
warrant. If successful, I will have demonstrated that reformed epistemology can be 
incorporated into several mainstream theories of justification and warrant, and thus I will 
have established that the reformed epistemology project should be taken seriously, even by 
those who aren’t proper functionalists. After all of this has been established, I will briefly 
mention the benefits of using the proper functionalist framework over competing theories 
of justification or warrant in endorsing reformed epistemology.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1967). 
 
4 William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). 
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6.4 Internalism: Classical Foundationalism 
 
At first, it might seem odd that I endorse that there could be a classical foundationalist 
model of reformed epistemology. Isn’t this the theory of justification that Plantinga spends 
the first part of Warranted Christian Belief attacking, in order to make room for reformed 
epistemology?5 Certainly, the few contemporary advocates of classical foundationalism 
don’t think that classical foundationalism is compatible with reformed epistemology.6 Why 
should one think that reformed epistemology and classical foundationalism are 
compatible?  
 
First, classical foundationalism needs to be defined. I take classical foundationalism 
to be the epistemological theory that espouses that only beliefs that are incorrigible or self-
evident can be considered properly basic beliefs. The advocate of classical foundationalism 
will likely endorse it because incorrigible beliefs are supposed to have the tightest 
connection to truth one could have. It is often said that one who has incorrigible beliefs, 
actually ‘grasps’ or ‘sees’ the truth of such beliefs; that is, one grasps or sees the relation 
between the truth-maker and truth-bearer.  
 
It is prima facie obvious why most philosophers of religion don’t think that 
classical foundationalism is compatible with reformed epistemology. Believing in God 
doesn’t seem self-evident for most people. There are many naturalists in Western 
philosophy (in fact, most professional philosophers are naturalists) and none of them seem 
to think that belief in God is incorrigible or self-evident. In fact, it is safe to assume that 
most theists or even Christians think that belief in God isn’t a belief that is incorrigible or 
self-evident. If belief in God isn’t incorrigible or self-evident, it follows from the tenet of 
classical foundationalism, that belief in God isn’t properly basic.  
 
In defending Christian theism, Greg Bahnsen argues that it is the case that every 
human knows that the Christian God exists in a self-evident way, but that because of sin 
humans are generally self-deceived into thinking he doesn’t exist.7 I take it that belief in 
                                                          
5 See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 
6 See Tim and Lydia McGrew, Internalism and epistemology: the architecture of reason (New York: 
Routledge, 2007).  
 
7 See Greg Bahnsen, ‘The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics,’ Westminster 
Theological Journal LVII (1995): 1-31; Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and 
Analysis:Phillipsburg (N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1998).  
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the Christian God is something like a dispositional belief that isn’t functionally accessed, 
and thus, it doesn’t become an occurrent belief, due to sin. Bahnsen’s apologetic turns into 
an internalist project wherein he attempts to demonstrate that humans all believe in the 
Christian God but that they are suppressing the truth in unrighteousness. He does this by 
arguing that the preconditions of intelligibility (the laws of logic, induction, ethics, and 
rational thought) can only be accounted for in the Christian worldview, which would seem 
to indicate that we all think like Christians even if we don’t outwardly endorse Christian 
belief.8  
 
It seems to me that even if Bahnsen is unsuccessful in demonstrating this, he has 
still given a model that would allow a proponent of classical foundationalism to 
consistently endorse that belief in God is properly basic. This can be seen in the following 
formulation:  
 
CFRE: Because Christianity is true, belief in God is an incorrigible belief that 
doesn’t appear to be self-evident or incorrigible (at least as it should be) due to sin 
and self-deception.  
 
The soundness of this formulation would depend on if one could prove that Christianity is 
true and if one could show that Christian belief entailed that all humans know God but are 
or can be self-deceived about believing in him. However, one could even soften this 
formulation to bypass needing to prove such things by endorsing the following alternative: 
 
CFRE2: It is epistemically possible that belief in the Christian God is really a self-
evident or incorrigible belief but it doesn’t appear that it is as there exists universal 
self-deception.  
 
Now I grant that most non-Christians won’t be impressed with this model as this 
establishes a highly controversial claim based on mere epistemic possibility; however, I 
take it to be in the spirit of Plantinga’s own project in arguing that if Christianity is true, it 
is probably warranted.  
 
 
                                                          
8 Greg Bahnsen, Always Ready: Directions for Defending the Faith (Atlanta, GA: American Vision, 1996).  
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6.5 Internalism: Phenomenal Conservatism 
 
The prospects of formulating reformed epistemology on a phenomenal conservatism 
model, seems to be even more promising than on classical foundationalism. According to 
Martin Smith, phenomenal conservatism is a prominent view in epistemology that says ‘if 
it seems to one that P is true then, in the absence of defeaters, one has justification for 
believing that P is true.’ 9 At the heart of this theory, are seemings. Seemings are supposed 
to be a particular type of mental state that bears propositional content and a distinct sort of 
phenomenology. Upon one having a certain seeming, one is justified in making a natural 
doxastic response to affirm a related belief to that seeming.  
 
If this is the case, then it is easy to imagine a scenario where it seems to S that 
Christianity is true, and in the absence of defeaters, S would be justified in believing in 
Christianity. Like on Plantinga’s model, this belief could be a result of a belief-forming 
mechanism like the sensus divinitatis or it could be the result of accepting the testimony of 
God, an individual, or a community. It is important to note that two contemporary 
phenomenal conservatists, Trent Dougherty and Chris Tweedt, explicitly agree that one 
could advocate for reformed epistemology as a phenomenal conservatist. As they state, 
‘[e]videntialists can maintain epistemic evidentialism and hold that someone can rationally 
believe that God exists without argument by holding to phenomenal conservatism.’10  
 
However, there is one important distinction between proper functionalism and 
phenomenal conservatism. Plantinga’s proper functionalism would enable the belief to not 
only be internally justified but also warranted. That is, he would allow the justified belief 
to become actual knowledge that the individual possesses. Presumably, the individual on 
phenomenal coservatism account would only have justified, true belief. But, as most 
epistemologists believe, this would fall short of knowledge. This doesn’t appear to be a 
huge problem, however, as it could easily be fixed. In regard to obtaining knowledge, there 
are at least two different options. First, an individual might think that Gettier problems are 
the main obstacle between justified, true belief and knowledge. If this is the case, then one 
could make the following formulation: 
 
                                                          
9 Martin Smith, ‘The epistemology of religion,’ Analysis 74 (2014): 141. 
 
10 Trent Dougherty and Chris Tweetd, ‘Religious Epistemology,’ Philosophy Compass, forthcoming,  
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GFPCRE: If it seems to S that God exists and if S isn’t aware of any defeaters for 
S’s belief, and if the situation was Gettier free, S would know that God exists. 
 
Moreover, in regard to the other option, one might not think that the Gettier condition is 
what is important, or at least wholly important. Rather, one needs (or also needs) a 
mechanism that produces the right sort of seeming to be a reliable mechanism. If this is the 
case, one could formulate the following principle: 
 
RGFCRE: It is epistemically possible that in virtue of a reliable mechanism that 
produces certain seemings, S could have a justified doxastic response in believing 
that God exists as it seems like God exists to S; and as long as the situation is 
Gettier free (i.e. Gettier preventions are met), S would have knowledge that God 
exists. 
 
Regardless of what principle seems more attractive to the advocate of phenomenal 
conservatism, it would appear that there would be ways to flesh out reformed epistemology 
in such a way to where belief in God, or even Christianity, could be a belief that constitutes 
knowledge for S. Having now addressed how reformed epistemology might be formulated 
on different internalist models of justification, I will now move on to demonstrating how it 
could be formulated on different externalist models. 
 
 
6.6 Externalist Theories of Justification: Reliabilism and Virtue Reliabilism 
 
By externalism here, I just mean the denial of internalism, which states roughly, that one 
must have access to the properties which confer warrant.11 There are other internalist 
theories that I mention in chapter two of my project, that I won’t go into detail about here 
but they are still worthy of being mentioned. 12 Probably the most well-known externalist 
account is reliabilism. For the purposes of this chapter, I will call the reliabilism that I have 
in mind general reliabilism. This will help make the distinction between general reliabilism 
and virtue reliabilism. 
                                                          
11 See Chapter two for detailed definitions of internalism and externalism. 
 
12 For the definitions of inferential internalism or mentalism, see Richard Fumerton, ‘Evidentialism and 
Truth’ in Evidentialism and its Dicontents ed. Trent Dougherty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
179-191. 
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General reliabilism can be glossed in at least two different ways. First, it can be 
glossed to emphasize a reliable process such that it states roughly, S is justified in 
believing P iff S has a reliable mechanism which is responsible for S believing that P. 
Secondly, it could be glossed in such a way as to emphasize the evidence that S has, such 
that S’s belief P is reliable insofar as S’s evidence reliably leads S to produce P. Though 
one could loosen the requirements for what the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions 
are for what it means to have evidence, such that good evidence could be as weak as mere 
phenomenological imagery or seemings (which would make it more reformed 
epistemology friendly), for the purposes of establishing coherence with the thesis of 
reformed epistemology, I have more in mind the first of these types of reliabilism. It seems 
relatively easy to see how reformed epistemology might work on this account of 
justification. Without too much controversy, one could make the following formulation: 
 
RPRE: It is epistemically possible that S has a reliable faculty that produces in S 
the belief that God exists; and if such a faculty did produce belief that God exists, S 
could be justified in her belief that God exists. 
 
Of course, one might say that this account falls short of knowledge because there could be 
a need to invoke anti-Gettier conditions or safety conditions, but there is no reason to think 
it couldn’t be done in a similar way as I have handled the internalist accounts above. 
 
As mentioined, above, there is a sort of reliabilism that restricts the reliable process 
or mechanism to cognitive virtues. By cognitive virtues, I have in mind such virtues as 
inductive, deductive, perceptual, and memory faculties. Like with general reliabilism, it 
also seems clear how one could endorse RE given virtue reliabilism. In addition to the 
general criteria of reliabilism, this virtue account would just have to clarify that the sensus 
divinitatis (that is the reliable cognitive faculty that produces belief in God) would meet the 
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions of what it means to be a cognitive virtue. One 
could make the following formulation: 
 
VRRE: It is epistemically possible that S has a cognitive virtue ‘m’ that produces in 
S the belief that God exists; and if this was the case, S would be justified in her 
belief that God exists.  
 
135 
 
Again, if one felt that this wasn’t adequate for S knowing that God exists, one could 
formulate this in such a way as to where Gettier or safety conditions were also satisfied.  
 
 
6.7 Benefits of using a Proper Functionalist Theory of Warrant 
 
If there are all sorts of serious epistemological systems that could be considered 
compatible with reformed epistemology, why might an advocate of reformed epistemology 
defend proper functionalism? This question seems especially pertinent given that the 
easiest way to get a more narrow theory accepted in a community is to use broader already 
accepted theories which the narrower theory is based on, rather than basing the narrower 
theory on a more controversial broader theory. While this seems right to me, there are at 
least three benefits for the advocate of reformed epistemology to use a proper functionalist 
model, over the other models that were mentioned above. First, it best captures the needed 
connection to truth that a subject has to have in order to have knowledge. Though I won’t 
go into detail here, as I have explored this at length in chapter one (the brain lesion 
example) and chapter two (the Swampman example), it is still worth mentioning.  
 
Second, as established in this project, the proper functionalist has a powerful 
response to the Pandora’s Box Objection and it might be the case that other theories of 
justification or warrant aren’t able to respond to it with the same level of force. Third, as I 
have argued, if there were all sorts of religions whose core belief failed to meet the proper 
function condition, and if the proper function condition is a necessary condition for 
warrant, it might be that the core beliefs of these religions just couldn’t ever be warranted. 
This would mean that proper functionalism could actually help predict the 
unwarrantedness nature of other religious and philosophical traditions. For some, this 
might make the project of reformed epistemology look stronger as not only could it 
establish the warranted nature of Christian theism, it could actually help establish the 
unwarrantedness of other traditions. I take all of these reasons to be good reasons for the 
advocate of reformed epistemology to take seriously the proper functionalist formulation 
of reformed epistemology. 
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6.8 Tien’s Trouble and the Steadfast View 
 
Having now argued that the success of reformed epistemology isn’t predicated on the 
success of proper functionalism and that a supporter of reformed epistemology would 
nonetheless be advised to hold it, I will now explore the final implication of what would 
have been the case were my two-fold thesis to have failed. Would those members of 
differing religious communities have their religious beliefs defeated if everyone’s religious 
belief was compatible with the correct theory of warrant?  
 
This is what is indicated by Tien. Tien argues that since the Christian and the Neo-
Confucian would be in the same epistemic situation, Plantinga’s argument for the 
rationality of Christianity is greatly weakened.13 His reason is that given that both views 
can be seen endorsing the same epistemology and both are able to be warranted in the same 
sort of way, it would follow that adherents of both of these views would lack a way to 
rightly determine which religion should be preferred.14  
 
As mentioned in chapter one’s section on religious diversity, Tien’s claim isn’t 
right. Just because the Christian lacks the internal access to demonstrate the difference 
between herself and her epistemic acquaintance (the Neo-Confucian), it doesn’t follow that 
the two epistemic subjects are in the same epistemic boat. To endorse this would be to 
presuppose a type of internalism, which Plantinga obviously rejects. Even if both traditions 
endorsed the same epistemology, and both could account for the preconditions that are 
needed to make intelligible that epistemology, it wouldn’t necessarily follow that the 
adherents of both are epistemic peers. In fact, as only one design plan could be 
successfully aimed at truth (if both design plans are conflicting as in this case), there could 
only be two options for what could be going on with the subjects. First, both could be 
malfunctioning. In which case, an argument could be made that these two subjects are 
epistemic peers. However, there is a second possibility, namely that one of them is 
functioning properly, which would then preclude the other from functioning properly (at 
least, functioning properly insofar as that involves functioning properly with design plan 
aimed at truth) and thus both wouldn’t be epistemic peers. Given that one would be 
                                                          
13 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the 
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 4 (2004): 38. 
 
14 Ibid., 37-38. 
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functioning properly and the other wouldn’t be, there would be a significant epistemic 
difference between the two subjects, and this epistemic difference would be enough to 
ensure that the two subjects would no longer appear to be in the same epistemic boat.  
 
Even if one wanted to advocate that both the Christian and the Neo-Confucian were 
in the same epistemic situation (perhaps being epistemic peers), this wouldn’t 
automatically defeat Plantinga’s project or the Christian’s belief. There is a whole 
literature based on epistemic disagreement and getting into the details of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this project.15 However, there is a view that is worth briefly 
mentioning. The steadfast view states that it is sometimes reasonable to believe P even in 
light of peer disagreement about P.16 Besides rehashing the already discussed arguments 
against equal-weight theory,17 I think the following scenario can help make this account 
plausible: Suppose that one day, Luke wakes up and gets out of bed. As Luke goes about 
his morning routine and he encounters his wife, Lynn. Lynn informs him that she doesn’t 
really exist and that she is just a Freudian projection that comforts him in a dark and cold 
world and that his cognitive faculties are inadvertently letting him know this now. As Luke 
argues with Lynn about her existence, he leaves the house to find his neighbor, Pastor 
Brian. Luke seeks counsel from this morally trust-worthy pastor. However, upon Luke 
sharing with Brian what his fight was about, Brian informs Luke that he too is a projection 
of the mind; but contra the Freudian projection theory, he informs Luke that it is due to an 
evil demon playing tricks on him. As Luke becomes more upset he decides to drive into 
town where he runs into countless individuals (maybe he also runs into some who like him, 
affirm the existence of other minds and have no idea what is going on) who inform him 
that they don’t really exist and are really projections caused by Freudian reasons, demonic 
activity, or perhaps some other reason.  
 
Now, for argument’s sake, let us say that there are no good arguments justifying 
belief in other minds: at least arguments that would justify Luke in believing that there 
                                                          
15 A good place to start is David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, The epistemology of disagreement: new 
essays (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2013).  
 
16 Kenneth Boyce and Allan Hazlett, ‘Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox’ (forthcoming in 
Ratio).   
 
17 See Chapter one of this thesis for arguments against equal-weight theory.  
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were other minds.18 Since Luke is a good philosopher, under these conditions he knows 
that there could be different explanations or theories formed by the evidence that he has (I 
have in mind the experiences of perceiving other wills, emotions, and rational behavior, in 
other bodies that are not his own) for believing in other minds. Maybe Luke realizes that 
he has no further evidence that can disprove those he encounters that belong to team-evil-
demon-monster hypothesis. Likewise, he also realizes that he lacks reasons to prefer his 
hypothesis about other minds as opposed to those that can be considered on being on team-
Freudian-Projection hypothesis. Luke realizes that the phenomenological imagery that has 
always moved him doxastically to affirm that other minds exist hasn’t changed. In fact, the 
phenomenological imagery that he perceives is just as clear and evident as ever before. In 
this case, is the phenomenological imagery that has acted as evidence his whole life no 
longer sufficient grounds for the rationality of his belief in other minds? Would it no 
longer be sufficient just because he has become aware that there exist epistemic peers with 
differing views, and he lacks an argument to prefer his own view over competing views? It 
seems right that Luke is in his epistemic right in continuing to affirm that there exist other 
minds, even in light of there being different viable explanations of his experience. 
 
Now, perhaps one thinks that Luke being a good philosopher would realize that his 
peers are in a self-defeating position, as according to them, they are not even Luke’s peers. 
This would then put Luke’s view in a distinct category in regard to justification and thus 
this situation is irrelevant to defending the steadfast view. I think there are two responses to 
this. First, it is easy to imagine Luke being in such a frantic state that he doesn’t even 
reason in this way. He continues to only think about the phenomenological imagery that he 
has and that, likewise, his family and friends have. He can’t stop thinking about why they 
are interpreting their experience in such a way and why he is interpreting his experience in 
his way. Further reasons that can justify his position are just simply not thought of. 
 
 Second, if this example seems too controversial, one could just replace the dispute 
about the existence of other minds with disputes over the age of the earth. Maybe some of 
Luke’s friends think that they were all just created five minutes ago with the appearance of 
age, while others think that the earth was created a year ago with the appearance of age. 
Each individual has the same empirical data but there are multiple interpretations that can 
explain the data just as well. In this case, is Luke no longer warranted in believing what his 
                                                          
18 I take it that it can be helpful for argument’s sake, to affirm something contrary to the truth that one knows 
(even necessary truths) in a thought experiment, in order to experiment with and better articulate intuitions.  
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faculties produce, namely that he has existed alongside others for the past thirty years or 
that the world is a little under five billion years old? It is obvious that he is warranted in 
believing what his faculties produce in this situation, even in light of peer epistemic 
disagreement.  
 
Lastly, even if the above scenarios failed to make the Steadfast view more 
plausible, it would still be fair game to ask why the advocate of the steadfast view should 
be convinced of the opposing conciliatory view (that is, the view that rejects that there are 
some cases where S is rational in accepting ‘P’ in the case of genuine epistemic peer 
disagreement). It isn’t as if the conciliatory view should be considered the default view. 
According to Christensen, what separates conciliatory view advocates from steadfast view 
advocates is accepting something like the independence principle.19  
 
Independence: In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another person's belief 
about P, in order to determine how (if at all) to modify one's own belief about p, 
one should do so in a way that is independent of the reasoning behind one's own 
initial belief about p.20 
 
Christensen states that one is supposed to be compelled to accept this principle as it is 
needed to avoid dogmatism or blatant question begging. 
 
The motivation behind the principle is obvious: it's intended to prevent blatantly 
question-begging dismissals of the evidence provided by the disagreement of the 
others. It attempts to capture what would be wrong with a P-believer saying, for 
example, “Well, so and so disagrees with me about p. But since P is true, she's 
wrong about p. So however reliable she may generally be, I needn’t take her 
disagreement about p as any reason at all to change my belief.”21 
 
But if God did exist and Christians did have reliable or properly functioning faculties and 
their epistemic peers did not have such faculties, then the reformed epistemologist, who 
                                                          
19 David Christensen, ‘Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,’ Philosophy Compass 
4, no. 5 (2009): 758. 
 
20 Ibid., 758.  
 
21 David Christensen, ‘Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,’ Philosophers Imprint 
11, no. 6 (2011): 2. 
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has a high degree of warrant for her beliefs, might have a good reason to not be bothered 
by evidence that is advocated by another. If this were the case, then the reformed 
epistemologist shouldn’t be compelled to accept the conciliatory view. I will attempt to 
make this more plausible in the following section.  
 
 
6.9 Objective Probability and Religious Diversity 
 
Perhaps I have misunderstood Tien and what he is really getting at is that the advocate of 
Plantinga’s religious epistemology, upon reflection, has a defeater for believing that the 
Holy Spirit has testified to her. This might be because the subject has become aware that 
there exist other subjects who adhere to contradictory religious claims; and due to 
epistemological commitments, there is no way to up the probability that her view is the 
right one. Perhaps the other subjects even testify that they share the same type of 
phenomenological imagery as the Christian, when they go about forming their respective 
doxastic responses. If this is what Tien is getting at, then he would be espousing the same 
sort of argument that Erik Baldwin has defended.22 Baldwin tries to flesh this worry out 
into a scenario where several individuals (who are all proper functionalists) are rolling a 
die and each individual sees a different number come up on the die. As each individual is 
trustworthy, it would seem that each individual must come to the conclusion that most of 
them are experiencing some sort of cognitive malfunction. But if this is the case, then each 
individual must realize that there is a low objective probability23 for their faculties being 
the faculties that are still properly functioning (presuming that one of them has faculties 
that are working properly); and thus, each individual would have a defeater for trusting 
their faculties.24 And if each person were to realize that they had a defeater for the belief 
that their religious belief forming faculties were reliable, each individual would be 
internally irrationally if they continued to affirm their religious beliefs.  As the Plantigian 
affirms that internal rationality is required for warrant, the Plantigian couldn’t have a 
warranted belief under these conditions.  
 
                                                          
22 See Eric Baldwin, ‘Could the Extended Aquinas/Calvin model Defeat Basic Christian Belief?’ Philosophia 
Christi 8, no. 2 (2006).  Also, it is important to note that through personal correspondence with Erik 
Baldwin, I have recently learned that he no longer thinks that the probabilistic argument that he gives here 
is a good one. Erik Baldwin, personal message, August 25, 2014. 
 
23 By objective probability, I mean the evidential probability given the objective, sharable evidence. 
 
24 Baldwin, ‘Could the Extended Aquinas/Calvin model Defeat Basic Christian Belief?’ op. cit., 392. 
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If this is what really is behind Tien’s objection, I am still unconvinced that his 
objection (or Baldwin’s objection) is a troubling one for the Christian who endorses 
Plantinga’s epistemology. Even if a subject becomes aware that the objective probability of 
her faculties functioning properly in regard to her Christian belief is low, it doesn’t follow 
that this constitutes a defeater for her belief. Different degrees of warrant require different 
responses to potential defeaters (this includes defeaters which are based on probability). 
There may be cases where one should be unmoved in responding to potential defeaters 
(one shouldn’t react to them at all), as opposed to other cases where one would rationally 
be required to move doxastically. 
 
Recall the scenario that I discuss in Chapter two above:  
 
Say I am known for stealing philosophy books, in fact, there is even a picture of 
me, warning the clerks that I like to steal books. If, one day, the whole philosophy 
section of the library went missing and there were several witnesses saying they 
saw me steal a lot of books, the objective probability that I stole the books would 
be very high. Nonetheless, if I had a very distinct and highly warranted memory of 
myself at my house during the time that the books disappeared, would I have a 
defeater for my belief that I was at my house when the book snatching occurred? It 
doesn’t appear to be the case that I would. As I hold to this belief with a sufficient 
amount of firmness (which is partly responsible for my level of warrant being 
high), the probability that I stole the philosophy books wouldn’t play any 
significant role in my doxastic process.  
 
As shown, there are clearly cases where the objective probability for a belief being false is 
high and yet it can be warranted due to the high degree of warrant the belief has for a 
subject. As mentioned, the level of warrant depends on how firmly one holds to that belief. 
Firmness in this context is at least partly determined by the subjective probability one has 
for the belief being true. This means that, unlike objective probability, subjective 
probability is related to the design plan’s requirements for doxastic formation. One could 
argue that in the case of the missing books, given the non-propositional evidence for my 
belief that I wasn’t stealing the books, the subjective probability for my belief being true 
isn’t low and this is why my belief isn’t defeated. If this is the case, it would follow that 
the low objective probability that Baldwin’s die case tries to establish isn’t directly 
relevant to one’s doxastic formation. For Baldwin’s case, it might just be that one of the 
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subjects is designed to produce the right belief about the die and, due to the subject having 
a high degree of warrant for her belief (which is due partly to the high subjective 
probability that she has for the belief being true), even despite diverse opinions from her 
peers, she would be internally rational (and rational in accordance with proper function) in 
continuing to affirm the right number that’s on the die. The same story could be told for the 
Christian Plantigian. It just might be that the Spirit’s combined repairment of the sensus 
divinitatis and testimony to a subject, assures that the subjective probability will be high or 
at least high enough for one to rationality continue to hold to Christian belief, even in light 
of a low objective probability that one’s religious faculties are functioning properly 
 
 
6.10 Final Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter, after summarizing the previous chapters of this project, I concluded 
that I had successfully argued for my thesis. I then proceeded to examine some positive 
implications of the success of my thesis. I argued that one could use the information 
provided in my thesis to formulate a new Plantigian response to the problem of religious 
disagreement. I then briefly suggested areas where my work could be extended. 
 
After looking at positive implications for the success of my thesis, I turned to 
explicating what the contrary-to-fact failure of my two-part thesis would mean for the 
overall project of reformed epistemology. I first argued that even if Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant is shown to be false, the project of reformed epistemology could still be seen as 
successful. Lastly, I looked at what it would mean if there was no robust response to the 
Pandora’s Box Objection or a robust way to decrease the force of the problem of religious 
diversity. I argued that at least for the reformed epistemologist, the project of reformed 
epistemology isn’t significantly hindered by the lack of robust responses. Nonetheless, for 
the reasons mentioned in this project, I take it that my work will not only significantly add 
to the literature pertaining to the Pandora’s Box Objection, but also to the literature 
pertaining to reformed epistemology, proper functionalism, and the problem of religious 
disagreement. 
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Appendix 1: A Defeater for Islamic Belief 
 
 
 
A1.0 Introduction 
 
All of the religions surveyed have lacked one important thing, belief in the existence of a 
personal God. This has proven to be detrimental in each religion's attempt to account for 
and utilize Plantinga’s epistemology. But what about those religions that do endorse the 
classical theistic conception of God; would they fare any better? For example, Islam is 
very similar to Christianity in that there exists a good God who is responsible for creating 
all of life, so wouldn’t it be able to account for and utilize Plantinga’s epistemology in the 
same way that Christianity can? In this appendix, I will argue that though Islam is 
compatible with the proper function condition that is espoused by Plantinga, due to 
philosophical doctrines that have been espoused within mainstream Islamic traditions, 
there exists metalevel requirements which would prevent the core belief of Islam from 
being able to be warranted in the same way that the core belief of Christianity can be. After 
establishing this, I will move on to engage Islam and its compatibility with the truth-aimed 
condition. I will argue that due to certain Qur’anic passages, there is a subjective epistemic 
defeater for some Muslims. I now turn to surveying the Islamic tradition. 
 
 
A1.1 Islam 101 
 
Islam teaches that humans are all born Muslims.1 However, due to sin, there exists a need 
to correct human thinking about the nature of God and about how humans should act. 
Islam teaches that God has given this correction by giving people prophets. Islam explicitly 
endorses that the general story of the Old Testament is a fallible record of God giving 
humans such prophets. In addition to this, Islam also endorses that this calling back to God 
also includes the raising up of Jesus of Nazareth as a prophet to the world. Though these 
people of the book (that is Jews and Christians) are seen as once having God’s Word in 
pure form (that is through having the Law and the Gospel), through time and different 
                                                 
1 Until specified, the following is an excerpt (formatted to appropriately fit this thesis) from Erik Baldwin 
and Tyler Dalton McNabb, ‘An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic Belief?’  International Journal of 
Philosophy and Theology (2015): 352-367. Specifically, this excerpt can rightly be attributed to my own 
work. 
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disputes, the Word has now become corrupted (2:75-79). Such corruption has perverted the 
faith of Islam or what is true Abrahamic monotheism. 
 
In part, Islamic theology differs substantially with both Jewish and Christian 
theologies with respect to each theology’s view of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. In 
Judaism, Jesus at best was a good faithful rabbi who had followers who badly 
misunderstood him. In regard to Islam however, Jesus was a prophet, the messiah (al-
Maseeh), who was born of a virgin and anointed the blind so that they could see, whom 
God raised up to bring back His people from sin.  
 
If Judaism has too low of a view of Jesus, Christianity has too high a view of him. 
Nowhere can this be seen more than in regard to the nature of Jesus. Though Christianity 
endorses monotheism, it also teaches that as the second person of the Trinity, Jesus has 
both a divine and a human nature. Furthermore, it is in his human nature that Jesus suffered 
on the cross the consequences of the world’s sins. In addition to this, Christianity teaches 
that this act of love pleased God to the point where God justified and vindicated Christ by 
raising him from the dead. Islam denies all of this: Jesus was created (3:59), not God in the 
flesh (19:34-35), he was merely a messenger from God (4:171), he did not die a cursed 
death (4:157), and he was not raised from the dead but taken bodily into heaven (3:55). In 
fact, Islam teaches that Jesus will come back condemning those who worshipped him. 
(4:156-159) 
 
Thus for Islam, the major sects of the Abrahamic religions have clearly gone astray 
from God’s original intention. This being the case, God needed to restore the truth about 
Himself and about how His followers should act. Islam teaches that in God’s timing, God 
sent the Prophet Muhammad (circa 570-632) to the world. From his encounters with the 
angel Gabriel, Muhammad was reportedly given the Qur’an, which was used to make the 
needed corrections to contemporary Jewish and Christian theologies. The pure faith of 
Islam can be summarized by Surah 112 which states, ‘Say: He is Allah, He is one! Allah, 
the Eternally Besought of all! He begetteth not, nor was He begotten. And there is none 
comparable unto Him.’2 
 
 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all of the Qur’an verses that follow are from Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, 
English translation of Holy Quran taken from http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/pick/ 
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The Qur’an endorses most of the traditional attributes of God that both Judaism and 
Christianity endorse. In Islam, these attributes are considered the 99 names of God. The 
merciful, the loving one, the creator, the all-knowing, the all-powerful, the forgiver, and the 
judge are all names or attributes attributed to God.  
 
There are however, some differences between the conception of God in the Jewish 
and Christian scriptures and in the Qur’an. In Old and New Testaments, God makes man in 
His image and it is presumed that He has created man’s faculties to produce true beliefs 
that reflect the world around him. In Islam however, though God is still truth and though 
God still commands humans to be truthful, we are also told that God did not make man in 
His image and we are also told that He is the greatest deceiver or schemer. (3:54) 
Moreover, the New Testament portrays God as a God who loves sinners, even those who 
habitually oppose Him. In fact, He loves His enemies so much that He died a cursed death 
for them. (John 3:16 and Galatians 3:12-13) In contrast, however, the Qur’an teaches that 
God does not love the sinner as much as He can and in fact, it never once even affirms His 
love for them in any way. In addition to this, we learn that God’s love isn’t unconditional 
and it is based upon human efforts and performances.3  
 
It is worth mentioning however, that just because God doesn’t love sinners (at least 
in the same sort of way as the God of the New Testament does), it doesn’t follow that He 
isn’t merciful toward them. The Qur’an many times offers over and over again for sinners 
to stop doing what they are doing and to get right with Him. Islamic theology offers a path 
to God through the five pillars of Islam. These pillars go as follows: 
 
(1) The Confession: In order to become a Muslim, one must say the following: 
There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God. 
(2) Prayer: In Islam, Muslims are commanded to pray five times a day (dawn, 
noon, afternoon, evening, and night). 
(3) Alms Giving: Muslims are commanded to give out of their own income. 
(4) Fasting: Muslims are commanded to fast during the month of Ramadan.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See 3:31. 
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(5) The Pilgrimage: Muslims are commanded to make a journey to Mecca and walk 
around the Kaaba seven times.4  
 
Though there seems to be obvious similarities between the Old and New Testament 
conception of God with the Islamic conception of God, there does seem to be some 
significant differences as well. Having now established both commonalities and 
dissimilarities between Islam and Christianity, I will begin my engagement with Islam and 
Plantinga’s proper function condition.  
 
 
A1.2 Islam and Proper Function 
 
It is important to first note that according to Islamic theology humans are endowed with a 
cognitive faculty or process called qalb, which, like the sensus divinitatis, is a faculty of 
spiritual perception the proper function of which is to naturally produce belief in Allah. On 
the nature and function of qalb, Mohamed Yasien writes, ‘Through the organ of the heart, 
its faculty of intellect, and the guidance of revelation, man is able to attain all levels of 
perception, even the knowledge of God in a direct and immediate way.’5 He writes that 
untainted or original human nature, or fitrah, is such that everyone is naturally inclined 
towards goodness and towards belief in the oneness (tawhid) of God, and it is the social 
environment that causes an individual’s qalb to malfunction or otherwise deviate from this 
state.6 This natural correspondence between human nature and Islam is the reason why in 
Muslim theology all humans are born Muslims. Baldwin points out that just as in the 
Plantingian Christian story, belief in God can be overcome by external factors. In fact, 
Baldwin has argued that according to Islamic philosophy, Allah’s design plan for human 
faculties is to produce doubts.7 The doubts are meant to lead subjects to reflect on their 
justificatory status of their belief in Islam. The hope is that upon reflecting on one’s 
                                                 
4 For more on the Five Pillars, see Mualuna Muhammad Ali, The Religion of Islam: A Comprehensive Discussion of 
the  Sources, Principles, and Practices of Islam (Columbus: Amaddiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam, 1990), 99-101, 263-
442; Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 3. 
 
5 Mohamed Yasien, Fitrah: The Islamic Conception of Human Nature (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996), 97. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Erik Baldwin, ‘On the Prospects of an Islamic Externalist Account of Warrant,’ in Classic Issues in Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology Today, Eds. A.T. Tymieniecka and Nazif Muhtaroglu (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2010), 19-41. 
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justificatory status, one will accept the invitation of the Qur’an and test it.8 And since Allah 
has provided sufficient light through the Qur’an and through creation, the individual who 
seeks further evidence for Islam will eventually overcome these doubts and come to have 
robust knowledge of God and His Prophet. Baldwin thinks the early al-Ghazālī offers a 
good summary of this view when states, ‘It was about this light that Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) said, ‘God created the creatures in darkness, and then sprinkled upon them some 
of His light.’’ From that light must be sought an intuitive understanding of things Divine. 
That light at certain times gushes from the spring of Divine generosity.’9  
 
Baldwin’s points can also be seen as consistent with the experience that the Prophet 
Muhammad himself went through. In one particular instance, Muhammad was unsure how 
to interpret a Messenger coming to him. He lacked confidence that this Messenger 
intended good for him. Nonetheless, we are told that Muhammad was encouraged by his 
wife’s reasons for why he should trust the Messenger; this in turn led to a deeper 
relationship between Allah and His Prophet.10 
 
If Baldwin is right, it would follow that unlike in the Christian story, the design 
plan according to Allah’s will, isn’t such that (reflective) Muslims won’t have any doubts 
about the truth of Islamic belief or that those doubts can be overcome without making use 
of arguments or propositional evidence at some point or other. That is, warranted Islamic 
belief involves having what one might call genuine or robust knowledge, a degree of 
knowledge which requires that a Muslim be able to give an answer for how he/she knows 
that God exists and/or that Quran is trust worthy.11 This of course doesn’t mean that the 
                                                 
8 See 4:82 and 10:38 as examples of such an invitation. 
 
9 Erik Baldwin, ‘On the Prospects of an Islamic Externalist Account of Warrant,’ in Classic Issues in Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology Today, Eds. Tymieniecka, A-T and Nazif Muhtaroglu (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2010), 30. For the original quote, see al-Ghazālī, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, 25–26. 
 
10 Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhara, Vol. 1, Trl. by Muhammad Muhsin (Beirut: Darussalam 
Press, 1985). 
 
11 See Erik Baldwin, ‘On the Prospects of an Islamic Externalist Account of Warrant,’ in Classic Issues in 
Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today, op. cit., and Deborah Black, ‘Certitude, Justification, and the 
Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna's Epistemology,’ in Interpreting Avicenna, ed. by Peter Adamson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 137-141. It is important to note that according to 
Baldwin, ‘The Mu’tazila maintain that such knowledge [robust knowledge that comes about as the result of 
meeting certain metalevel requirements] is necessary if one is to be a true Muslim. Ahl al-Sunna maintains 
that while one is a true Muslim, to lack such knowledge is a sin. In either case, second-order awareness is 
necessary for an Islamic theory of knowledge of God.’ There are complications, however. For Ibn Sina and 
al-Ghazālī, awareness of the existence of one’s self as a thinking thing is immediate and epistemically 
basic. On the basis of reflection one can know that all created things, being contingent things, are 
metaphysically dependent on the existence of a necessarily existing God. Hence, on the basis of reflection 
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Muslim can’t account for the preconditions that make Plantinga’s theory of warrant 
intelligible; rather, unlike the Christian, the Muslim just couldn’t endorse that he/she could 
be warranted in his/her belief, apart from any propositional evidence or argument.  
 
This being the case, this would act as further evidence for my claim that there are 
certain serious world religions that cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate 
that their core belief could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be 
warranted. Some might take this alone to be sufficient reason for thinking that Plantinga’s 
epistemology isn’t weakened by its permissiveness, at least as it relates to major Islamic 
traditions. For those who still have further worries that Plantinga’s epistemology is too 
permissive, I will move on to engaging Islam in light of Plantinga’s truth-aimed condition. 
Having established the continuity and discontinuity that exists within Islam and Plantinga’s 
proper function condition, I will move on to our discussion of Islam and Plantinga’s truth-
aimed condition.12 
 
 
A1.3 Islam, the Truth-Aimed Condition, and Undercutting Defeaters 
 
As briefly mentioned above, several verses in the Qur’an state that God is a 
deceiver/schemer or even the best deceiver/schemer. The Arabic word for 
deceiver/schemer, makr, can be found in the following relevant verses:13 
 
                                                 
on one’s own contingent existence and upon the experience of a God recognized to be necessarily existent, 
one can come to see that the existence of God is as obvious as the existence of one’s own self. Having 
attained such a position, one no longer has need of the evidence or arguments that enabled one to come to 
that realization; for such a one, belief in God will be basic, no longer dependent on evidence or argument. 
(This is similar to having used a ladder to reach the roof one no longer has need of the ladder simply to be 
on the roof.) Further complicating matters is that according to some Muslims, including Sufi mystics, 
God’s existence can be as obvious as the existence of one’s own self can without the mediation of 
reflection and argumentation. As Rumi writes, ‘When the soul has been united with God, to speak of Soul 
(God) is to speak of this soul, and to speak of this soul means to speak of that Soul.’ (Erkan Turkman and 
Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, The Essence of Rumi's Masnevi, Including His Life and Work (Konya: Enis Booksellers, 
1992), 347.) For all that, whenever doubts arise about the existence of God arise (and doubts will arise so 
that one’s faith may be made stronger, given that no one has perfected faith in this life), Muslims can and 
should dispense with them appropriately which, according to Islam, requires relying on evidence and 
argument in some way or other at some stage.   
 
12 This paragraph is not in Erik Baldwin and Tyler Dalton McNabb, ‘An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic 
Belief?' op. cit. 
 
13 Both the verses and lexicon definitions were brought to our attention by Sahab, ‘Allah the Best Deceiver,’ 
last modified September 18, 2013, last accessed October 27, 2014, 
http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Allah_the_Best_Deceiver. 
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Surah 3:54 And they (the disbelievers) schemed, and Allah schemed (against them): 
and Allah is the best of schemers. 
Surah 7:99 Are they then secure from Allah’s scheme? None deemeth himself 
secure from Allah’s scheme save folk that perish. 
Surah 8:30 And when those who disbelieve plot against thee (O Muhammad) to 
wound thee fatally, or to kill thee or to drive thee forth; they plot, but Allah (also) 
plotteth; and Allah is the best of plotters. 
Surah 13:42 And when We cause mankind to taste of mercy after some adversity 
which had afflicted them, behold! They have some plot against Our revelations. 
Say: Allah is more swift in plotting. Lo! Our messengers write down that which ye 
plot. 
 
According to Lane’s Lexicon, makr is used to express deceit, guile, or circumvention.14 
Similarly, Hans Wehr Dictionary defines makr and variations of it in the following way.15 
 
Makara u (makr) to deceive, delude, cheat, dupe, gull, double-cross…16 
Makr cunning, craftiness, slyness, wiliness, double-dealing, deception, trickery 
Makra ruse, artifice, stratagem, wile, trick, ruse, dodge 
Makkar and makur cunning, sly, crafty, wily, crafty person, imposter, swindler 
Maker makara sly, cunning, wily. 
 
It is obvious that makr carries strong negative connotations. A member of the Council of 
Senior Scholars and the former head of the Saudi Supreme Court, Sheik Saleh Al-Fawzan, 
seems to grant that it carries negative connotations as he states in his commentary the 
following:  
 
This cunning added to God Almighty and ascribed to him is not like the cunning of 
creatures, because the cunning of creatures is blameworthy, and the cunning added 
to the Almighty God is praised, because the cunning of creatures means deception 
and misinformation, and the delivery of harm to those who do not deserve it, and 
                                                 
14 William Lane and S. Lane-Poole, Arabic-English Lexicon: Volume 7 (New York: F. Ungar Publishing 
Company, 1955), 256. 
 
15 H. Wehr, and J.M. Cowan, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Ithaca, N.Y.: Spoken Language 
Services. 1976), 917. 
 
16 Arabic letters and words are not repeated. 
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the cunning of God Almighty it good; as it is delivered to those who deserve 
punishment, so it is justice and mercy.17 
 
If it seems more plausible than not to translate makr as a word describing 
deception/scheming, it would seem that the Qur’an endorses that God is the greatest 
deceiver/schemer. If this is so, there seems to be a major problem with the Muslim who 
endorses the Qur’an as part of their epistemology. For how would the Muslim know that 
God is not deceiving or scheming him in regard to the very nature of the inspiration of the 
Qur’an? Why couldn’t God be deceiving the faithful Muslim? Notice, the question does 
not pertain to whether a good God could deceive and still be just. I am granting that such 
actions could be seen as compatible with Perfect Being theology. The question is strictly 
epistemic in nature.  
 
Perhaps the faithful Muslim might respond to this question, by saying that in the 
context of these verses, God is only deceiving His enemies and these texts don’t give us 
any reason to believe that God would also deceive the faithful. Furthermore, one might add 
that God only deceives those who deserve it and who have attempted to deceive God. Now, 
it does seem right that, generally speaking, the context of such verses do reflect unbelievers 
and God deceiving them as a response to their evil actions. However, there is a case in the 
Qur’an where God directly deceives the most faithful Muhammad in order for a greater 
good to be actualized.18 Surah 8:43-44 states,  
 
When Allah showed them unto thee (O Muhammad) in thy dream as few in 
number, and if He had shown them to thee as many, ye (Muslims) would have 
faltered and would have quarreled over the affair. But Allah saved (you). Lo! He 
knoweth what is in the breasts (of men). And when He made you (Muslims), when 
ye met (them), see them with your eyes as few, and lessened you in their eyes, (it 
was) that Allah might conclude a thing that must be done. Unto Allah all things are 
brought back. 
 
                                                 
17 S. S. Al-Fawzan, The Meaning of ‘Allah is the Best Deceiver’ and the Interpretation of Surah 8:30, 
http://ar.islamway.net/fatwa/5229/معنى-قوله-موانى-والله-خير-الخاارون, trl by Abdullah Almutairi, accessed August 
29, 2015. 
 
18 For another example of God deceiving the innocent, see Surah 4:157. Here, God deceives the world about 
the crucifixion and death of Jesus.  
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Here one has a counterfactual case. If the Muslims would have known that there were 
many, they would have fought against each other and would have quarreled about the 
situation. However, if the Muslims were to see that the enemy was small in number, 
everything would go smoothly and successfully. Thus, God directly deceives Muhammad 
in order to actualize a certain good that He wanted.  
 
If God boasts of being the best deceiver and one knows from the Qur’an that God 
puts this into practice by deceiving the faithful Muslim (so long as there is a greater good 
to be actualized), how would the faithful Muslim know that God isn’t deceiving him about 
the Qur’an being the inspired word of God? Perhaps there is something that one can’t 
grasp about why God would need to do such a thing, but merely not being able to grasp 
what greater good could be actualized doesn’t entail that God wouldn’t be deceiving the 
faithful about the inspired nature of the Qur’an. Let us turn what has been articulated thus 
far into an argument. Let (GD) stand for God is the greatest deceiver and let (GDF) stand 
for God deceives faithful believers only in order to actualize a greater good. 
 
(1) Given GD and GDF, God could be deceiving faithful Muslims by not aiming 
their cognitive faculties successfully toward producing true beliefs for a greater 
good. 
(2) Upon seeing that (1) could be the case, if a Muslim lacks a justified reason for 
thinking God is not deceiving him, the Muslim should see that the probability 
that his faculties are reliable (R) is inscrutable. 
(3) If a Muslim sees that the probability for R is inscrutable, then he has a defeater 
for trusting his faculties.  
(4) If the Muslim has a defeater for R, then he has an undercutting defeater for his 
belief that the Qur’an is the inspired Word of Allah. 
(5) If one has a defeater for their belief, it cannot be warranted. 
(6) The Muslim who comes to see that (1) could be the case and lacks a justified 
reason for thinking that God is not deceiving him has a defeater for his belief 
that the Qur’an is the inspired Word of Allah and that belief cannot be 
warranted. 
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A1.4 Reply 
 
Is there a way in which the Muslim can avoid the defeater as argued for above?19 In the 
Islamic tradition there are authoritative commentaries that are vital to the interpretation of 
Qur’anic passages. They are used to clarify theological, grammatical, semantic, and 
historic aspects of the Qur’an. 20 So perhaps a Muslim can run to the tafsīr in order to 
interpret Surah 8:43-44 in a different way than I have here. Perhaps, if the Muslim has 
good reason to think that Surah 8:43-44 should be interpreted in a different manner, the 
proposed defeater loses a lot of its force. So what do the tafsīrs say about Surah 8:43-44 
and are they plausible interpretations of the text? Muhammad Asad’s tafsīr states:  
 
… at the time of the actual encounter the Muslims could no longer be in 
doubt as to the great number of the enemy force, the phrase ‘He made them 
appear as few in your eyes’ has obviously a metaphorical meaning: it 
implies that, by that time, the Prophet’s followers were so full of courage 
that the enemy appeared insignificant to them. The Quraysh, on the other 
hand, were so conscious of their own power and numerical superiority that 
the Muslims appeared but of little account to them – a mistake which 
ultimately cost them the battle and a great number of lives.21 
 
Ibn ‘Abbās emphasizes the reasons for why God deceives Muhammad in His dream: 
 
(When Allah showed them unto thee) O Muhammad (in your dream) on the Day of 
Badr, (as few in number, and if He had shown them to thee as many, ye (Muslims) 
would have faltered) you would have been fearful (and would have quarreled over 
the affair) over the question of war. (But Allah saved (you)) He decreed otherwise. 
(Lo! He knoweth what is in the breasts (of men)) what is in people’s hearts. (And 
when he made you (Muslims), when ye met (them)) on the Day of Badr (see them 
with your eyes as few) such that He emboldened you vis-à-vis them, (and lessened 
you in their eyes) such that they were emboldened vis-à-vis you, ((it was) that Allah 
                                                 
19 What follows is a summary/paraphrase of sections from Erik Baldwin and Tyler Dalton McNabb, ‘An 
Epistemic Defeater for Islamic Belief?,’ op. cit. This section can be attributed to Erik Baldwin’s work. 
 
20 Hussein Abdul-Raof, ‘Schools of Qur'anic Exegesis: Genesis and Development,’ in Culture and 
Civilization in the Middle East, in Ed. Ian Richard Netton (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 12. 
 
21 Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur'an: The Full Account of the Revealed Arabic Text Accompanied 
by Parallel Translation, Trl. by Muhammad Asad.  Vol. 2, (Bristol: The Book Foundation, 2003), 279. 
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might conclude a thing) so that Allah might give victory and the spoils of war to the 
Prophet (pbuh) and his Companions and bring about death and defeat for Abu Jahl 
and his host (that must be done) that has to be. (Unto Allah all things) the end 
results of things (are brought back) in the Hereafter.22 
 
Assad informs the Muslim faithful that they should interpret Surah 8:43-44 in a 
metaphorical way. Muhammad and his army didn’t have cognitive malfunction which was 
induced by Allah Himself. Rather, the text is meant to be taken as metaphor. Muhammad 
and his army were so inspired and united that what was before them seemed like only a 
small obstacle. And according to Abbās, as far as the dream goes, God did deceive 
Muhammad by giving him the dream but it was for the greater good. 
 
A Muslim who has other background beliefs and possibly other warranted beliefs, 
might be rational in accepting the authoritative interpretations discussed here. If this is the 
case, the Muslim would not have the discussed defeater. Suppose, however, that a faithful 
and reflective Muslim does acquire the purported defeater as the reflective Muslim finds 
such interpretations less plausible than the one I propose above. This would lead to the 
questioning of the role of authority that commentators play in the Islamic tradition and it 
might make the Muslim ripe for the defeater that I argue for.  
 
But there are other mental states that may be of use here, including experiences and 
propositional attitudes.23 Having a new experience or having formed a new propositional 
attitude, one’s doubts about Islamic belief may be undermined or overcome. And so a 
Muslim may come to understand that God may sometimes deceive Muslims without 
thereby having a reason to think that their cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. To 
provide further motivation for this way of dealing with the purported defeater, consider a 
case that is relevantly similar to the one read in Surah 8:43-44.24 
 
Imagine there remains only a group of soldiers left on your side as you try to defeat 
the evil opposition in front of you. Unbeknownst to you, your general has a nefarious 
deception gun and decides to use it on you and the remaining brothers in arms. This 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 233. 
 
23 Ibid., 155. 
 
24 This paragraph is taken directly from Erik Baldwin and Tyler Dalton McNabb, ‘An Epistemic Defeater for 
Islamic Belief?, op. cit. 
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deception gun alters your faculties to where you produce the belief that reinforcements are 
coming. This belief propels you and your fellow soldiers to act courageously and 
miraculously defeat the opposing enemy. After the battle, you find out that your general 
used a nefarious deception gun on you and that no reinforcements were ever coming. It 
doesn’t seem, at least prima facie, that you would have a defeater for trusting your 
cognitive faculties for every battle that you have been in (or will be in) with your general. 
If you were ever plagued with doubt about trusting your faculties in light of this incident, 
you could put such doubts away by way of thinking of all of the times your general has led 
you to victory, or by thinking about all of the times he has personally been there for you in 
battle, or perhaps by reflecting on previous statements that he had made which just seemed 
true to you. In these cases, there would be non-propositional evidence that would outweigh 
and overcome the concerns delivered by the discussed defeater. Thus, by focusing in on the 
non-propositional evidence, the Muslim has another way to avoid the discussed defeater. 
 
But, perhaps you begin to think about all of the times your general has boasted 
about how great he is at using the deception gun and maybe you begin to think of all of the 
major character flaws that your general possesses. In addition to entertaining these 
thoughts, maybe you begin to reflect on other times when your general has deceived the 
innocent. It seems plausible that, upon bringing all of this to mind, the doubts would begin 
to really cause you to question the reliability of your faculties. If this is so, it seems likely 
that some individuals who are in such a situation would end up with a defeater. As it 
applies to the Muslim who is convinced that Surah 8:43-44 teaches that God deceived 
Muhammad and his army, if the Muslim also reflects on all of the Qur’an’s boasts about 
God being the best of all deceivers in conjunction with God’s other acts of deceiving the 
innocent25 and God’s additional character flaws,26 it seems plausible to think that the 
Muslim might gain a defeater for trusting that their faculties are reliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Surah 4:157 informs us that, contrary to the appearance, Jesus wasn’t crucified and that he didn’t die on 
the cross. 
 
26 Surah 3:31-32 informs us that God’s love can be earned and is not unconditional. 
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A1.5 Tu quoque and Christian Belief 
 
The third response that is available to the Muslim is to argue that the Christian has the 
same problem given certain relevant Biblical passages.27 In attempting to show that 
Christians have an undercutting defeater for believing that their faculties are reliable, Erik 
Wielenberg argues28 that the failed promise that Adam and Eve would die if they ate from 
the tree of knowledge,29 God telling Abraham that he should sacrifice his son,30Jeremiah’s 
declaration that God had deceived him,31 and Jesus’ statement that He wouldn’t go to a 
feast but then in secret did, all act as evidence to show that the Christian God deceives.32 
How should the Christian Plantingian respond to this argument? If the Muslim responded 
in this way, it should be pointed out that he would be committing the Tu quoque fallacy. S 
cannot merely rebut the defeater S* formulated by way of saying that it applies to the S* as 
well. This simply doesn’t address the issue. Now, while I don’t think that these verses are 
troubling or at least at all as troubling as the Suras mentioned above, Biblical exegesis of 
all of these relevant Christian Scriptures is beyond the scope of this project. I will however, 
give an example of how one could respond to the verses mentioned by Wielenberg, by 
addressing the best candidate that Wielenberg puts forth. Jeremiah 20 states: 
 
O Lord, you have deceived me, 
    and I was deceived; 
you are stronger than I, 
    and you have prevailed. 
I have become a laughing-stock all the day; 
    everyone mocks me. 
 
 
                                                 
27 The rest of this appendix does not feature any material from previous co-authored published work. 
 
28 Erik Wielenberg, ‘Divine Deception’ in Skeptical Theism: New Essays, eds. Trent Dougherty and Justin 
McBrayer (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2014, 236-249.  
 
29 Genesis 2:17 
 
30 Genesis 22:2 
 
31 Jeremiah 20:7 
 
32 John 7:4 
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Wielenberg uses Trigg’s commentary on Origen to point out how God deceived Jeremiah: 
 
God had a prophecy of judgment for Jeremiah to make against his own people. God 
knew however, that although Jeremiah would not willingly prophesy against his 
own people, he would have no qualms about prophesying against other people. God 
therefore, deceived Jeremiah. He says to him, “Take from my hand the cup of this 
unmixed wine, and make all the nations to whom I send you drink from it.” 
Jeremiah understood God to be asking him to make all the other nations drink from 
the cup of God’s wrath and punishment, without imagining that his own would be 
the first nation to drink from it. Having accepted the cup, he realized he had been 
deceived when God said, “And you shall first make Jerusalem drink from it.”33 
 
If this interpretation is right, then we have a similar situation as to that of Surah 8:43-44. 
God deceives a prophet in order to achieve a greater good that wouldn’t come about if the 
deception didn’t occur. Wielenberg briefly entertains an alternative translation from Clines 
and Gunn as they translate the passage as ‘[y]ou tried to persuade me [to be a prophet], and 
I was persuaded; You [i.e. your arguments] proved too strong for me, and you 
overpowered me.’34 Wielenberg responds to this translation by stating the following: 
 
One problem with this proposal is that the “arguments” that God offers Jeremiah 
after Jeremiah’s initial reluctance to serve as a prophet consist of (i) God repeatedly 
insisting that Jeremiah become a prophet and (ii) God assuring Jeremiah that it 
won’t be so bad. Specifically, God tells Jeremiah that “I am with you to deliver 
you” (Jeremiah 1:8) and that “today I appoint you over nations and over kingdoms, 
to pluck up and to pull down” (Jeremiah 1:10). Together, these words surely leave 
Jeremiah (who is at this time “only a boy” [Jeremiah 1:6]) with a misleading 
impression of what is in store for him: predicting the destruction of his own people 
and consequently becoming reviled, threatened with death, and imprisoned. The 
best description of what God has done to Jeremiah here is not “persuasion” but 
rather “seduction,” “enticement,” or “deception.” 
                                                 
33 Joseph Triggs, ‘Divine Deception and the Truthfulness of Scripture,’ in Origen of Alexandria: His World 
and His Legacy, eds. Charles Kannengiesser and William L. Petersen (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 154. 
 
34 D.J.A. Clines and D.M. Gunn, ‘You Tried to Persuade Me’ and ‘Violence! Outrage!’ in Jeremiah XX 7–8,’ 
Vetus Testamentum 28: 20–7 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press), 1978, 20-27. 
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Does this passage then act as a problem for Christians in regard to the truth-aimed 
condition? I think there are several disanalogous factors that should be considered. First, 
the wider context within the Qur’an is God’s continual pronouncement that He is the 
greatest deceiver. There isn’t anything like this within Christian Scripture. In fact, we 
constantly get a picture of a God who doesn’t lie.35 Furthermore, in the case of Jeremiah, 
there doesn’t exist deception that involves cognitive malfunction. This is different from the 
Prophet Muhammad’s case where he and all of his men seem to have malfunctioning 
perceptual faculties. Lastly, there is good reason to think that Jeremiah was just lamenting 
to God about his situation (contra really accusing God of great deception) as God had 
previously told him that he would be rejected. Commentator F.B. Huey argues for this as 
he states: 
 
God had not deceived Jeremiah. He had warned him that the people would resist 
his words (1:8, 19; 12:5). But in his hurt and confusion, Jeremiah lashed out at God 
and accused him of forcing him against his will to be a prophet. “You prevailed” 
continues the figure of seduction (cf. Deut 22:25; 2 Sam 13:11, 14; Prov 7:13 for 
other examples of seduction) and is employed repeatedly by Jeremiah in these 
verses (20:7, 9–11). Jeremiah was deeply offended because people did not take him 
seriously. They laughed at him and mocked him in disbelief that God would punish 
them.36  
 
This interpretation seems plausible, especially given similar instances within the 
Psalms and Job where the author lashes out to God in an analogous way.37 If there isn’t 
reason to think that the Christian suffers from the same problem as the Muslim does in 
regard to God and His deceptive nature, it would appear that this objection is moot. In any 
case, when arguing against this objection, the Christian has at least five options: 
(1) Deny Biblical inerrancy, 
(2) Show that God doesn’t actually deceive in the Bible, 
                                                 
35 Numbers 21:9 
 
36 F.B. Huey, Jeremiah, Lamentations (Nashville Ten: Broadman Press, 1993), 192.
 
37 For example, out of hurt and frustration Job consistently accuses God of certain things, which through the 
narrative, the reader knows God isn’t guilty of. 
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(3) Argue that the deceptive cases in the Bible aren’t analogous because of who is 
being deceived in the Qur’an (In the Qur’an God deceives both believers and 
unbelievers), 
(4) Argue that there won’t likely be an epistemic defeater formed for the Christian 
as unlike the Qur’an, the Bible lacks God’s continual boast about His deception, 
other cases of deceiving the innocent, or a depiction of God having character 
defects,  
(5) Argue that the Biblical deceptive cases aren’t analogous to the Qur’anic 
deceptive cases because its deceptive cases are of a different kind of deception. 
 
In responding to the charge that the Jeremiah passage gives Christians a defeater for 
trusting the reliability of their cognitive faculties, I took an approach that focused on (2), 
(4), and (5). While more could and should be said on this topic, this is beyond the scope of 
this appendix. As for now, I hope that I have established a brief response and an outline for 
how one could go about developing a more robust response to the Tu quoque objection. 
 
 
A1.6 Conclusion 
 
In this appendix, I have argued that though Islam is compatible with Plantinga's proper 
function condition, due to an internalist metalevel requirement, the core belief of Islam still 
couldn’t be warranted in the same way that the core belief of Christianity can be. I then 
moved on to argue that Islam will also have a hard time accounting for Plantinga's truth-
aimed condition due to legitimate scepticism that can be invoked through select Qur’anic 
passages.  
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Appendix 2: Catholicism and Plantigian Epistemology 
 
 
 
A2.0 Introduction  
 
Throughout my thesis, I have argued that there are certain serious world religions that 
cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their core belief could be 
warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. This comes somewhat as 
a surprise given all of the attempts to incorporate Plantinga’s epistemology into different 
religious traditions. Contrary to the advocates who I think unsuccessfully try to co-opt 
Plantinga’s epistemology, there has been a conservative effort from some Catholic 
philosophers to argue that not only is Plantinga’s epistemology not plausibly true, but that 
it is contrary to Catholic (especially its Thomistic glossing) epistemology.1 In this 
appendix, I will take up their claim and argue that (1) Plantinga’s overall (including his 
religious) epistemology is nearly indistinguishable from Aquinas’ epistemology, and (2) 
There is a non-Thomistic viable Catholic epistemology that can be seen as version of 
reformed epistemology.2 I will begin now by summarizing Plantinga’s epistemology.  
 
A2.1 Plantinga Meets Aquinas 
 
S’s belief that P is warranted iff  
 
(1) At the time S forms the belief that P, S’s cognitive faculties are functioning 
properly, 
(1.2) As the design plan requires, S has given appropriate reflection to the 
possibility of defeaters, 
                                                          
1 See Linda Zagzebski, Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). In this volume, each contributor focuses on either 
metaepistemological tensions or theological tensions that they think Reformed epistemology either can’t or 
at least will have a hard time resolving.  
 
2  By Reformed epistemology, I have in mind the thesis that one could be justified or warranted in their belief 
that God exists apart from argumentation. 
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(2) At the time S forms the belief that P, S’s cognitive environment (both the maxi-
environment and mini-environment) is sufficiently similar to the one which the 
cognitive faculties were designed, 
(3) At the time S forms the belief that P, the design plan that governs the 
production of such beliefs is aimed at producing true belief,  
(4) At the time S forms the belief that P, the design plan is a good one such that 
there is a high statistical (or objective) probability that the belief produced under 
these conditions will be true.  
 
Summarizing the main points about Plantinga’s epistemology from my thesis, Plantinga’s 
theory of warrant is an externalist theory of warrant. This again means Plantinga denies 
that one always has to have access to the properties which confer warrant. Moreover, 
Plantinga’s theory emphasizes the need for properly functioning cognitive faculties which 
are successfully aimed toward producing true beliefs. As long as the above conditions are 
in place when S believes p, S would be warranted in her belief that p. Moreover, Plantinga 
thinks that naturalism will fail to give an account of proper function. One ultimately needs 
a conscious, intelligent, and intentional designer for one’s cognitive faculties to be 
functioning properly. In other words, Plantinga’s overall epistemology requires that in all 
possible worlds where S knows p, theism is true. Having now briefly reiterated Plantinga’s 
epistemology, I will now briefly articulate Aquinas’ epistemology.  
 
It is first important to note that, similar to Plantinga, Aquinas was an externalist.3 In 
summarizing Aquinas’ epistemology, Aquinas thought that in order for S to know p, S has 
to have faculties which have the particular ends of producing true belief and they must 
work in the successful manner for which they were designed. Stump states, ‘[o]n 
Aquinas’s view, our cognitive capacities are designed by God for the express purpose of 
enabling us to be cognizers of the truth, as God himself is. IN particular, when we use 
sense and intellect as God designed them to be used in the environment suited to them, that 
is, in the world for which God designed human beings, then those faculties are absolutely 
reliable.’4 Right away, the reader will be able to tell that both Plantinga and Aquinas share 
                                                          
3 See Eleanore Stump, ‘Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 
Supplement Volume 17 (1991): 148-149. Also, see Terence Allan, The epistemology of St. Thomas 
Aquinas with special reference to Summa Theologiae 1a q84, unpublished, PhD thesis, University of 
Glasgow (1997). 
 
4 Eleanore Stump, ‘Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge,’ op. cit., 148-149. Also, see Thomas Aquinas 
[3], St Ia q. 91 a.3. 
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a similar epistemology. Terence Allan sees so much resemblance, that he calls Plantinga’s 
epistemology a contemporary version of Aquinas’ epistemology.5  
 
A2.2 God as a Precondition  
 
Moreover, as with Plantinga’s epistemology, Aquinas’ epistemology can’t be made 
intelligible without the existence of God. In the tradition of Aquinas’ Fifth Way, Feser 
argues that non-conscious things that have final causes or ends6 must have an intellect 
outside of those final causes or ends: 
What then of the vast system of causes that constitutes the physical universe? Every 
one of them is directed towards a certain end or final cause. Yet almost none of 
them is associated with any thought, consciousness, or intellect at all; and even 
animals and human beings, which are conscious, are comprised in whole or in part 
of unconscious and unintelligent material components which themselves manifest 
final causality. But given what was said above, it is impossible for anything to be 
directed towards an end unless that end exists in an intellect which directs the thing 
in question towards it. It follows that the system of ends or final causes that make 
up the physical universe can only exist at all if there is a Supreme Intelligence or 
intellect outside the universe which directs things towards their ends.7 
 
Thus, if our cognitive faculties have final causes or ends, we cannot account for what gives 
our cognitive faculties their purpose (or in Plantigian terms, design plan), without 
ultimately appealing to God; indirectly, then, God is still a necessary condition to make 
proper function intelligible. To this Feser states:  
 
By analogy (and it is only an analogy, and admittedly not an exact one) we might 
think of the relationship of the Supreme Intelligence of the Fifth Way to the system 
of final causes in the world as somewhat like the relationship of language users to 
language. The Supreme Intelligence directs things to their ends, but the system 
thereby created has a kind of independence insofar as it can be studied without 
                                                          
5 Terence Allan, The epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas with special reference to Summa Theologiae 1a 
q84, op. cit., 140. 
 
6 By ‘final cause’ and ‘end’ I have in mind what the purpose or telos of the thing is. 
 
7 Edward Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 117. 
162 
 
reference to the Supreme Intelligence himself, just as linguists can study the 
structure of language without paying attention to the intentions of this or that 
language user.8 
 
Perhaps, one thinks that Aquinas was wrong about the Fifth Way and needing to 
invoke God as the source of our faculties’ final causes or ends. Maybe like Paul Hoffman, 
one thinks that something’s final cause or end could just be a brute fact; that is, there is just 
no need to further explain why C is tied to E and not E’. C is tied to E and that is that.9 In 
this case, there would be no need to appeal to theology in order to explain how a faculty 
has a final cause or an end. 
 
Even if one granted that C could be tied to E without there being any need for an 
explanation of why it is the case that C is tied to E, one wouldn’t avoid needing to invoke 
Aquinas’ Fifth Way. For Hoffman, there is a sense in which C is aimed at E, that is in the 
sense that C always (or mostly) results in producing E, but this isn’t the same sort of 
‘aimed at’ that one would use to describe a faculty’s purpose or design plan, which is what 
Aquinas and Plantinga have in mind.10 For example, I could say that I have a faculty F and 
F constantly produce p, but this wouldn’t be the same as saying F should produce P or F’s 
purpose is to produce p. This being the case, the ‘brute fact’ proponents still haven’t shown 
that they can capture what Aquinas and Plantinga have in mind by purpose or design plan. 
Having now argued that Plantinga and Aquinas essentially share the same epistemological 
theory, I will now move on to demonstrating that Aquinas was a Reformed epistemologist. 
 
A2.3 Aquinas and His Reformed Epistemology 
 
Before demonstrating that Aquinas was a Reformed epistemologist, I will first mention 
again, how Plantinga applies his proper functionalism to Christian belief.  He argues that, 
if God exists, and if He has successfully constituted subject S’s cognitive faculties in such 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 120. 
 
9 Paul Hoffman, ‘Does efficient causation presuppose final causation? Aquinas vs. Early Modern 
Mechanism,’ in Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. 
Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (Oxford University Press, 2009): 307. 
 
10 Feser pays special attention to biological teleology or biological final causation, which is what Plantinga 
and Aquinas have in mind insofar as it pertains to cognitive faculties having final causes. It is in regard to 
biological final causation that I think one can most clearly see that just because C always (or mostly) 
produces E, that it doesn’t follow that there is a design plan for F to produce C to cause E. See Edward 
Feser, Neo-Scholastic Essays (Indiana: Saint Augustine Press, 2015), 37-38.  
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a way that, when they are properly functioning in the environment for which they are 
meant, they would produce the belief that God exists, then S’s belief that God exists could 
be warranted even apart from argumentation.11 Due to Plantinga’s belief that this is what 
Aquinas and Calvin taught, Plantinga calls this the AC model. 12  Plantinga also develops 
the extended AC model. On this model, Holy Scripture, which has both a primary author 
(the Holy Spirit) and numerous secondary authors (the human writers), acts as a testimony 
to S, in that it testifies to the truth of the Gospel message. The Spirit of God then instigates 
S to see that the Gospel message is true.13  
 
Why does Plantinga think that Aquinas endorsed Reformed epistemology? 
Plantinga takes the following quote to be an endorsement of it, ‘[t]o know in a general and 
confused way that God exists is implanted in us by nature.’14 Here Plantinga sees Aquinas 
as endorsing something like Calvin’s Sensus Divinitatis.15 There is some confused 
understanding of God implanted in the human race, that when a subject’s faculties 
successfully reach their ends, some vague belief in God could be warranted.  
 
Is Plantinga right in interpreting Aquinas in this way? If he isn’t, does it follow that 
Aquinas didn’t endorse that belief in God could be warranted apart from argumentation? 
Regarding the former question, I don’t think Plantinga’s interprets Aquinas rightly. To 
explain why, it would be helpful to first look at the quote in its immediate context: 
 
To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by 
nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, 
and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, 
however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is 
approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is 
                                                          
11 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford Press, 2000), 189. 
 
12 For Thomas Aquinas, see Summa Theologia I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. For Calvin, see John Calvin, Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, Tr. Ford Lewis Battles and ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960 
[originally published in 1555]), 44. 
 
13 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, op. cit., 252. 
 
14 Summa Theologiae I, q. 2 a. 1, ad 1. 
 
15 It is worth noting that given Augstine’s influence on Calvin, it seems very likely that Augustine played a 
significant role in Calvin’s epistemology. For Augustine being a Reformed epistemologist, see Dewey 
Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology (Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
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Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good 
which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in 
something else.16  
 
Here, Aquinas is agreeing that belief in God stems from some sort of hard wiring (though 
in this case, given to us by nature), only insofar as humans have the ability and are aimed 
to reason to happiness, the obtaining of which leads one to the Good, who is God.  God is 
for man, his beatitude. This of course isn’t to say that man has a faculty given to him by 
God which when functioning properly, produces belief that God exists. Plantinga’s 
interpretation seems even less plausible when one considers the broader context of Article 
1, where Aquinas first rejects that belief in God’s existence is self-evident and then 
answers objections to God’s existence not being demonstrable.   
 
However, this doesn’t mean that Aquinas didn’t endorse that belief that God exists 
could be warranted apart from argumentation. Aquinas argues that presenting God’s 
existence by way of faith is superior than presenting it by way of argumentation, even in 
light of reason being able to tell us that God exists. In fact, for Aquinas, this faith apart 
from argument is considered knowledge: 
 
This is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth 
concerning divine things should be presented to men by faith. Beneficially, 
therefore, did the divine Mercy provide that it should instruct us to hold by faith 
even those truths that the human reason is able to investigate. In this way, all men 
would easily be able to have a share in the knowledge of God, and this without 
uncertainty and error.17  
 
For Aquinas, faith could be considered knowledge, even apart from argumentation, but 
only by way of the Spirit’s testimony working in the right epistemic environment, as 
Aquinas states, ‘[t]he believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the 
authority of divine teaching confirmed by miracles and, what is more, by the inward 
instigation of the divine invitation.’18 For Aquinas, the subject needs to be in an 
                                                          
16 Ibid 
 
17 Contra Gentiles Book I, IV: 5-6. 
 
18 Summa Theologiae II-II, q.2, a.9, reply to ob. 3.  
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environment where there are divine miracles or signs, and it is upon being in an 
environment where God has performed these miracles or signs to attest to the truthfulness 
of Divine teaching, that the Spirit testifies to the subject that these miracles do come from 
God and thus, confirm Divine teaching. Notice for Aquinas, the subject isn’t doing 
abductive reasoning in trying to come up with the best explanation for the apparent 
miracles or signs, but rather, the subject comes into contact with the miracles or signs, and 
prompted by the Holy Spirit, the subject finds herself believing that that these miracles are 
from God and that the Divine teaching is true.  
 
In this way, the subject isn’t believing that God exists or that Jesus is the Christ by 
way of having access to the properties which confer the warrant for her belief. It could 
very well be the case that God performing M isn’t the best explanation of data D. And 
again, the subject isn’t thinking that God has performed D because of argument A. The 
subject merely comes into contact with M by way of a direct experience or by way of  
testimony, and the Spirit illuminates M for S so that S forms the belief that God is 
performing (or performed) ‘M’ and that the Divine Teaching T is true. And it is in this way 
that Aquinas like Plantinga, affirms that belief in God (and even Christianity) could be 
warranted, apart from argumentation. 
 
A2.4 Balthasar and Reformed Epistemology 
 
Perhaps one will not be satisfied with how I have interpreted Aquinas. Would it then 
follow that there aren’t any viable Catholic glossings of Reformed epistemology? It 
wouldn’t follow as Thomistic epistemology isn’t essential to the Catholic Faith; thus, there 
could be other viable Catholic epistemologies. First and foremost, I am not convinced that 
Plantinga’s own articulation is incompatible with Catholic theology. Moreover, even if one 
wanted an epistemology that was historically rooted within the Catholic tradition, there are 
still other epistemologies available. I will now argue that Balthasar’s religious 
epistemology is very much in line with Plantinga’s own.19  
                                                          
19 Another viable Catholic model of Reformed epistemology that is not discussed here, is the model proposed 
by Cardinal Henry Newman. According to Stephen Grimm, Newman believed that it was through our 
conscience that belief in God is produced in a basic way.19Grimm quotes Newman’s Grammar and Assent: 
As then we have our initial knowledge of the universe through sense, so do we in the first instance begin to 
learn about its Lord and God from conscience; and, as from particular acts of that instinct, which makes 
experiences, mere images (as they ultimately are) upon the retina, the means of our perceiving something 
real beyond them, we go on to draw the general conclusion that there is a vast external world, so from the 
recurring instances in which conscience acts, forcing upon us importunately the mandate of a Superior, we 
have fresh and fresh evidence of the existence of a Sovereign Ruler, from whom those particular dictates 
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Balthasar, like Plantinga, wasn’t optimistic about natural theology. He did however, 
think that through non-propositional evidence one could ‘see’ that Christianity is true. How 
would this happen? According to Balthasar, humans are designed to instantiate holiness. 
Because of this, unbelievers crave it. God has also setup our faculties in such a way that we 
will recognize the holiness displayed by a Christian as Christians share in what Balthasar 
calls the Christ form.20 Such recognition might come about from seeing the Christian 
regularly attend mass, feed the poor, share the Good News, protect the innocent, and 
catechize new converts. In the case of an unbeliever, the subject will see that the 
Christian’s holiness is ‘right’ and will be moved to participate in the Christ form as well.21 
Upon living a holy life in the Christ form, the subject will see that Christianity is 
valid/true.22  
 
It seems likely that Balthasar would endorse that a subject’s faculties need to be 
properly functioning when they enable the subject to recognize holiness and when they 
enable the subject to see the truth of Christianity from within the Christ form.  This being 
the case, for Balthasar’s religious epistemology, proper function would be a necessary 
condition for warranted religious belief. More importantly, however, notice that in line 
with Reformed epistemology’s main thesis, one could be justified or warranted in their 
belief that God exists apart from argumentation. Balthasar does not appeal to any argument 
in order to ground the positive epistemic status of Christian or Catholic belief. Thus, given 
that this epistemology is thoroughly Catholic in both its content and origins, Balthasar’s 
epistemology is an example of a Catholic epistemology that could be rightly construed as a 
version of Reformed epistemology. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
which we experience proceed; so that, with limitations which cannot here be made without digressing from 
my main subject, we may, by means of that induction from particular experiences of conscience, have as 
good a warrant for concluding the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have, from parallel 
experience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast world, material and mental. See 
Stephen Grimm, ‘Cardinal Newman, Reformed Epistemologist?,’ American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 75, no. 4 (2001): 497-522. 
 
20 Victoria Harrison, ‘Human Holiness As Religious Apologia,’ International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 46, no. 2 (1999): 63-82. 
 
21 Ibid., 70. 
 
22 Ibid., 64. 
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A2.5 Conclusion 
 
In summary, I first referenced the work of Stump, Allan, and Feser in discussing how 
Plantinga and Aquinas share the same epistemology. After discussing the great similarities 
that exist between them, I transitioned the discussion to arguing that like Plantinga, 
Aquinas also thinks belief that God exists could be warranted apart from argumentation. 
After this much, I argued that even if I am wrong in my interpretation of Aquinas, a 
thorough going Reformed epistemology can be clearly found in Balthasar. 
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1928. 
176 
 
Rea, Michael. World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002. 
Reid, Thomas. Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man. In Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays, edited 
by R. Beanblossom and K. Lehrer. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983. 
Reppert, Victor. ‘The Argument From Reason.’ In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 
edited by W.L. Craig and J.P. Moreland, 334-390. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.  
Rowe, William. ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.’ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-341. 
_______. ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.’ In The Evidential Argument from 
Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 1-11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1996. 
Ruse, Michael. ‘God is Dead. Long Live Morality.’ The Guardian. Last modified March 15, 2010. 
Accessed October 27, 2014. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/15/morality-evolution-philosophy. 
Saeed, Abdullah. Islamic Thought: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2006. 
Sahab. ‘Allah the Best Deceiver.’ Last modified September 18, 2014. Accessed October 27, 2014. 
http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Allah_the_Best_Deceiver. 
Searle, John R. Minds, Brains, and Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Samkara. ‘Brahmasutrabhasya.’ In The essential Vedanta: a new source book of Advaita Vedanta, 
edited by Eliot Deutschand and Rohit Dalvi, 196-256. Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 
2004. 
_______,Prabhavananda, and Christopher Isherwood. Shankara's Crest-Jewel of Discrimination. 
Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press, 1978. 
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Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
Wehr, Hans and J. Milton Cowan. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. Ithaca, NY: Spoken 
Language Services, 1976. 
Wielenberg, Erik. ‘Divine Deception’ in Skeptical Theism: New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty 
and Justin McBrayer, 236-249. Oxford: Oxford Press, 2014. 
178 
 
Williams, Paul. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. London: Routledge, 1989. 
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001.  
Yasien, Mohamed. Fitrah: The Islamic Conception of Human Nature. London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 
1996. 
Zagzebski, Linda. Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology. Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993. 
_______. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Zhang, Junmai. The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. 
Zimmer, Robert. Philosophies of India. New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
